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Abstract 
This thesis explores three topics in empirical corporate finance. The first chapter 
examines the cross-border private equity buyout performance. The second chapter investigates 
social ties and venture capital investment. The final chapter looks into the internal capital 
market of the conglomerate and examines the investment efficiency by taking the equity carve-
out as the restructuring event.  
The first chapter examines the question of a country’s institutional quality as a 
determinant of the cross-border buyout performance. Using a sample of 2,665 cross-border 
buyout investments from 1998 to 2007 in 40 countries and regions, I find that institution quality 
of the portfolio company nation, as measured by the ranking in the composite index of political, 
economic and financial risk, is important to cross-border buyout performance in terms of exit 
success. In a high institution quality country, the probability of a successful exit via Initial 
Public Offerings (IPO) or Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is higher. Institutional distance 
between portfolio company country and private equity (PE) firm country lowers the exit 
success. PE firms’ international experience, industrial experience, and reputation based on deal 
experience help to improve buyout exit success and their industrial experience could mitigate 
the adverse influence of institutional distance.  
The second chapter investigates how social ties between VC partners and start-up 
founders influence the venture capital investment. We find that if the VC partners have social 
ties, obtained from previous education, past employment or ethnic minority community, with 
the start-up founders, the collaboration between the VC firm and the start-up is more likely to 
happen. Also, this homophily improves the post-investment outcome and we observe higher 
probability of next round financing, higher hazard rate of next round financing and shorter 
expected duration, larger amounts of fund-raising in the next round, and higher probability of 
the VC firm taking the start-up to Initial Public Offerings (IPO) or Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A). Using the estimate of a two-stage Heckman selection model and addressing the 
selection effect, we find that post-investment monitoring effect still accounts for the 
performance patterns.  
In the third chapter, we examine whether equity carve-outs (ECOs) lead to 
improvements in the functioning of the internal capital markets (ICM) of diversified firms. 
Divestments, including spin-offs, sell-offs, and ECOs, can be employed by firms to improve 
allocative efficiency. Equity carve-outs, unlike spin-offs and sell-offs, leave the parent’s ICM 
intact but provide the opportunity to enhance internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms. Using a U.S. sample of 354 ECOs completed between 1980 and 2013, we find 
that the allocative efficiency of parents is augmented significantly following ECOs. This 
increase in investment efficiency is related to the improvements in the internal and external 
governance characteristics of parent companies. 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Cross-border Buyout 
Performance 
1.1 Introduction 
A leveraged buyout (LBO), an important part of private equity (PE) investments, is the 
acquisition of a company financed with a substantial portion of borrowed funds. During a 
typical buyout investment, PE firms (1) improve the portfolio company’s value by conducting 
financial, governance, and operational engineering (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008), (2) exit 
portfolio companies as PE funds have a limited contractual lifetime, and (3) return capital to 
their investors. Cross-border PE investments have become a phenomenon since the late 1990s 
(Cao, Cumming, Qian, and Wang, 2015). In the global PE report by Duff & Phelps (2014), 30% 
of PE executive respondents planned to make cross-border deals in the following year.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the country’s institutional quality as a 
determinant of cross-border buyout performance in terms of exit success and the role of PE’s 
experience in mitigating the effects of institutional barriers. The previous literature on cross-
border PE investment performance mainly either focuses on early-stage venture capital (VC)’s 
cross-border performance (Dai, Jo, and Kassicieh, 2012; Wang and Wang, 2012; Betroni and 
Groh, 2014; Li, Vertinsky, and Li, 2014; Nahata, Hazarika, and Tandon, 2014; Espenlaub, 
Khurshed, and Mohamed, 2015; Buchner, Espenlaub, Khurshed, and Mohamed, 2017) or 
compares buyout performance in domestic markets within different countries (Strömberg, 2008; 
Jenkinson and Sousa, 2015; Hammer, Knauer, Pflücke, and Schwetzler, 2017). To my 
knowledge, no study has focused on the factors predicting a PE cross-border buyout’s eventual 
successful exit. In this study, I attempt to fill this gap in the PE literature by examining the 
determinants of cross-border buyout performance.  
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Uncertainty and information asymmetry could create transaction obstacle for PE 
investments. Formal institutions are a set of political, economics and contract rules which guide 
the human behaviour and human interaction (North, 1990). When making their investment in 
countries of higher institution quality, which offers stronger investor protection and contract 
enforcement and has less political, economic and financial uncertainty and lower transaction 
cost, PE firms could facilitate the divestment process and are more likely to exit the portfolio 
company successfully. Further, when PE firms invest abroad, such transaction problems could 
be more severe because of the significant intrinsic risks arising from the institutional, cultural 
and geographic distance of a foreign country which could jeopardise the exit success (Li et al., 
2014; Buchner et al., 2017). However, PE firms could accumulate local business, institutional 
and cultural knowledge and increase international practice in their ongoing activities. Also, PE 
firms tend to circumscribe investment activities by focusing on specific industries and develop 
their industry expertise, thereby reducing information asymmetry and uncertainty (Cressy, 
Munari, and Mallipiero, 2007; Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein, 2008) and helping 
them to overcome the institutional barriers. I thus hypothesise that PE firms’ deal experience 
will have a positive impact on cross-border buyout performance and mitigate the negative 
impact of institutional barriers. 
I adopt a sample of 2,665 cross-border buyout investments in 40 countries between 
1998 and 2007. To proxy for the country’s institution quality, I use the country risk index from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. ICRG has recorded this country 
composite risk index for more than 140 countries and regions since 1984 by taking the political, 
economic, and financial risks into account. A country is a low risk country and of high 
institution quality if the country risk index is higher than 80 points. I measure the institutional 
distance between two countries based on the absolute country risk index differences between 
the portfolio company country and PE firm country. To proxy for cultural distance, I adopt the 
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Hofstede’s cultural dimensions which include power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
individualism vs. collectivism and masculinity vs. femininity. I create four deal experience 
variables: country-specific, multinational and industry experience, and reputation based on deal 
experience.  
Following Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Nahata (2008), and Nahata et al. 
(2014), I measure performance in terms of exit success. I define the PE’s portfolio company 
exit to be successful if it is later brought to the market through an initial public offering (IPO) 
or acquired by another company. I first examine the relationship between exit success and 
institutional and cultural factors at the portfolio company’s country level and the portfolio 
company-PE firm country-pair level. I then examine the probability of a successful exit in a 
Cox Hazard model. In additional analyses, I study the impact of the above factors on the choice 
between initial public offerings (IPO) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as exit routes. I 
further relate the PE firms’ IRR and exit multiple with these factors.   
This paper demonstrates that the exit success increases when the quality of the portfolio 
company country’s institutional environment is higher. The institutional differences between 
PE firm and portfolio company countries raise an obstacle to cross-border investment and are 
detrimental to the exit success. However, the cultural distance between PE firms and their 
portfolio companies has no significant impact on cross-border buyout performance. Further, 
PE firm’s deal experience is positively related to the likelihood of the exit success. My findings 
on PE’s performance are consistent with those in Li et al. (2014) who report insignificant and 
marginally significant mitigating effects of country-specific and multinational experience on 
institutional distance for VC’s cross-border performance. However, I find that PE firms’ 
industrial experience helps them to reduce the institutional barriers. PE firms with more 
industrial experience learn more and gain deeper knowledge of companies in that industry. 
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Cressey et al. (2007) and Gompers et al. (2008) show that VC firms with the most industrial 
experience are most responsive to public signals of investment opportunities. Consequently, 
being an industry expert could also alleviate the burden of being a foreigner for PE firms. 
In terms of exit strategies, compared with choosing M&A as the exit route, PE firms 
are more likely to exit via IPO when PE firms are in an investment club and when initial buyout 
value is larger. In contrast to unsuccessful exits, the probability of going IPO increases when 
PE firms are more experienced, form an investment club and when deal size is larger; similarly 
the probability of choosing M&A increases when the quality of the institutional environment 
is higher and when PE firms are more experienced. In addition, I find that IRR of the PE firm’s 
investment in the portfolio company is larger if institution quality of the portfolio company 
country is higher.   
The results are robust as regards the self-selection issue in which the performance of 
PE firms may be attributable to the quality of their portfolio companies rather than PE firms’ 
experience (Nahata, 2008). I follow Nahata (2008) and adopt a variation of Heckman’s (1979) 
correction procedure. In the first stage, I estimate the experienced PE firms’ likelihood of 
investing in a portfolio company. In the second stage, I include the inverse Mills ratio received 
from the first-step probit model as an additional control variable to estimate the buyout 
performance. The results are also robust when I adopt the multiple imputation method to 
compensate for the missing records of deal value.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Previous PE literature either 
focuses on the investments of cross-border VC firms or compares buyout performance in 
domestic markets with different countries. Nahata et al. (2014) examine the influence of 
institutional differences on global VC success. Both VC and buyout investments are alternative 
investments and illiquid. However, buyouts, as a new form of company structure (Jensen, 1989) 
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and important part of M&A activities (financial bidders), acquire mature companies and are 
different from VC investments which enter into start-ups and adopt stage-financing. How 
institutional differences affect cross-border buyout investments is not well answered yet. Cao 
et al. (2015) and Holloway, Lee, and Shen (2016) shed lights on cross-border LBO activities 
by examining issues at the stage of entry. My paper investigates the buyout performance at the 
stage of exit which completes the investment process. Consequently, it helps us to deepen the 
understanding and expands the literature of internationalization of PE.  
Also, this paper complements a number of studies examining the role of intuitions in 
cross-border M&A (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Ferreira, Massa, and 
Matos, 2010). They do not incorporate LBO in the sample and examine M&A performance 
with premium or acquisition announcement cumulative abnormal return. The acquirer’s 
performance in LBO could not be easily examined because PE firms usually are in limited 
partnership and not listed in stock exchange. My findings offer direct evidence of the influence 
of institutional differences across countries and between portfolio company country and PE 
firm country on buyout performance.  
Moreover, this paper is related to the literature on PE experience and reputation (Cressy 
et al., 2007; Gompers et al., 2008; Nahata, 2008; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Ivashina and 
Kovner; 2011) and investigates the importance of experience in the cross-border setting. Lastly, 
to alleviate common data limitations in previous deal-level studies, I construct a dataset by 
extracting portfolio companies’ details of 1,008 PE firms around the world and shed light on 
the determinants of buyout success in both developed and developing markets.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides a review of the 
literature, the institutional framework and the hypotheses. Section 1.3 presents the data 
collection procedure and the variables construction. Section 1.4 discusses the empirical 
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analyses. Section 1.5 concludes.  
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
1.2.1 Literature Review 
The literature on PE performance can be categorised into two groups: fund-level studies 
and deal-level studies. Metrick and Yasuda (2011) outline both advantages and limitations of 
these studies. The net of fund fees and carry could be calculated at the fund level, however, 
there is missing information about timing and exits of individual projects. Also, investment 
write-offs which incur losses are not observed at the fund level. In contrast, deal-level data 
could alleviate the selection bias problem as the outcome of unsuccessful investments could be 
tracked. Nevertheless, deal-level studies suffer from data incompleteness (Kaplan, Sensoy, and 
Strömberg, 2002) and a novel data set or a model which could overcome the data problem is 
thus required.  
Fund-level studies track the stream of cash flow and can shed light on the risk and return 
of PE investment (Kaplan and Scholar, 2005; Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009; Driessen, Lin, 
and Phalippou, 2012). Several deal-level studies also consider the risk and returns (Groh and 
Gottschalg, 2008; Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou, and Gottschalg, 2015). Other deal level studies 
examine the real effects such as post-buyout production efficiency (Alperovych, Amess, and 
Wright, 2013). Deal-level studies also consider the determinants of buyout exit, including 
market condition (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2015), PE firm characteristics and strategies (Arcot, 
Fluck, Gaspar, and Hege, 2015; Hammer et al., 2017) and portfolio company characteristics 
(Jenkinson and Sousa, 2015).  
There is emerging literature focusing on the cross-border PE investment performance. 
Papers in the international VC field have analysed determinants of VC exit performance:  legal 
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system and economic/market activities across countries (Wang and Wang, 2012; Nahata et al., 
2014; Espenluab et al., 2015), legal, institutional, and cultural distance between the country of 
VC firm and that of entrepreneurial firm (Li et al., 2014; Nahata et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 
2017), syndication with local VC and joint venture (Dai et al., 2012), and additional exit 
opportunities brought by foreign VC firms (Betroni and Groh, 2014). Few papers study cross-
border buyout investment performance. The contemporaneous study Chemmanur, Hull, and 
Krishnan (2014) examines the exit performance of U.S. buyout specialists and exploits the 
exogenous shock to the effective proximity of U.S. PE investors to other countries.     
This paper studies cross-border buyouts and differs from previous literature in several 
perspectives. Firstly, previous cross-border studies use the sample either in the U.S., the 
European, or the Asian market or observe the cross-border investments from either U.S. 
investors or U.K investors. This paper includes investments in both developed and developing 
countries, and considers non-U.S. and non-U.K. investors. Further, under the framework of 
institution, this paper not only considers institutional/legal/economic difference across 
countries but also takes the difference between the country of portfolio company and that of 
the PE firm into account.   
1.2.2 Hypothesis Development  
Gompers and Lerner (2004) state that there is little theoretical attention being paid to 
the divestment aspect of PE and therefore established theories are limited in their ability to 
explain the sale of portfolio companies. In previous cross-border investment studies, the 
influence of law and institution (see e.g. Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and national distance (see e.g. 
Nahata et al., 2014) on investments are well documented. The framework of institution could 
also be adopted to develop the hypotheses in the cross-border buyout setting. North (1990) 
defines the institution as the “rule of the game in a society” and “humanly devised constraints 
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that shape human interaction”. The institution emphasizes the role of information asymmetry 
and transaction cost in economic activities and the key function of the institution is to reduce 
the uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to facilitate interaction among people. 
Williamsons (2000) establishes four hierarchies of the institution and the first two levels are 
country-specific and vary across different countries. The first level is the informal institution 
which comes from socially transmitted information and is part of the culture (North, 1990). 
The second level is the formal constraints, including constitutions, contract laws and 
enforcement of property rights. Differences in formal and informal rules result in different 
levels of information asymmetry and transaction cost.  
1.2.2.1 Formal Institutions 
Formal rules contain political and legal rules, economics rules, and contracts. The 
purpose of these rules is to facilitate political or economic exchange (North, 1990). There are 
two contrasting views on effects of law and institution on financial transactions. Under the 
“Coasian” view, institutional differences do not matter as sophisticated investors could 
privately negotiate and optimize the contract to mitigate the impediments (Bergman and 
Nicolaievsky, 2007). For instance, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) state that, in the emerging 
economy China, neither its legal or financial system is well developed. However, the 
institutional impediments do not prohibit China’s fast growth. Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg 
(2007) show that legal regime does not matter, and more experienced VC investors adopt U.S. 
style sophisticated contracts. 
Under the “law matters” view, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 
1998) show that the legal system exerts a positive influence on investor protection and capital 
market development. Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) state that appropriate laws and 
regulations and high enforcement of shareholder and creditor rights are instrumental in building 
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up the market confidence and attracting investments. Cao et al. (2015) report that the level of 
creditor rights in a certain country is positively related to the prosperity of LBO activities. The 
law and institution could affect the PE exit in two ways: institutional differences across 
countries and between the PE firm country and portfolio company country.  
Firstly, all else being equal, in a country with a better-developed institutional system, 
the capital market will be more active and cross-border PE firms have more opportunities to 
divest their portfolios. Further, the exit decision will be influenced by the information 
asymmetry between the foreign PE investors and local markets and the transaction cost. In a 
country with high institution quality, information asymmetry and transaction cost could be 
reduced as there are stronger investor protection and contract enforcement, and less political, 
economic and financial uncertainty, facilitating the exit process. Secondly, when PE firms 
invest abroad, and the local formal rules are significantly different from their home countries, 
there will be limitations on the effective transfer and enforcement of the governance structure 
and contract design they adopt in their home countries (Tykvová and Scherlter, 2014). 
Consequently, institutional differences between two countries could be the obstacle to cross-
border investments.   
Hypothesis 1a null: In line with the “Coasian” view, institutional quality of the portfolio 
company country is not associated with the likelihood of a successful exit.  
Hypothesis 1a alternative: In line with the “law matters” view, higher institutional quality 
of the portfolio company country is associated with a higher likelihood of a successful exit.  
Hypothesis 1b: Larger institutional differences are associated with a lower likelihood of a 
successful exit.  
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1.2.2.2 Informal Institutions 
The informal institution is referred to the culture. Culture could exert influences on 
economic activities as it shapes economic individuals’ choices and perceptions (Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988). The influence of cultural differences on cross-border investments has been 
examined in recent studies but the results are mixed. Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) 
report that the cultural distance adversely affects the cross-border mergers volume and 
combined announced returns. They argue that different cultural values could lead to 
impediments such as mistrust, misunderstanding or mismatched goals in cooperation. Li et al. 
(2014) and Buchner et al. (2017) find similar results in studying cross-border VC performance. 
However, Nahata et al. (2014) find that cultural distance increases the VC success. They argue 
the cultural disparity between VC firms and their portfolio companies leads to more rigorous 
due diligence and deal selection, and hence improves the performance.  
The influence of cultural distance on the outcome of buyout investments has not been 
seriously examined. Li et al. (2014) state that cultural distance between VC firms and their 
portfolio companies could adversely affect the VC performance in three ways: communication 
problems, value and beliefs conflicts, and liability of outsidership. In the buyout context, 
similarly, cultural diversity can lead to different approaches to deal negotiation, contract 
negotiation, corporate policy design, and working relationship development and thus increase 
information and transaction costs, leading to conflicts and investment failures.  
On the other hand, in an LBO, PE firms usually fully acquire the portfolio company 
and PE firms’ targets are mature companies in the late development stage which could generate 
a stable cash flow to meet the debt repayment requirement (Jensen, 1989). Also, buyout 
investors are sophisticated. To add firm value, they restructure the portfolio company’s capital 
structure, replace the management team with industrial experts, and guide the operational 
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change. In comparison, VC firms invest in early-stage and start-up companies. Understanding 
of business ideas and entrepreneurs is essential to VC investments (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2004). Consequently, buyout investors might not suffer from the adverse influence of cultural 
differences because they rely more on the hard information while VC investors could be subject 
to cultural differences as they rely more on the soft information.  
Hypothesis 2 null: Cultural differences will not influence the cross-border buyout 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2 alternative: Cultural differences adversely influence the cross-border buyout 
performance. 
1.2.2.3 Learning  
North (1990) claims that games are shaped by formal and informal constraints but the 
contrast comes from organisational learning in the repeated game. Under the “experience 
matters view”, Meuleman and Wright (2011) claim that PE firms can reduce institutional 
barriers through learning. Learning is the process in which firms accumulate local institutional 
and cultural knowledge about a certain market or develop insights into a certain industry 
through their ongoing activities. De Clercq and Dimov (2007) argue that PE firms obtain 
knowledge about local businesses and institutions through prior investments and acquire skill 
sets in the process of evaluation, selection, and management. Also, PE firms could establish 
their local networks through prior investments in the target country (Humphery-Jenner, Sautner, 
and Suchard, 2016). As cross-border investments can be considered as part of the 
internationalization process, multinational experience of a rich array of environments with a 
broad range of institutional and cultural characteristics also plays a vital role in the cross-border 
investment process (Li et al., 2014). In addition, PE firms with substantial industrial experience 
could identify better investment opportunities in a certain industry and obtain the know-how to 
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manage and add value to these investments (Gompers et al., 2008). PE firms’ learning could 
mitigate the information asymmetry created by intuitional barriers, lower the transaction cost, 
and hence facilitate the exit process. Further, as PE firms approach the buyout market 
repeatedly, building reputation is necessary because such a reputation can serve as certification 
and help to mitigate the information asymmetry between PE firms and potential buyers 
(Gompers, 1996).  
Various empirical studies provide insights into PE learning and experience and confirm 
the positive role of experience in investment activities. Cressy et al. (2007) find that industrial 
specialised PE firms are more likely to have higher post-buyout profitability. Demiroglu and 
James (2010) argue that reputable PE firms have persistent performance, and this confirms PE 
firms’ skills in selecting, monitoring, and restructuring. Reputation based on deal experience 
will help PE firms to deliver the impression of being less risky to investors and banks, resulting 
in better lending terms.    
Hypothesis 3a: More experienced PE firms are more likely to perform better in the cross-
border buyout.  
Hypothesis 3b: PE firms’ deal experience helps to mitigate the adverse influence of distance.  
1.3. Data and Variables Construction 
1.3.1 Data and Sample  
My sample of global LBOs comes from Mergermarket, a data provider for M&A 
transactions. Mergermarket tracks investment records for 1,008 worldwide PE firms (as of 31st 
December 2015). Unlike other databases such as Capital IQ M&A and SDC Platinum M&A, 
which track investments at the transaction level, Mergermarket categorises investments into 
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exit portfolios and holding portfolios at the PE firm level. It provides information on holding 
periods, buyout/exit types, transaction value, deal description, and financial characteristics.  
I obtain the sample as follows. Firstly, I select the investment of which the deal type 
“buyout” is specified. I only keep the investment with the leading PE1 in club deals where more 
than one PE firm participates in the transaction. Since my aim is to study cross-border buyout 
performance, I select deals if the dominant country of the portfolio company is different from 
the country in which the PE firm is headquartered. In addition, I keep deals for which 
transaction dates and holding periods are non-missing. Although Mergermarket tracks the deal 
history back to 1997, it has provided more reliable information since 1998. Consequently, 
following Nahata et al. (2014), I include buyout transactions from 1st January 1998 and exclude 
all countries with less than ten observations to avoid the adverse effects of outliers. I stop the 
sample at the end of 2007 to be able to track the outcome of all buyout transactions during an 
eight-year window until the end of 20152. The final sample has 2,665 deals from 40 countries 
from 1998 to 2007.  
To supplement other deal characteristics such as deal value and management 
participation, I match the sample with two other buyout databases: SDC Platinum M&A and 
Zephyr. Zephyr has better coverage for European deals and smaller deals. I match these 
databases using the PE name, the portfolio company’s name, and the transaction date3. Since 
some PE firms have changed their name (for example, HSBC PE is renamed as Montagu PE), 
                                                          
1 The leading PE is defined as the one which invests the largest stake or the oldest firm in the club deals if stake information 
is missing (Nahata et al. 2014). To confirm the correctness of leading PE firms, I also go through the deal description and 
check if the PE firm is leading the consortium/group. As Mergermarket keeps records at the PE firm level, same transaction 
will be recorded several times for club deals. I check the deal ID and target name and delete duplicates. Only transactions with 
leading PE firms are kept. 
2 Strömberg (2008) investigates a sample of 21,000 LBO transactions 1970-2007 and documents that the median duration is 
9 years. In line with his findings, this paper leaves a window which is at least 8 years for PE firms to exit their portfolios.  
3 Deal is labelled as “Leveraged Buyout” in SDC and “Institutional Buyout” in Zephyr; deal status is “completed deals”; the 
time span is from 1st January 1998 to 31st December 2007. The geographical area is worldwide, and the dominant country is 
defined as the place where the portfolio company is located in. In Zephyr, the PE name is not always specified so that I go 
through each deal description to figure out the PE firms behind each deal. 
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I therefore extensively check the company website, confirm the change, and carefully match 
different databases. In addition, following Cao et al. (2015), I carefully check the industry 
based on the sub-industry description in Mergermarket and reclassify it into one of the 11 SIC 
industries, as defined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) SIC Code List.  
Finally, I obtain institutional data from the ICRG database and cultural distance data 
from Taras, Steel, and Kirkman (2011). The market development data come from SDC 
Platinum M&A database. Other country-pair controls are from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook, the Foreign Law Guide database, and CEPII website. 
1.3.2 Variable Construction  
1.3.2.1 Dependent Variables  
Mergermarket identifies the following four exit types: IPO, secondary buyout, trade 
sale, and other exits. Other exits are exit routes excluding IPO, secondary buyout and trade sale 
as well as routes for which Mergermarket could not track details. I follow the previous PE 
literature (Hochberg et al., 2007; Nahata, 2008; Nahata et al., 2014) and code exits as being 
successful if PE firms were able to exit portfolio companies either via IPO or M&A (trade sales 
and secondary buyout).  
In the aggregate country-level analysis, I calculate the successful exit ratio as the 
number of successful exits to the number of investment for each portfolio company country in 
each investment year and for each portfolio company-PE firm country pair in each investment 
year. For the deal-level analysis, to take the time-to-successful exit and right-censored data 
characteristic into account, I adopt the survival analysis. The hazard rate is the conditional 
probability that the PE firm divests the portfolio company successfully. The time-to-successful 
exit is the number of months between the buyout date and the successful exit date. For portfolio 
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companies with unsuccessful exits, the holding time is the number of months between the 
buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date.  
1.3.2.2 Explanatory Variables  
The explanatory variables can be categorized into four sets of variables. The first set 
pertains to the institution. The second set consists of learning factors from different 
perspectives. I also control for deal characteristics including management participation, club 
size (the number of PE firms) and deal value and country-pair variables including common 
religion, common language, common law origin, and geographic distance. The Appendix 1.2 
provides detailed description of all deal characteristics and country-pair control variables.   
1.3.2.2.1 Factors Related to Institutions 
Firstly, I obtain the country risk index from International Country Risk Guide database. 
This database has been intensively used in the law and intuition studies (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bekaert et al., 2005; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming, Fleming, 
and Schwienbacher, 2006; Cumming, 2008; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; 
Nahata et al., 2014). The country risk index is a composite index: political risk components 
account for 50% and the rest consists of economic and financial risk components. Political risk 
components include: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, 
internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and 
order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. Economic risk 
rating aims to provide a measure of a country’s current economic strengths and weakness. It 
includes following components: GDP per head, real GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP, and current account as a percentage of GDP. Financial risk 
rating measures a country’s ability to finance its official, commercial, and trade debt 
obligations. It includes following components: foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign 
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debt services as a percentage of exports of goods and services, current age account as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services, net international liquidity as months of import 
cover, and exchange rate stability. The composite index calculation method is developed and 
used in several law and institution studies such as Cumming et al. (2006) and Nahata et al. 
(2014). As argued by Nahata et al. (2014), the positive aspect of using a single composite index 
is to alleviate the influence of multicollinearity when all individual variables are included.   
Bhagwat, Brogaard, and Julio (2017) classify countries into three groups based the 
political risk components: medium risk country (political risk score is between 60 and 80), high 
risk country (political risk score is below 60), and the rest group (political risk score is higher 
than 80). In line with their measurement, to proxy institution quality of the portfolio company 
country, I create a dummy variable Low_Risk_Country which is defined as the one with 
composite rating score higher than 80 points in the ICRG database. Low risk countries have 
lower political, economic and financial risk and thus have higher institution quality. The 
variable Institutional_Distance is defined as the logarithm of the absolute difference between 
the country risk indices of PE firm country and portfolio company country. As a further test, I 
follow Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) and Cumming et al. (2006) and construct a 
legality index. The legality index captures the impact of the quality of legal system on the 
buyout performance. Additionally, Meuleman and Wright (2011) state that the development of 
local LBO market is one of the key factors in the institutional context. A mature LBO market 
could facilitate the exit process because there are more buyout-related investment banks, law 
firms, and financial advisors and the transaction complexity could, therefore, be reduced. Also, 
PE firms could find more financial buyers and sell their portfolios via a secondary buyout. In 
line with Nahata et al. (2014), I construct the LBO_Market_Development variable as the 
aggregate number of LBOs in the country of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior 
to the initial buyout and normalize it by the world total number of LBOs in the same period.  
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To proxy for the cultural distance, I adopt the Hofstede’s cultural distance. There are 
four dimensions in his cultural evaluation: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance. I compute the multidimensional cultural distance between the country 
of the PE firms and the country of the portfolio company as follows:  
Cultural Distance =  
(∑ (CTC,i − CPE,i)
24
i=1 )
1/2
4
 
where CTC,i is the portfolio company’s national culture measured on element 𝑖 and CPE,i is the 
leading PE firm’s national culture measured on element 𝑖. To capture changes in the cultural 
distance, I use culture scores from Teras et al. (2011). These data are country-specific and time-
varying over three periods: 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. If the buyout year is between 1998 and 
1999, the 1990s data will be used; if the buyout year is between 2000 and 2007, the 2000s data 
will be used. Following Nahata et al. (2014), if the data are missing for the 1990s, I will use 
2000s score as the proxy. If the data are missing for both 1990s and 2000s, the 1980s score will 
be used as the proxy4.    
1.3.2.2.2 Factors Related to Learning  
I construct four variables to measure different aspects of experience. Strömberg (2008) 
shows that the experience of PE firms consistently explains the global exit behaviour and the 
variation in holding periods. The first learning variable is the Country_Experience. Following 
Kogut and Singh (1998) and Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016), I construct this variable as the 
number of buyouts which the PE firm completed in the country of the portfolio company from 
1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. The second variable Multinational_Experience is 
                                                          
4 There are three countries and regions where I could not obtain available culture information from Teras et al. (2011): the 
Channel Island, Iceland, and Luxemburg. Luxemburg is the portfolio company country or PE firm country in 29 investments, 
the Channel Island is the PE firm country in 6 investments, and Iceland is PE firm country in 1 investment, amounting to a 
total of 35 investments. I adopt the average of culture score in the group with a legal system of the same origin as the proxy, 
namely, the average of the French civil law group for Luxemburg, the average of English common law origin group for the 
Channel Island, and the average of Scandinavian civil law origin group for Iceland. In addition, I remove these 35 investments 
and re-run main regressions and find statistically and qualitatively similar results.  
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constructed as the number of foreign countries in which the PE firm invested from1990 to the 
year prior to the initial buyout (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). The next variable 
Industrial_Experience aims to capture the industrial specialization as each PE firm has its own 
industrial focus. For example, in Mergermarket records, the U.K. PE group 3i focuses more on 
Service industries. Industry experience is calculated as the number of buyouts which the PE 
firm completed in the industry of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to the 
initial buyout. Further, as argued by Demiroglu and James (2010), experience will accumulate 
over time but this will not be able to distinguish between funds. Following Demiroglu and 
James (2010), I construct another variable Reputation based on recent experience, i.e. the total 
number of buyout transactions completed by the PE firm in the three years prior to the initial 
buyout. As there is a time gap between the initial buyout date and the final exit date, all 
measures link PE firms’ experience to their future performance and thus avoid the reverse 
causality.   
1.3.3 Summary Statistics  
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of cross-border buyouts. Panel 
A reports the incidence of buyout based on the buyout year. I classify the exit outcome types 
based on the Mergermarket records as of 31st December 2015: successful exits and 
unsuccessful exits. Successful exits represent 64% of the sample and portfolio companies are 
divested via IPO (4%) or M&A (60%)5. The sample suggests that PE firms prefer M&A as the 
way to divest their portfolios. Unsuccessful exits include other exits (7%) and non-exit ones 
(30%). Other exits are portfolio companies for which Mergermarket loses tracking information 
and non-exit portfolios are still privately held by PE firms. The sample is comparable to that 
used by Strömberg (2008) who reports one-third of portfolio companies are still private until 
                                                          
5 For IPO: 110/2,665 = 4%; for M&A: 1,603/2,665 = 60%; for other exits: 180/2,665 = 7%; for non-exit ones: 772/2,665 = 
30%.  
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2008 and M&A earns its popularity as the divestment alternative to IPO. In terms of the 
distribution of the sample, most buyout portfolios taking place in early years are exited 
successfully. For the buyout portfolios that took place in 2007, 47% of them are still private 
until 2015. The holding time is thus right censored. 
 [Insert Table 1.1 about here] 
In panel B of Table 1.1, I show the incidence of buyout portfolios based on industry. 
Most portfolio companies operate in the Manufacturing industry, amounting to 45% of the 
deals. Service industry and Retail industry account for 24% and 7% of the buyouts, respectively. 
The distribution in terms of industry is comparable to that in Cao et al. (2015). The successful 
exit ratios within each industry are highest in Manufacturing (69%) and Service (66%) 
industries. I also find that in the Finance industry, the successful exit ratio (45%) is lower than 
other groups. To control the industry heterogeneity, I include the industry fixed effects in the 
empirical tests.  
Panel C of Table 1.1 shows the clustering of buyouts across countries of portfolio 
companies. Cross-border buyouts in Germany constitute 12% of the deals and U.K. accounts 
for 10%. Cao et al. (2015) use a sample in which 60% of buyout transactions are in the U.S. 
and U.K. markets. My sample is more comprehensive as I include deals in both developed and 
developing markets. Further, emerging Asian countries have attracted foreign investors’ 
attention in recent years, especially China and India, as there are rapid macroeconomic growth, 
demographic change, and legal and financial reforms (Dai et al., 2012). India and China 
account for 5% and 4% of the deals, respectively. I find that in these countries, the successful 
exit ratio is lower and less than 50%. This result is consistent with Lerner, Sørensen, and 
Strömberg (2009) who find a low exit ratio in emerging Asian countries. I list the countries of 
PE firms in panel D of Table 1.1 U.S. and U.K. markets are generally believed to be the most 
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developed LBO markets, and PE specialists from these two countries contribute to 67% of the 
buyouts.  
Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics for main explanatory variables. The average 
deal value is around 523 million USD (logarithm value of 4.901) which is close to 526 million 
USD reported in Cao et al. (2015).  
[Insert Table 1.2 about here] 
1.4 Empirical Results and Discussions 
1.4.1 Aggregate Cross-border Buyout Successful Exit Ratio   
In this section, I test the relationship between cross-border buyout exit success and 
institutional and cultural factors at the country level as well as country-pair level. For the 
country-level test, I follow Ferreira et al. (2010) and adopt a specification that allows for 
heteroscedaisticity, cross-correlation, and autocorrelation in the error term, cluster the standard 
errors at portfolio company country level, and include year fixed effects. Alternatively, I follow 
Bekaert et al. (2005) and Ferreira et al. (2010) and use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
standard errors to adjust for heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and autocorrelation. 
Because of the heteroscedasticity adjustment, generally, the SUR standard errors are smaller 
than the OLS standard errors. For the country-pair-level test, I cluster the standard errors in the 
country-pair level.  
[Insert Table 1.3 about here] 
As can be seen in Table 1.3, the successful exit ratio is positively related to the 
institution quality of the portfolio company country across all specifications. In columns 4 and 
5, the ratio is negatively related to the institutional distance between portfolio company country 
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and PE firm country. However, cultural distance has no significant influence on the exit success. 
Overall, the results in Table 1.3 support hypotheses 1a the “law matters” view and 1b (La Porta 
et al., 1998; Nahata et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2015). I could not reject the null hypothesis 
regarding the cultural distance. In the country of well-developed institution system, information 
asymmetry and transaction cost could be lower and PE firms are more likely to bring their 
portfolio company to IPO or M&A. However, if PE firms are unfamiliar with the local 
institutional rules, information asymmetry and transaction cost are higher, and it is more 
difficult for them to successfully exit the portfolio companies.   
 
1.4.2 Likelihood of a Successful Exit – Hazard Rate of a Successful Exit 
I apply the survival analysis to analyse the impact of the chosen explanatory variables 
on the time-to-successful exit. After the initial buyout, a portfolio company can be privately 
held, unidentified as tracking details are missing, or divested via IPO or M&A. The right-
censored observations in the dataset are those portfolio companies that are either privately held 
as of the cut-off date 31st December 2015 or lost. I follow Nahata (2008) and Nahata et al. 
(2014) and use a dichotomous variable describing the status of a portfolio company as either 
successful exits (IPO and M&A) or unsuccessful exits (other exits and non-exit ones). In 
survival models, I interpret the probability of a failure event for a buyout portfolio as the 
probability of its exit success. I adopt both non-parametric and semi-parametric approaches of 
survival analysis to assess the influence of chosen explanatory variables on the failure and 
hazard functions. The non-parametric analysis provides insights into the difference between 
groups. The semi-parametric approach could be used for the multivariate analysis.  
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1.4.2.1 Non-parametric Analysis  
In the non-parametric analysis, I categorise the sample based on institution quality, 
institutional distance, cultural distance, and reputation. I create three new dummy variables. 
The first one is Familiar_Institution which equals one, if the institutional distance belongs to 
the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is Familiar_Culture which 
equals one if the cultural distance belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise. Further, 
the variable Reputable_PE is an indicator variable denoting whether the PE firm belongs to the 
top quartile of reputable PE firm groups based on the reputation measurement in the year prior 
to the initial buyout. In Kaplan-Meier estimations, the failure function is the cumulative 
probability of a successful exit at any given time t.  
[Insert Figure 1-4 about here] 
In Figures 1-4, I plot the Kaplan-Meier failure functions based on the institutional 
quality, institutional distance, cultural distance, and reputation, respectively. As plotted in 
Figure 1, the probability of a successful exit at any given time is always higher for the low risk 
country group. In the unreported log-rank test, the difference between these two failure 
functions is significant at 1% level (χ2 = 77.94). The result suggests that in the low risk 
country (i.e. higher institutional environment quality), PE firms have higher likelihoods of 
bringing portfolio companies to successful exits. Figure 2 shows the plot of Kaplan-Meier 
functions based on institutional difference. The failure function of Familiar Institutions group 
is always higher than the rest of the sample, suggesting a negative relationship between 
institutional distance and probability of a successful exit. The difference is significant at 1% 
level (χ2 = 9.99). In Figure 3, the curves of failure functions are parallel to each other to a 
large degree, and one could therefore expect that there is no significant difference between 
familiar culture group and the rest. The difference in their failure functions is not statistically 
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significant (χ2 = 1.45). The PE firms are not influenced by cultural distance. Finally, as shown 
in Figure 4, the Kaplan-Meier failure function plot of the reputable PE firm is consistently 
above that of the non-reputable PE firm. The difference of these failure functions is significant 
at the 1% level ( χ2 = 27.90) . This result suggests that reputable PE firms have better 
performance in cross-border buyout investments.  
Overall, the results of the non-parametric analyses suggest the institutional environment 
quality and reputation are positively associated with the buyout performance and institutional 
distance is negatively related to the buyout performance, supporting hypotheses 1a the “law 
matters” view, 1b and 3a. In addition, I find insignificant influences of cultural differences on 
the buyout performance.  
1.4.2.2 Semi-parametric Analysis  
In this section, I perform the Cox Proportional Hazard estimation. In the survival model, 
the hazard rate can be referred to as the probability of a successful exit during one unit of time, 
conditional on unsuccessful exit up to time t (Axelson and Martinovic, 2013). The Cox Hazard 
model regresses the logarithm of the hazard function on the explanatory variables. A positive 
and significant coefficient would imply a higher hazard rate and a shorter expected holding 
duration. A negative and significant coefficient would imply a lower hazard rate and a longer 
expected holding duration.  
[Insert Table 1.4 about here] 
Across models 1-4 in Table 1.4, I relate the all institutional and cultural factors, deal 
characteristics and country-pair control variables to the likelihood of a successful exit. To avoid 
multicollinearity, I include measurements of experience variables separately. As reported in 
models 1-4 of Table 1.4, the hazard rate of a successful exit increases when (1) PE firms invest 
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in low risk countries, (2) PE firms are more experienced, (3) management participates in the 
deal and (4) deal value is larger. The hazard rate of a successful exit decreases when the 
institutional distance is larger, when the club size is larger, and when the PE firm is 
geographically far away from the portfolio company.  
Firstly, coefficients of the variable Low_Risk_Country are positive and statistically 
significant. In low risk countries, the likelihood of a successful exit is higher, and the expected 
holding time is shorter. In model 1, the coefficient of 0.275 on Low_Risk_Country indicates 
that the estimated hazard ratio of the group based on the dummy Low_Risk_Country is 1.3176. 
Therefore, the hazard of successful exit when PE firms invest in low risk countries is 1.317 
times higher than that when PE firms invest in other countries. This evidence is consistent with 
survival studies on PE performance (Cumming et al., 2006; Nahata et al., 2014) and provides 
support to the “law matters” view.  
Secondly, the coefficients on Institutional_Distance is negative and statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level. If PE firms are unfamiliar with the institutional environment 
and institutional distance is larger, the probability of successful exit is lower, and it takes longer 
time for them to exit. The results suggest that institutional barriers are the investment obstacles 
which is consistent with the previous cross-border PE studies (Li et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 
2017). This finding supports the hypothesis 1b.  
Coefficients of the variable Culture_Distance are insignificant across all models and 
this paper fail to reject the null hypothesis that cultural differences will not influence the 
performance. This result implies that PE firms which are sophisticated investors (Cao et al., 
2015) suffer from minimal adverse influences of cultural differences. This is different from the 
findings on VC by Nahata et al. (2014) who show a positive influence of cultural differences 
                                                          
6 The hazard ratio = 𝑒0.275 = 1.317 
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on VC exit performance and Li et al. (2014) and Buchner et al., (2017) who document a 
negative relationship. Compared to VC firms, buyout firms conduct the LBO to acquire the 
late-stage and mature firms which could generate enough operating cash flow to repay the debt 
(Jensen, 1989). Consequently, the sophisticated buyout specialist relies on hard information 
and thus overcomes the barrier of cultural differences.  
In line with Cressey et al. (2007), Gompers et al. (2008), Nahata (2008), Demiroglu and 
James (2010) and Meuleman and Wright (2011), PE firms’ experience and reputation have 
positive impacts on investment performance. Specifically, country experience which offers 
local insights, multinational experience which brings in the knowledge of different institutions, 
industrial experience which offers deep industrial insights, and reputation based on deal 
experience which serves as the certification to resolve asymmetric information problems,  all 
of which help PE firms achieve higher likelihoods of a successful exit in the cross-border 
buyout. The findings support the hypothesis 3a.  
 I also show that management participation which reduces the information asymmetry 
between insiders and PE managers helps to improve the buyout performance. In terms of club 
size, I find the diseconomies of scale of the PE club as the larger PE club takes a longer time 
to successfully divest the portfolio company. In the later section 1.4.3, club size is positively 
associated with the likelihood of going IPO and negatively associated with the choice of M&A. 
PE firms frequently adopt M&A as the route to divest portfolio companies, but IPO is 
considered as the most successful way (Gompers, 1996). Combining these results, one could 
argue that although it takes more time for the larger PE club to divest the portfolio company, 
the large PE club improves the cross-border buyout performance in a modest way as it increases 
the probability of bringing the portfolio company to the market through an IPO. When the 
geographic distance is taken into consideration, I provide consistent evidence to support the 
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geographic proximity studies (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner, 2010). PE firms are less 
likely to exit successfully if they are far away from their portfolio companies.  
In model 5, instead of using the country risk classification to proxy institution quality, 
I follow Berkowitz et al. (2003) and Cumming et al. (2006) and adopt the legality index. I find 
that the legality index is positively related to the investment performance and statistically 
significant at 10% level. The result indicates that well-developed legal systems which generally 
reduce the information asymmetry and transaction complexity are beneficial to improve the 
buyout performance. In model 6, I include the deal value to control for the size effect and I find 
that the larger the size, the higher the probability of successful divestment.  
To examine the mitigation effects of a PE firms’ deal experience on institutional 
distance, I construct interaction terms of institutional distance and four deal experience 
variables and include them in the models separately. The results are reported in Table 1.5.  
[Insert Table 1.5 about here] 
The coefficients of interaction terms institutional distance and country-specific 
experience, multinational experience, and reputation based on recent deal experience are 
statistically insignificant. The results suggest that only having the knowledge about the local 
institution, business and international practice might not be enough for PE firms to overcome 
the intuitional barriers. The findings are consistent with Li et al. (2014). However, the 
coefficient of the interaction term of institutional distance and industrial experience are positive 
and significant at the 5% level. In cross-border activities, PE firms could effectively transfer 
the governance structure and enforce the contract design if they have substantial experience in 
the portfolio company’s industry. As PE firms tend to specialize in particular industries, 
compared to other experience, the industrial experience is more important in their investment 
activities. The findings are consistent with Cressy et al. (2007) and Gompers et al. (2008).  
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Overall, the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard analysis suggest that the hazard rate 
of a successful exit has a positive relationship with the quality of the institutional environment, 
PE firms’ experience and management participation, and has a negative relationship with 
institutional distance and geographic distance, providing supporting evidence to hypotheses 1a 
“law matters” view, 1b and 3a. Moreover, this paper documents that PE firms’ industrial 
experience could help to overcome the adverse influence of institutional distance, which 
supports the hypothesis 3b.  
1.4.3 Exit Strategies: IPO versus M&A 
1.4.3.1 Multinomial Analysis on the Status 
To test whether the chosen factors have different impacts on the choice between IPO 
and M&A as exit strategies, I firstly relate the choice of IPO relative to M&A as the exit 
strategies, and then perform the multinomial logit analysis. The base category for the 
multinomial analysis is the group of portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits (other exits 
and non-exit ones).  
[Insert Table 1.6 about here] 
As shown in model 1 of Table 1.6, the choice of IPO as the exit strategy over M&A 
mainly depends on deal characteristics. With management participation, the PE firm prefers 
the M&A over IPO as the exit strategy. The larger the PE club size, the higher the likelihood 
of PE firms bringing the portfolio company to the market through an IPO. The deal value 
matters for the exit strategy as there are certain threshold limits on the IPO requirement (Brau, 
Francis, and Kohers, 2003). The larger the deal value, the higher the probability of going IPO.  
In models 2-5, I relate the learning variables separately as well as other explanatory 
variables to the choice of the exit strategy. As shown in Table 1.6, compared to the group with 
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unsuccessful exits, the likelihood of choosing IPO increases when private equity firms are more 
experienced, when the club size is larger, and when the initial buyout value is higher. M&A is 
the most frequently adopted exit route by buyout specialists. Compared to the unsuccessful 
exits group, the quality of institutional environment is positively associated with the likelihood 
of choosing a takeover. In addition, the PE firm’s experience and reputation help to increase 
the likelihood of conducting M&A. These findings support the conjecture based on the “law 
matters” and “experience matters” views. Also, compared to the unsuccessful exits group, the 
PE firm is more likely to divest the portfolio company via M&A if management participates in 
the buyout. In terms of club size, a larger PE club aims for the most successful divestment way 
IPO (Gompers, 1996).  
Overall, the results of the multinomial logit analysis show that the probability of 
bringing the portfolio company to the market through an IPO increases when PE firms are more 
experienced, the PE club size is larger and deal value is higher. The probability of divesting 
the portfolio company via M&A rises when the quality of the institutional environment is 
higher, when the PE firms are more experienced, and when the management participates in the 
buyout.  
1.4.3.2 Holding Time for IPO and M&A 
I also perform the survival analysis on the choice between IPO and M&A as exit 
strategies and report the results in Table 1.7. The specifications used for this test are the same 
as those in Table 1.5.  
[Insert Table 1.7 about here] 
As shown in Table 1.7, the hazard rate of choosing IPO as the exit strategy is related to 
the deal characteristics: it increases when PE firms are more experienced, when the PE club 
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size is larger, and when the initial buyout value is larger. Like the findings in Table 1.6, 
coefficients of all institutional variables are insignificant for the choice of going IPO, and the 
coefficient of the variable Legality Index remains positive. In terms of the hazard rate of 
choosing M&A as the exit strategy, I find that it is positively related to the institutional 
environment quality and PE firms’ experience. Also, management participation increases the 
hazard rate of choosing M&A. Finally, PE club size is positively related to the choice of IPO 
as the exit route and negatively related to the choice of M&A.  
1.4.4 IRR and Exit Multiple  
Constrained by the data availability, just a few studies consider PE returns and most 
studies measure performance in terms of exit success (Buchner et al., 2017). Mergermarket 
database does not provide detailed cash flow data, but it records the initial investment value 
and exit sale value for certain transactions. I acknowledge that the sample of IRR and exit 
multiple is relatively small as 161 out of 2,665 investments have available information for 
buyout value, buyout date, exit value, and exit date. I calculate the IRR as the discount rate 
which equates the exit value to the buyout value and exit multiple as the value of exit value to 
the buyout value.  
[Insert Table 1.8 about here] 
Table 1.8 reports the results on IRR and exit multiple. The coefficient of 
Low_Risk_Country is significant at the 10% level and suggests that in a country of high 
institution quality, PE firms are more likely to receive higher returns. This study documents no 
evidence on the influence of institutional distance on returns. The coefficient sign of 
Institutional_Distance is negative, albeit insignificant, which is consistent with Buchner et al. 
(2017), and suggests that institutional distance might be detrimental to the returns. I also find 
that the management participation is negatively related to the IRR and exit multiple. Previous 
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results suggest that management participation leads to a shorter holding time. The combined 
findings indicate that management might be eager to exit the portfolio company even though 
the IRR and exit multiple are lower. 
1.4.5 Robustness Tests 
1.4.5.1 Selection Bias 
The results of the analyses of the successful exit can be biased if I ignore the fact that 
the performance is not due to the experience of PE firms, but to the selection of high quality 
portfolio companies. Sørensen (2007) argues that the endogeneity originates from two effects: 
selection effect and monitoring effect. Selection effect means that more experienced PE firms 
select companies of higher quality while monitoring effects mean that PE activities after the 
acquisition add value to the target company. To address concerns of endogeneity, I follow 
Nahata (2008) and use the Heckman’s (1979) correction procedure. The dependent variable 
Experienced_PE in the selection stage is an indicator variable denoting whether the PE firm 
belongs to the top quartile of experienced PE firm group based on the industrial experience 
measurement in the year prior to the initial buyout. Nahata (2008) adopts the total VC funding 
as the proxy for the company quality. Buyout specialists invest in the late stage and usually do 
not enter further stage financing. This study adopts the deal value which captures the company 
quality to a certain degree. Sørensen (2007) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) argue 
that aggregate market characteristics are good candidates for exogenous variables because the 
distribution of companies and investors in various markets is exogenous. As shown in Panel D 
of Table 1.1, U.S. and U.K. PE firms are the most active cross-border buyout investors. These 
two markets are the most two developed markets for PE investment and buyout specialists from 
these two markets tend to accumulate more experience. I use two PE firms’ country origins 
U.S. and U.K. to create two dummy variables as exogenous variables. Intuitively, for example, 
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a portfolio company in Australia is more likely to encounter foreign investors from U.S. and 
U.K.. These investors are more likely to be experienced buyout specialists. However, 
conditioned on encountering an experienced investor, there is no more screening advantage and 
the quality of investment of an experienced U.S. or U.K. investor is not necessarily better than 
that of an experienced France investor. Further, some PE firms are public companies and they 
establish the reputation as a listed company. I include these explanatory variables in the 
selection step plus other deal characteristics variables. The first stage model estimates the 
likelihood of the experienced PE firm investing in the portfolio company. I then add the inverse 
Mills ratio from the first step into the second step regression to estimate the performance. The 
specifications thus are:  
First step (selection):  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝐸 𝑖 = Probit (Kj), where Ki =  αj + β1𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + β2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
β3𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑏_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑈. 𝑆. _𝑃𝐸𝑖 + β5𝑈. 𝐾. _𝑃𝐸𝑖 + β6𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝐸𝑖  
Second step:  
(Cox Hazard): Hazard_Rate = λ(t|X) = λ0(t) ∗ e
xi
′βi+β 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒_𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
(Logit): IPO vs M&A = Logit (yi), where yi = αi + xi
′βi + β𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒_𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
[Insert Table 1.9 about here] 
As shown in Table 1.9, in the selection stage, the likelihood of the experienced PE firm 
investing in the portfolio company is higher when the initial buyout value is larger, when the 
PE firm is from the U.S. or the U.K., and when the PE firm is a public company. In the second 
step, I find that after controlling for the selection bias, the probability and the hazard rate of 
successful exits increase when the institutional environment quality is higher, when PE firms 
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have a better reputation and when the management team participates in the deal. I also find 
consistent evidence of the mitigation effect of industrial experience on institutional distance. 
In terms of the choice between IPO and M&A as exit strategies, deal characteristics are 
important in the decision-making process.  
1.4.5.2 Imputed Deal Value  
 The sample includes 2,665 cross-border buyout deals but the size decreases to 1,997 if 
the deal value is considered. The sample reduction through the missing values might result in 
biased estimation. To alleviate the concern of missing value, I follow Strömberg (2008) and 
adopt the multiple imputation to create the complete case dataset.  
[Insert Table 1.10 about here] 
In Table 1.10, I present re-estimations of the main models with deal value imputed 
based on the multiple imputation. The main results remain consistent with previous tests. 
Institution quality and private equity firms’ experience insert positive influence on buyout 
performance while institutional distance has the opposite effect. Moreover, industrial 
experience could mitigate the adverse effects of institutional distance. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This study examines the determinants of the cross-border buyout performance, focusing 
on institutional and learning factors. I use the Mergermarket database and obtain a sample of 
2,665 cross-border buyout transactions in 40 countries from 1998 to 2007. Firstly, I test the 
relationship between sucessful exit ratio and the factors mentioned above. To study the 
likelihood of a successful exit, I follow Hochberg et al. (2007), Nahata (2008), and Nahata et 
al. (2014) and use the survival analysis to examine the determinants of exit success. I conduct 
additional analyses to examine the impact of chosen explanatory variables on the choice of exit 
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strategies and IRR/exit multiple.  
I find that the institutional environment quality is positively related to the likelihood of 
successful exits while the likelihood decreases when the institutional differences between PE 
country and portfolio company country are larger. The result is in line with Nahata et al. (2014) 
and consistent with the “law matters”  view (La porta et al., 1997, 1998). Further, cultural 
differences do not play a role in determing cross-border buyout performance. I measure PE 
firms’ learning from four aspects: country-specific experience, multinational experience, 
industry experience and reputation. Consistent with previous studies (Cressey et al. 2007; 
Gompers et al., 2008; Nahata, 2008), I find that more experienced PE firms perform better and 
their industrial experience has a mitigation effect. In the additional analyses examining the 
choice of exit routes, PE experience, PE club size, and initial buyout value are positively 
associated with the likelihood of going IPO. As the most frequently used exit strategy, M&A is 
more likely to be adopted when the institutional environment quality is higher and when PE 
firms learn more from their past activities. Finally, the institution quality of portfolio company 
country is positively related to the IRR. This study is the first using a novel dataset of portfolio 
companies’ details of PE firms around the world to offer important insights into the 
determinants of buyout success in both developed and developing countries.  
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Appendix 1.1: Variable definition 
Variables  Definition and Source  
Dependent variables   
Hazard_Rate Conditional probability that the PE firm could exit the portfolio company successfully.  
Exit_Types 
Exit types include three categories: IPO, M&A (Secondary buyout and trade sales), and 
unsuccessful exits (other exits and non-exit ones). (Source: Mergermarket) 
Institutions    
Low_Risk_Country 
Dummy variable which equals one if the country risk index of the portfolio company’s country 
is higher than 80. The country risk index consists of political risk components with 50% weight, 
economic risk components with 25% weight and financial risk components with 25% weight. 
(Source: International Country Risk Guide)  
Institutional_Distance 
Logarithm of one plus the absolute value of the country risk index difference between the 
country of portfolio company and the country of the PE firm. (Source: International Country 
Risk Guide) 
Legality_Index 
Legality Index = 0.381*(Efficiency of Judiciary) + 0.5578*(Rule of Law) + 
0.5031*(Corruption) + 0.3468*(Risk of Expropriation) + 0.3842 * (Risk of Contract 
Repudiation). (Source: La Porta et al., 1998).  
Cultural_Distance 
The cultural distance between the country of the leading PE firm and country of the portfolio 
company. It is measured as the distance between Hofstede's four-dimensional cultural factors 
on time-varying meta-analytic scores: power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance 
and masculinity. (Source: Taras et al., 2011)  
Buyout_Market_ 
Development  
The number of buyouts in the country of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to 
the initial buyout. The number is then normalized by the world total number of buyouts in the 
same period. (Source: SDC Platinum M&A) 
Learning    
Country_Experience  
Logarithm of one plus the number of buyouts which the PE firm completed in the country of 
the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. (Source: Mergermarket 
and SDC Platinum M&A) 
Multinational_Experience 
Logarithm of one plus the number of foreign countries in which the PE firm invested from1990 
to the year prior to the initial buyout. (Source: Mergermarket and SDC Platinum M&A) 
Industrial_Experience 
Logarithm of one plus as the number of buyouts which the PE firm completed in the industry 
of the portfolio company from 1990 to the year prior to the initial buyout. (Source: 
Mergermarket and SDC Platinum M&A) 
Reputation 
Logarithm of one plus the number of buyouts completed by the PE firm three years prior to the 
initial buyout. (Source: Mergermarket and SDC Platinum M&A) 
Deal Characteristics    
Management 
Dummy variable which equals one if the management participates in the initial buyout 
transaction and zero otherwise. (Source: Mergermarket, SDC Platinum M&A, and Zephyr)  
Club_Size  
The number of PE firms in the club deal. (Source: Mergermarket, SDC Platinum M&A, and 
Zephyr) 
Deal_Value Logarithm of buyout deal value (Source: Mergermarket, SDC Platinum M&A, and Zephyr) 
PE Characteristics  
U.S._PE  
Dummy variable which equals one if the PE firm headquarters in the U.S. and zero otherwise. 
(Source: Mergermarket)  
U.K._PE 
Dummy variable which equals one if the PE firm headquarters in the U.K. and zero otherwise. 
(Source: Mergermarket) 
Listed_PE 
Dummy variable which equals one if the PE firm is listed in stock exchange and zero otherwise. 
(Source: Orbis) 
Country-pair Controls    
Common_Religion 
Dummy variable which equals one if the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio 
company have the same primary religion and zero otherwise. (Source: CIA World Factbook) 
Common_Language 
Dummy variable which equals one if the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio 
company have the same first official language and zero otherwise. (Source: CIA World 
Factbook) 
Common_Law-Origin 
Dummy variable which equals one if the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio 
company have the same legal origin and zero otherwise. (Source: Foreign Law Guide database) 
Geographic_Distance 
Logarithm of geographic distance between the most populated city of the country of the PE 
firm and the country of the portfolio company. (Source: CEPII)  
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Appendix 1.2: Description of Variables  
Factors related to deal characteristics 
With the management team participating in the buyout transaction, the information asymmetry between 
PE firms and the portfolio company could be reduced and hence a better performance is anticipated. To account 
for the corporate governance characteristics, I adopt the dummy variable Management which equals one if the 
deal is defined as “management buyout” in Mergermarket, “acquirer including management” in SDC Platinum 
M&A database, or “management buyout” in Zephyr.  
Further, to account for the syndication among PE firms, the variable Club_Size is included. Officer, 
Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) demonstrate that the PE club pays less for the buyout transaction and such lower pricing 
might be an inadvertent by-product of an unobserved motivation for club deals. Meuleman and Wright (2011) 
find that institutional differences induce U.K. PE firms to cooperate with a local PE firm when they invest in 
continental Europe. The variable Club Size7 is calculated as the number of PE firms in the deal. Moreover, Nahata 
(2008) includes the total funding amount across all rounds to capture the quality of the portfolio company. The 
higher the total funding across all rounds, the better the company quality. He admits that because of the data 
limitation, the proxy is imperfect and involves the look-ahead bias. Mergermarket, SDC and Zephyr provide little 
information on portfolio companies other than transaction details. In a similar manner of Nahata (2008), I include 
the deal value to measure the size effect and the quality of the portfolio company. The larger the deal value, the 
larger the investment the PE firm makes. The deal value thus could capture the quality of the portfolio company 
to a certain degree. The deal value information is from the “buy value” in Mergermarket, “transaction value” in 
SDC Platinum M&A or “deal value” in Zephyr.  
Factors related to country-pair controls 
I also consider other types variables measuring the link between the country of the PE firm and the 
country of the portfolio company. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) and Aizenman and Kendall (2008) show 
that religion and language have an impact on the economic development. The religion and language information 
is extracted from Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) World Factbook. Variable Common_Religion is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the country of the PE firm and the country of the portfolio company have the same 
primary religion. Variable Common_Language is the dummy variable that equals one if they have the same first 
official language. Also, I track the law origin and commercial code of both portfolio companies’ nations and PE 
firms’ nations in Foreign Law Guide database. Following previous law and finance studies such as La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Lerner and Schoar (2005), the world legal systems are divided into six groups: English common law, 
French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, Islamic law and Socialism background law. Variable 
Common_Law_Origin is a dummy variable that equals one if country of the PE firm and the country of the 
portfolio company have the same legal origin. Finally, geographic proximity could favour the participation of PE 
firms in portfolio companies and improve the performance (Chen et al., 2010). I measure the geographic proximity 
by using the geographic distance between the most populated city of the country of the portfolio company and the 
country of the PE firm. The data is from CEPII database.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 To find the club size in Mergermarket, I read through the details in buyer description, seller description, equity provider and 
deal description, and figure out the number of PE firms.  
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Table 1.1: Distribution of buyouts and exit types 
Panel A: Temporal distribution 
Panel A illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by the buyout year. The buyout sample includes 2,665 
worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket.  
Year Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
1998 2 75 77   8 11 19   96 
1999 10 107 117   7 15 22   139 
2000 6 117 123   11 13 24   147 
2001 5 86 91   7 21 28   119 
2002 7 117 124   12 20 32   156 
2003 11 137 148   12 25 37   185 
2004 14 205 219   19 66 85   304 
2005 17 253 270   24 123 147   417 
2006 23 272 295   39 221 260   555 
2007 15 234 249   41 257 298   547 
Total 110 1,603 1713   180 772 952   2,665 
 
Panel B: Industrial distribution 
Panel B illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by industry. The sample includes 2,665 worldwide 
buyouts over 11 SIC two-digit industries. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket.  
Industry Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
Agriculture 0 4 4   1 2 3   7 
Mining 5 14 19   3 11 14   33 
Construction 2 29 31   5 20 25   56 
Manufacturing 45 778 823   86 277 363   1,186 
Transportation 1 55 56   6 31 37   93 
Communication 9 89 98   10 49 59   157 
Energy 1 36 37   3 24 27   64 
Whole Sales 4 42 46   4 18 22   68 
Retails 10 112 122   13 61 74   196 
Finance 6 68 74   12 80 92   166 
Services 27 376 403   37 199 236   639 
Total 110 1,603 1713   180 772 952   2,665 
 
Panel C: Countries of portfolio companies  
Panel C illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by countries of portfolio companies. The sample 
includes 2,665 worldwide buyouts across 40 countries and regions. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. 
Panel C includes the top ten countries in terms of the number of buyouts and presents them in descending order.  
Target Country Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
Germany 10 251 261  19 48 67  328 
U.K. 12 160 172  16 89 105  277 
France 4 183 187  17 56 73  260 
U.S. 7 104 111  19 54 73  184 
India 4 47 51  15 73 88  139 
Netherlands 7 81 88  11 36 47  135 
Italy 3 88 91  7 32 39  130 
Sweden 9 73 82  4 30 34  116 
China 16 21 37  9 56 65  102 
Canada 5 44 49  7 40 47  96 
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Panel D: Countries of PE firms 
Panel D illustrates the distribution of buyouts and exit types by countries of PE firms. The PE firms are from 42 
countries and regions. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. Panel D includes top ten countries in terms of 
the number of buyouts and presents them in descending order.  
PE Country Successful exits  Unsuccessful exits  Total 
IPO M&A Sub total  Other exits Non-exit Sub total  
U.S. 48 513 561   58 332 390   951 
U.K. 40 590 630   51 149 200   830 
France 5 68 73   12 21 33   106 
Australia 1 43 44   9 43 52   96 
Netherlands 1 59 60   4 16 20   80 
Sweden 3 49 52   4 18 22   74 
Hong Kong 2 29 31   5 29 34   65 
Bahrain 1 44 45   7 9 16   61 
Germany 0 30 30   6 9 15   45 
Singapore 1 10 11   4 27 31   42 
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics 
The table shows the summary statistics for key explanatory variables. The sample includes 2,665 worldwide 
buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max 
Institutions      
Low_Risk_Country 2,665 0.628 0.483 0 1 
Institutional_Distance 2.665 1.559 0.677 0.000 3.370 
Cultural_Distance 2,665 0.290 0.136 0.000 0.976 
LBO_Market_Development 2,665 0.075 0.123 0.000 0.457 
Legality_Index 2,665 18.778 1.167 11.733 21.714 
Learning      
Country_Experience 2,665 0.785 0.871 0.000 3.780 
Multinationa_Experience 2,665 1.309 0.931 0.000 3.220 
Industrial_Experience 2,665 1.627 1.255 0.000 5.160 
Reputation 2,665 2.213 1.118 0.000 4.440 
Deal Characteristics      
Management 2,665 0.370 0.483 0.000 1.000 
Club_Size 2,665 1.416 0.905 1.000 11.000 
Deal_Value 1,997 4.901 1.561 2.303 7.623 
Country-pair Controls      
Common_Religion 2,665 0.214 0.410 0.000 1.000 
Common_Language 2,665 0.219 0.413 0.000 1.000 
Common_Law-origin 2,665 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Geographic_Distance 2,665 4.229 4.212 1.730 19.147 
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Table 1.3: Success ratio analysis 
The sample includes 2,665 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from 
Mergermarket. The dependent variable in specifications 1-3 is successful exit ratio at the country i and investment 
year t. The dependent variable is specifications 3-5 is the successful exit ratio at the country pair level j and in 
investment year t. Robust standard errors are clustered at the portfolio company country level in models (1) and 
(3) and are in parentheses. SUR standard errors are used in model (2) and are in parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the country-pair level in models (4) and (5) and are in parentheses *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model 
Country 
(1) 
 
Country 
(2) 
Country 
(3) 
 
Country-Pair 
(4) 
Country-Pair 
(5) 
Institutions      
Low_Risk_Country 0.086* 0.125***  0.103*** 0.100*** 
 (0.046) (0.034)  (0.036) (0.033) 
Institutional_Distance    -0.055*** -0.056*** 
    (0.019) (0.020) 
Cultural_Distance    0.068 -0.005 
    (0.098) (0.100) 
Legality_Index   0.204*   
   (0.114)   
Country-pair Controls      
Common_Religion     -0.028 
     (0.038) 
Common_Language     -0.109** 
     (0.053) 
Common_Law-Origin     0.015 
     (0.035) 
Geographic_Distance     -0.019* 
     (0.011) 
Observations 318 318 318 919 919 
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.232 0.041 0.227 0.140 0.151 
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Table 1.4: Cox proportional hazard estimation 
The sample includes 2,665 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The hazard 
rate is the conditional probability that the PE firm exits the portfolio company successfully. The holding time of the successful 
portfolio company is the total months from the buyout date to the successful exit date. For portfolio companies with unsuccessful 
exits, the holding time is the number of months between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date. 
In Cox hazard model, the failure event is the case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via IPO or M&A before the end of 
2015. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Institutions       
Low_Risk_Country 0.275*** 0.231*** 0.225*** 0.218***  0.183*** 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.073) (0.076)  (0.070) 
Institutional_Distance -0.076** -0.097*** -0.086** -0.089*** -0.085** -0.107*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039) 
Cultural_Distance -0.234 -0.313 -0.268 -0.275 -0.320 -0.230 
 (0.231) (0.224) (0.221) (0.226) (0.239) (0.255) 
LBO_Market_Development -0.392** 0.035 0.070 0.063 -0.219 -0.006 
 (0.173) (0.167) (0.169) (0.173) (0.213) (0.195) 
Legality_Index     0.682**  
     (0.298)  
Learning       
Country_Experience 0.180***      
 (0.033)      
Multinational_Experience  0.229***     
  (0.029)     
Industrial_Experience   0.162***    
   (0.031)    
Reputation     0.183*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
Deal Characteristics       
Management 0.222*** 0.215*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 0.191*** 0.260*** 
 (0.056) (0.063) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.066) 
Club_Size -0.090*** -0.096*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.093*** -0.111*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
Deal_Value      0.073*** 
      (0.021) 
Country-pair Controls       
                         Common_Religion -0.048 0.027 0.007 -0.010 -0.035 0.021 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.058) 
Common_Language -0.089 -0.105 -0.156 -0.124 -0.145 -0.170 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.108) (0.133) 
Common_Law-Origin -0.088 -0.036 -0.032 -0.051 -0.026 -0.028 
 (0.098) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.099) (0.105) 
Geographic_Distance -0.030* -0.068*** -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.061*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) 
Observations 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 1,997 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -12403 -12389 -12393 -12388 -12389 -8722 
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Table 1.5: The role of PE firm’s experience 
The sample includes 2,665 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The hazard 
rate is the conditional probability that the PE firm exits the portfolio company successfully. The holding time of the successful 
portfolio company is the total months from the buyout date to the successful exit date. For portfolio companies with unsuccessful 
exits, the holding time is the number of months between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date. 
In Cox hazard model, the failure event is the case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via IPO or M&A before the end of 
2015. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutions     
Low_Risk_Country 0.276*** 0.227*** 0.218*** 0.214*** 
 (0.081) (0.075) (0.073) (0.077) 
Institutional_Distance -0.097* -0.168*** -0.186*** -0.158* 
 (0.051) (0.064) (0.054) (0.083) 
Cultural_Distance -0.229 -0.315 -0.248 -0.270 
 (0.229) (0.225) (0.225) (0.228) 
LBO_Market_Development -0.401** 0.039 0.083 0.063 
 (0.175) (0.163) (0.169) (0.172) 
Learning     
Country_Experience 0.135*    
 (0.071)    
Institutional_Distance*Country_Experience 0.030    
 (0.042)    
Multinational_Experience  0.143**   
  (0.073)   
Institutional_Distance*Multinational_Experience  0.056   
  (0.046)   
Industrial_Experience   0.069*  
   (0.039)  
Institutional_Distance*Industrial_Experience   0.063**  
   (0.024)  
Reputation     0.135** 
    (0.054) 
Institutional_Distance*Reputation    0.032 
    (0.035) 
Deal Characteristics     
Management 0.221*** 0.211*** 0.193*** 0.197*** 
 (0.056) (0.063) (0.061) (0.061) 
Club_Size -0.091*** -0.096*** -0.091*** -0.087** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Country-pair Controls     
Common_Religion -0.045 0.019 0.006 -0.013 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.049) (0.049) 
Common_Language -0.088 -0.098 -0.157 -0.119 
 (0.110) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) 
Common_Law-Origin -0.086 -0.043 -0.033 -0.055 
 (0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) 
Geographic_Distance -0.031* -0.073*** -0.058*** -0.062*** 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Observations 2,665 2,665 2,665 2,665 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -12403 -12388 -12391 -12388 
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Table 1.6: Multinomial logit analysis for choice of exit routes 
The sample includes 1,997 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The dependent variable in specification 1 is the dummy variable which equals one if the portfolio 
firm has gone public and zero if it is acquired. In specifications 2-5, the multinomial logit estimation is used. The base group in the multinomial logit model is group of portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits (other 
exits and non-exit ones). Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model 
IPO vs. M&A  IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful 
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful 
 IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful 
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful 
 IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful 
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful 
 IPO vs. 
Unsuccessful 
M&A vs. 
Unsuccessful 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Institutions              
Low_Risk_Country -0.426  0.026 0.314**  -0.019 0.271**  -0.033 0.267**  -0.041 0.258* 
 (0.389)  (0.379) (0.134)  (0.361) (0.136)  (0.366) (0.134)  (0.362) (0.136) 
Institutional_Distance 0.211  -0.028 -0.226***  -0.071 -0.261***  -0.052 -0.239***  -0.037 -0.232*** 
 (0.159)  (0.150) (0.067)  (0.148) (0.064)  (0.147) (0.066)  (0.148) (0.069) 
Cultural_Distance 1.892*  1.249 -0.390  1.071 -0.529  1.166 -0.446  1.176 -0.454 
 (1.063)  (0.884) (0.498)  (0.972) (0.500)  (0.938) (0.491)  (0.954) (0.488) 
LBO_Market_Development -1.821  -2.299** -0.206  -1.335 0.552  -1.490 0.476  -1.505 0.480 
 (1.473)  (1.108) (0.519)  (1.168) (0.467)  (1.150) (0.482)  (1.163) (0.485) 
Learning              
Country_Experience   0.323** 0.269***          
   (0.160) (0.062)          
Multinational_Experience      0.427*** 0.340***       
      (0.141) (0.066)       
Industrial_Experience         0.300** 0.282***    
         (0.122) (0.051)    
Reputation  0.048           0.303** 0.279***  
(0.123)           (0.118) (0.046) 
Deal Characteristics              
Management -0.897***  -0.335* 0.523***  -0.354* 0.512***  -0.357* 0.495***  -0.360* 0.501*** 
 (0.246)  (0.177) (0.112)  (0.185) (0.112)  (0.185) (0.115)  (0.186) (0.111) 
Club_Size 0.409***  0.117* -0.263***  0.110* -0.266***  0.113* -0.258***  0.120* -0.254*** 
 (0.098)  (0.065) (0.062)  (0.065) (0.062)  (0.066) (0.063)  (0.066) (0.063) 
Deal_Value 0.327**  0.429*** 0.127***  0.367*** 0.075**  0.393*** 0.090**  0.385*** 0.087** 
 (0.142)  (0.109) (0.041)  (0.112) (0.038)  (0.113) (0.037)  (0.112) (0.039) 
Country-pair Controls              
Common_Religion 0.009  -0.295 -0.179  -0.192 -0.069  -0.214 -0.106  -0.235 -0.120 
 (0.320)  (0.300) (0.122)  (0.323) (0.118)  (0.321) (0.113)  (0.318) (0.115) 
Common_Language 0.889*  0.450 -0.406*  0.403 -0.419*  0.327 -0.502**  0.378 -0.458** 
 (0.511)  (0.546) (0.231)  (0.534) (0.216)  (0.540) (0.219)  (0.539) (0.221) 
Common_Law-Origin -0.015  -0.028 0.001  0.017 0.031  0.038 0.066  -0.008 0.022 
 (0.613)  (0.575) (0.181)  (0.568) (0.177)  (0.569) (0.175)  (0.565) (0.179) 
Geographic_Distance 0.117  0.046 -0.113***  -0.025 -0.172***  0.010 -0.147***  -0.009 -0.162*** 
 (0.163)  (0.124) (0.034)  (0.117) (0.041)  (0.120) (0.038)  (0.118) (0.041) 
Observations 1,259  1,997  1,997  1,997  1,997 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.130  0.132  0.136  0.136  0.136 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -297.3  -1439  -1431  -1432  -1432 
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Table 1.7: Hazard analysis for IPO and M&A 
The sample includes 1,997 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. The holding time of the successful portfolio company is the total months from the buyout date to 
the successful exit date. For portfolio companies with unsuccessful exits, the holding time is the number of months between the buyout date and 31st December 2015 or the last available tracking date. In specifications 
1-5, the failure event is the case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via IPO before the end of 2015. In specifications 6-10, the failure event is case that the PE firm divests the portfolio company via M&A 
before the end of 2015. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 IPO  M&A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institutions          
Low_Risk_Country -0.021 -0.038 -0.064 -0.072  0.239*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.201** 
 (0.399) (0.386) (0.386) (0.382)  (0.079) (0.081) (0.077) (0.081) 
Institutional_Distance 0.069 0.042 0.054 0.066  -0.120*** -0.134*** -0.117*** -0.121*** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.130) (0.128)  (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 
Cultural_Distance 1.238 1.141 1.186 1.208  -0.374 -0.435 -0.394 -0.393 
 (0.894) (0.924) (0.901) (0.913)  (0.273) (0.282) (0.268) (0.269) 
LBO_Market_Development -2.487** -1.856 -1.928 -1.976*  -0.318 0.194 0.191 0.175 
 (1.125) (1.189) (1.189) (1.191)  (0.228) (0.209) (0.216) (0.219) 
Learning          
Country_Experience 0.223     0.178***    
 (0.157)     (0.035)    
Multinational_Experience  0.325***     0.226***   
  (0.112)     (0.035)   
Industrial_Experience   0.198**     0.169***  
   (0.095)     (0.029)  
Reputation     0.218**     0.180***  
   (0.093)     (0.026) 
Deal Characteristics          
Management -0.483*** -0.515*** -0.503*** -0.522***  0.336*** 0.324*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 
 (0.180) (0.186) (0.186) (0.193)  (0.068) (0.073) (0.075) (0.071) 
Club_Size 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.173***  -0.175*** -0.173*** -0.169*** -0.166*** 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Deal_Value 0.356*** 0.313*** 0.337*** 0.328***  0.074*** 0.041* 0.054** 0.053** 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Country-pair Controls          
Common_Religion -0.176 -0.113 -0.120 -0.135  -0.006 0.069 0.051 0.032 
 (0.324) (0.338) (0.336) (0.335)  (0.050) (0.064) (0.061) (0.056) 
Common_Language 0.652 0.615 0.559 0.613  -0.220* -0.231* -0.285** -0.248** 
 (0.510) (0.505) (0.503) (0.502)  (0.132) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) 
Common_Law-Origin -0.043 0.004 0.010 -0.022  -0.035 -0.011 0.010 -0.019 
 (0.574) (0.570) (0.566) (0.558)  (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) 
Geographic_Distance 0.136 0.099 0.121 0.105  -0.046** -0.077*** -0.064*** -0.073*** 
 (0.130) (0.126) (0.129) (0.126)  (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Observations 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997  1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 
Year FE & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -655.9 -654 -655.3 -655  -8031 -8024 -8024 -8024 
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Table 1.8: IRR and exit multiple 
The sample includes 161 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. In specifications 
1-2, the dependent variable is IRR which is measured as the discount rate which equates the exit value to the buyout value. In 
specifications 3-4, the dependent variable is exit multiple which is measured as the value of exit value to the buyout value. Robust 
standard errors clustered at portfolio company level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
IRR 
(1) 
 
IRR 
(2) 
 
Exit Multiple 
(3) 
Exit Multiple 
(4) 
Institutions     
Low_Risk_Country 0.106* 0.105* 0.415 0.418 
 (0.056) (0.053) (0.761) (0.721) 
Institutional_Distance -0.069 -0.076 -0.269 -0.339 
 (0.065) (0.055) (0.264) (0.263) 
Cultural_Distance 0.297 0.318 3.002 3.420 
 (0.333) (0.276) (2.302) (2.291) 
LBO_Market_Development 0.420 0.528 1.266 2.321 
 (0.437) (0.514) (2.861) (3.080) 
Learning     
Reputation  -0.033  0.074 
  (0.081)  (0.147) 
Deal Characteristics     
Management  -0.233**  -1.665*** 
  (0.098)  (0.523) 
Club_Size  0.037  -0.175 
  (0.087)  (0.632) 
Country-pair Controls     
Common_Religion 0.120 0.135 2.124 2.203* 
 (0.082) (0.090) (1.255) (1.160) 
Common_Language -0.170 -0.194 -0.623 -0.767 
 (0.115) (0.130) (0.860) (0.802) 
Common_Law-Origin 0.119* 0.096 1.671 1.650 
 (0.063) (0.064) (1.025) (1.015) 
Geographic_Distance -0.023 -0.047 -0.153 -0.367 
 (0.032) (0.046) (0.240) (0.258) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
R2 0.041 0.058 0.093 0.142 
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Table 1.9: Robustness test for selection bias 
The sample includes 2,665 worldwide buyouts between 1998 and 2007. The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. In the selection 
stage, the dependent variable Reputable PE is a dummy variable which equals to one if the PE firm belongs to first quartile of 
reputable PE firm group based on the reputation measurement. The model settings for the second stage analysis are similar to the 
settings in Tables 4, 5, and 7, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Model 
Selection Cox 
Hazard 
 Selection Cox 
Hazard 
 Selection IPO vs. 
M&A 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Institutions         
Low_Risk_Country  0.201***   0.193***   -0.341 
  (0.066)   (0.064)   (0.398) 
Institutional_Distance  -0.105***   -0.219***   0.198 
  (0.040)   (0.057)   (0.169) 
Cultural_Distance  -0.193   -0.194   2.084** 
  (0.245)   (0.245)   (1.058) 
LBO_Market_Development  0.159   0.186   -1.439 
  (0.213)   (0.214)   (1.486) 
Learning         
Industrial_Experience  0.143***   0.034   -0.059  
 (0.030)   (0.044)   (0.134) 
Institutional_Distance*Industrial_ 
Experience  
 
  
0.072** 
(0.030)    
Deal Characteristics         
Management 0.190** 0.223***  0.190** 0.219***  0.223*** -1.015*** 
 (0.078) (0.078)  (0.078) (0.077)  (0.078) (0.212) 
Club_Size -0.086 -0.104***  -0.086 -0.106***  -0.065 0.434*** 
 (0.056) (0.035)  (0.056) (0.035)  (0.066) (0.098) 
Deal_Value 0.088*** 0.064***  0.088*** 0.064***  0.061 0.311** 
 (0.031) (0.022)  (0.031) (0.022)  (0.047) (0.143) 
Country-pair Controls         
Common_Religion  0.046   0.028   0.050 
  (0.055)   (0.052)   (0.329) 
Common_Language  -0.269*   -0.229   0.676 
  (0.145)   (0.146)   (0.553) 
Common_Law-Origin  0.047   0.014   0.153 
  (0.117)   (0.117)   (0.684) 
Geographic_Distance  -0.048***   -0.059***   0.135 
  (0.016)   (0.017)   (0.166) 
Private Equity Firms Characteristics         
U.S._PE 0.682***   0.682***   0.752***  
 (0.157)   (0.157)   (0.180)  
U.K._PE 0.937***   0.937***   0.973***  
 (0.132)   (0.132)   (0.177)  
Listed_PE 0.953***   0.953***   1.141***  
 (0.148)   (0.148)   (0.175)  
Inverse_Mills_Ratio  -0.184*   -0.188**   -0.665* 
  (0.095)   (0.095)   (0.356) 
Observations 1,997 1,997  1,997 1,997  1,259 1,259 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.123 -  0.123 -  0.136 0.135 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -967.2 -8721  -967.2 -8721  -650.1 -295.8 
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Table 1.10: Robustness test for imputed deal value 
The sample is extracted from Mergermarket. In Table 8, following Strömberg (2008), I impute the deal value with Multiple 
Imputation. Robust standard errors clustered at the portfolio company country level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Cox Hazard  Cox Hazard  IPO vs. M&A 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Institutions      
Low_Risk_Country 0.195***  0.188***  -0.4536 
 (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.343) 
Institutional_Distance -0.085**  -0.185***  0.2017 
 (0.035)  (0.053)  (0.183) 
Cultural_Distance -0.271  -0.252  1.440 
 (0.216)  (0.220)  (0.953) 
LBO_Market_Development -0.014  -0.0008  -2.0499 
 (0.175)  (0.175)  (1.252) 
Learning      
Industrial_Experience 0.152***  0.060  0.0654 
 (0.031)  (0.038)  (0.094) 
Institutional_Distance*Industrial_Experi
ence 
  0.063*** 
(0.024) 
  
Deal Characteristics      
Management 0.202***  0.192***  -0.536** 
 (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.211) 
Club_Size -0.101***  -0.103***  0.435*** 
 (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.104) 
Deal_Value 0.059***  0.059***  0.275** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.127) 
Country-pair Controls      
Common_Religion -0.0026  -0.00382  -0.1239 
 (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.249) 
Common_Language -0.178*  -0.179*  0.994** 
 (0.107)  (0.105)  (0.430) 
Common_Law-Origin -0.00113  -0.00307  -0.1631 
 (0.098)  (0.094)  (0.538) 
Geographic_Distance -0.054***  -0.059***  0.1555 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.143) 
Observations 2,665  2,665  1,713 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Figure 1-4: Plots of Kaplan-Meier failure functions 
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Figure 1: Groups based on Country Risk
Kaplan-Meier failure estimates
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Figure 2: Groups based on Institutional Distance
Kaplan-Meier failure estimates
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Figure 3: Groups based on Cultural Distance
Kaplan-Meier failure estimates
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Figure 4: Groups based on Reputable PE
Kaplan-Meier failure estimates
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Chapter 2 Benefits of Friendship: Social Ties 
and Venture Capital Investment 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Information asymmetry is a typical friction in financial markets (Spence, 2002). In 
sociology literature, people sharing similar characteristics such as ethnicity and school tend to 
interact with each other and this shapes connection formation in schools and work places. 
Social ties thus lead to a sense of trust between individuals and can serve as the channel of 
information transfer and help to reduce the information asymmetry among financial market 
participants. There is a growing literature investigating social connections and financial 
activities including mutual fund performance (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008), boards (Cai 
and Sevilir, 2012; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2012; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013; Ishii 
and Xuan, 2014), hedge fund activism (He and Li, 2018), sell-side analyst recommendation 
(Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2010), loan markets (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012; Lin, 
Prabhala, and Viswanathan, 2013), and angel investment (Venugopal, 2017). In venture capital 
markets, social ties are critical. Firstly, start-up founder team characteristics, one kind of soft 
information, is the most important determinant in VC’s investment decision and investment 
success (Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, and Strebulaev, 2016 (hereafter 2016a)). The soft 
information, unlike hard information such as revenue and cash flow, is difficult to obtain and 
verify. Secondly, the VC investment process is a two-sided matching one. The information gap 
between VC partners and start-up founders could put great strain on the investment. Social ties 
between VC partners and start-up founders can increase the information flow and reduce 
information asymmetry. Consequently, socially connected pairs are more likely to collaborate 
with each other. Upon collaboration, social ties can be either beneficial or detrimental to the 
investment performance. Social ties could be associated with either superior performance 
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because of easier communication (Hedge and Tumlinson, 2014) or poor performance because 
of group-thinking and social conformity (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Gompers, Mukharlyamov, and 
Xuan, 2016 (hereafter 2016b)).  
This paper investigates two questions: How do social ties influence the collaboration 
of the VC firm and the start-up and how do social ties influence the post-investment outcome. 
The first comprehensive paper on VC’s social network is Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) 
which focuses on the VC firm level and examines the VC firms’ investment network and 
investment performance. Investment in VC markets is typically individually-led and individual 
level studies are demanded. However, because of data limitation on the biographic information 
of individuals, social ties studies in the VC market are rather limited. There are a few exceptions. 
Gompers et al. (2016b) examine the influence of social ties between the leading VC partner 
and subsequent VC partners on the syndication decision and investment outcome. Hedge and 
Tumlinson (2014) examine the ethnic tie between VC partners and start-up founders and 
conclude that there is a positive influence of social ties on investment match and investment 
success. Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) also examine the ethnic tie but take into account the 
composition of the board. They document positive influence of social ties on investment match, 
but negative influence on investment success.  
This paper focuses on the ties between VC partners and start-up founders and extends 
previous papers as follows. Firstly, we consider not only the ethnic tie but also two other 
important ties: education and employment. The education tie is an important unit in social 
connection analysis (Cohen et al., 2008). Secondly, previous papers apply SDC Venture Expert 
database which include all founders in the start-up and all active partners in the VC firm. In a 
VC firm, a partner could be in a network with a start-up, but he/she may not be the decision 
maker for funding the deal and taking responsibility for the follow-on monitoring activities. 
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Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) assume that all partners are actively involved in all investments. 
They also include all VC-start-up pairs in a deal. However, in an investment, it is the leading 
VC firm which initiates the investment and invites other VC firms to participate in the deal 
(Gompers et al., 2016b). By using a new database, we have been able to identify the 
participating partners in the leading VC firm and provide a clear measure of social ties. Finally, 
Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) admit that they do not address the endogeneity and control for the 
selection effect. The omitted selection effect could be the key reason why they find negative 
influence of social ties on investment success. We adopt the two-stage Heckman selection 
model and attempt to control for the selection effect.  
We hand collect data from Crunchbase (www.crunchbase.com), which archives early 
stage investments (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015) and is the largest crowd-sourced database on 
entrepreneurial activities (Venugopal, 2017). It contains the detailed information on the funding 
round, VC firms, start-ups, founders, and VC firm partners. The data includes 2,246 leading 
VC firm-start-up pairs during the period from 2006 to 2016.  
To investigate the probability of collaboration of the VC firm and the start-up, we need 
both actual pairs and counterfactual pairs (what if the VC did not invest in the start-up). We 
create counterfactual pairs as if the VC firm invests in other start-ups in the same year-state-
industry of the actual start-up. We find that social ties are positively related to the probability 
of collaboration of the VC firm and the start-up. To examine the post-investment outcome, we 
conduct both round level analysis and exit outcome analysis. In the round level analysis, we 
remove the final financing round if the next round is IPO/M&A. We find that social ties are 
related to higher probability and hazard rate of next round financing. Upon surviving to next 
round, connected start-ups can raise larger amounts of funds. In the exit outcome analysis, we 
restrict our sample to the period before 2015 and leave an at least three years window for the 
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VC firm to exit the start-up. We find that social ties are related to higher likelihood of exit 
outcome either via IPO or M&A. Our results support the “Benefits of Friendship” hypothesis.  
Improved post-investment outcome could be due the selection of higher quality start-
ups instead of better post-investment monitoring. The selection effect could be omitted and 
captured by the error term in the post-investment regression. Following Bottazzi, Da Rin, and 
Hellmann (2008) and Hedge and Tumlinson (2014), we adopt the Heckman selection model 
and create an exogenous variable in the first stage. The exogenous variable is the local 
percentage of connected pairs in the market which is defined as the same year-state-industry of 
the start-up. This variable captures the characteristics of the local market and helps to identify 
the selection effect (Sørensen, 2007). After addressing the selection effect, we still document 
positive and statistically significant influence of social ties on post-investment outcome.  
This paper contributes to a growing community of finance research investigating the 
impact of social ties on financial transactions. Instead of studying aggregate firm level of social 
connection such as board level connection (see e.g. Ishii and Xuan, 2014), fund level 
connection (see e.g. Cohen et al., 2008), and VC firm level connection (see e.g. Hedge and 
Tumlinson, 2014), this paper looks into the key investment principal, avoids the noisy measure 
of social connection, and documents the relationship between individual level social ties and 
financial activities. 
Further, this paper contributes to the broad venture capital studies. Start-ups have short 
operation and financial records. Little information is systematically observed for early start-
ups and VC firms emphasize the intangible qualities such as the founding team characteristics 
in the investment selection and post-investment management (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; 
Sørensen, 2007; Gompers et al., 2016). By investigating the social ties in the VC context and 
empirically testing the role of know-how of soft information in VC investments, we provide 
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new evidence and broaden the horizon in understanding the match between VC partners and 
start-up founders and VC’s investment success.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops the testing 
hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data and present the variable construction. Section 2.4 
examines the across-firm evidence on the role of social ties. Section 2.5 concludes the paper.   
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
In VC markets, the investment process is a two-sided matching one (Sørensen, 2007). 
VC firm partners conduct the deal sourcing and select the start-ups to include in their portfolios 
while entrepreneurs are also looking for the right investors who will finance them and help 
them to grow. Collaboration could help to increase the likelihood that the start-up will become 
successful and this could be a win-win situation for both partners and founders. Upon 
investment success, partners will receive the carry and build-up of their reputation while 
founders will receive monetary payoffs and enjoy the benefits of being successful.   
However, little hard information such as revenue and product development are available 
in the VC investment. Gompers et al. (2016a) report that, the characteristic of start-up team is 
the most important factor in a VC firms’ investment decision making process and determinant 
in the VC firms’ investment success. Soft information, unlike hard information, is difficult to 
obtain and verify, leading to high information asymmetry in the VC markets. Social ties, which 
could serve as an information channel, could help to alleviate the information asymmetry in 
the economic decision (Granovetter, 2005). In the VC context, if social ties could help to reduce 
the information asymmetry between VC firm partners and start-up founders, they might lead 
to the collaboration of the VC firm and the start-up and help to improve investment 
performance.  
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2.2.1 Collaboration of the VC Firm and the Start-up 
In the sociology literature, homophily describes the situation where individuals tend to 
form relationships with people who share similar characteristics and background (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). It shapes the partnership formation in various settings such as 
school, work, marriage and friendship. Similarity between group members could then be found 
across a broad range of characteristics including age, gender, education, social status and 
ethnicity. Currarini et al. (2009) report the biases toward same-types in both individual 
preferences and the matching processes affect the pairing result and the homophilic behaviour 
has been shown to be critical in financial markets (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2016). In 
VC markets, particularly, the flow of information, especially the soft one, is larger between the 
VC partners and start-up founders who are of the same type.  
Following Gompers et al. (2016b), I formally incorporate three social ties elements: 
education, employment, and ethnicity. I hypothesize that those ties may affect information 
exchange, VC firms’ investment decision, and founder’s decision to accept funding from the 
VC. Cohen et al. (2008) argue that educational institutions can form an effective basis for social 
ties since life long relationship could be formed via alumni associations, college sports, and 
donation programs. In addition to the education tie, individuals could also build up relationship 
in past employment and are more likely to speak the same “company language”. Finally, as our 
focus is the U.S. VC industry and the U.S. is an immigrant country, we also include the ethnicity 
tie. As claimed by Bengttson and Hsu (2015), individuals might prefer to conduct business with 
co-ethnics with a typical example being that patients may prefer to meet doctors of same 
ethnicity. Also, as information about the participants and their actions spreads rapidly within a 
tight ethnic social network, any misconduct behaviour is monitored. As a result, individuals are 
more likely to build up trust with each other.  
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Hypothesis 1: Social ties between VC firm partners and Start-up founders are associated 
with higher probability of collaboration of the VC firm and the Start-up.  
2.2.2 Post-investment Outcome 
Social ties can impact not only the matching between the VC firm and the start-up but 
also the post-investment outcome. However, previous empirical results about the influence of 
social ties on financial market activities are mixed and the success implications of social ties 
remain unclear.  
2.2.2.1 Cost of Friendship 
On one hand, social connections could lead to flawed decision making and poor 
performance because of a lack of diverse viewpoints, a tendency for social conformity or 
group-thinking mentality (Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Gompers et al., 2016b). Firstly, because 
individuals in homophilic relationship could gain personal utility by working together, they are 
more likely to lower the expected return hurdle and perform a less strict due diligence. Further, 
they tend to ignore the disadvantages of the favoured decision as well as the external advice. 
Cohen et al. (2012) find that companies which appoint overly optimistic analysts as the 
independent directors are also relatively poor performers and appear to be poorly governed. 
Ishii and Xuan (2014) report that acquirer-target social ties are related to statistically significant 
abnormal negative returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity upon the merger 
announcement. Gompers et al. (2016b) find that social ties between the founding VC firm 
partners and subsequent VC firm partners contribute to ultimately worse VC investment results. 
2.2.2.2 Benefits of Friendship  
On the other hand, the more characteristics a pair of individuals have in common, the 
better the performance that can be expected. The benefits of friendship may come from more 
56 
 
efficient communication and the ability to effectively convey tacit information and make joint 
decisions. Cohen et al. (2008) claim that information is exchanged via educational networks 
between mutual fund managers and corporate boards. They find that portfolio managers place 
higher weight on connected firms and earn higher returns than with the non-connected holdings. 
Engelberg et al. (2012) report that firms could borrow money at a lower interest rate from the 
connected banks and have better future credit ratings and stock returns. Cai and Sevilir (2012) 
report that board connections benefit acquirers as they pay lower premiums and have greater 
value creation. Engelberg et al. (2013) find that CEOs with large networks are better 
compensated than those with small networks. Lin et al. (2013) study the Peer-to-Peer market 
and claim that friendships leads to a higher probability of successful funding, lower interest 
rates and lower ex post probability of default. Further, Venugopal (2017) and He and Li (2018) 
find connected intuitions perform better in the angel investment and hedge fund investment, 
respectively.  
In the VC context, social ties could lead to easier communication between founders and 
partners and lower the coordination cost (Hedge and Tumlinson, 2014). After the investment, 
VC partners will interact with their portfolio companies and try to add value to the start-up. 
The value adding activities including board structuring (Lerner, 1995), professionalization of 
start-up (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), outside director hiring (Amornsiripanitch, Gompers, and 
Xuan, 2016), and strategy guidance (Gompers et al., 2016a). Founders are more receptive to 
the value adding suggestions if they are socially connected with their VC partners. 
Consequently, social ties could improve the post-investment outcome via better communication 
and increasing value adding activities. Based on the discussion above, the null and alternative 
hypotheses with respect to post-investment outcome are:  
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Hypothesis 2 null: In line with “Cost of Friendship”, social ties between VC partners and 
Start-up founders are associated with worse post-investment outcome.  
Hypothesis 2 alternative: In line with “Benefits of Friendship”, Social ties between VC 
partners and Start-up founders are associated with better post-investment outcome.  
2.3 Sample and Variables  
2.3.1 Sample 
To construct the sample, firstly, we need to identify partners in the leading VC firm who 
make the investment decision and lead the investment. Secondly, we need the biographies of 
the founders and the partners involved in each investment. Few commercial databases could 
provide the information about participating partners and the relevant biographic information. 
One exception is Crunchbase (www.crunchbase.com) which is the largest crowd-sourced 
database on global entrepreneurial activity. It was founded in 2007 and provides detailed 
profiles on investors and founders back to 1980s. It identifies partners who lead the deal in the 
leading VC in each financing round. Also, it contains information about start-ups, VC firms, 
deal, founders, and partners.  
We collect the data as follows. Firstly, we download all financing rounds by the U.S. 
VC firms and obtain the relevant hyperlinks to each financing round web page. Secondly, we 
search the financing found on each web page and acquire the hyperlinks for start-ups, VC firms, 
participating partners and founders and other information including: leading VC status, fund-
raising round, fund-raising date, number of VCs and news article coverage. In addition, we 
search the webpages via those links and obtain the following information: Start-ups (founding 
date, location, industry category, and exit status), VC firms (founding date, location, and 
investment history), participating partners (identity, LinkedIn, education history and 
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employment history) and start-up founders (identity, LinkedIn, education history and 
employment history). To obtain a more complete data coverage, we also search LinkedIn, S&P 
Capital IQ, Bloomberg Investor Profiles, company websites, and relevant news websites.  
The ethnic information of partners and founders is obtained by using the database 
constructed by Kerr (2008). Kerr (2008) classifies the ethnic minority groups by using 
surnames of investors. We have the 100 most common surnames for Chinese, Indian, Japanese, 
Korean, Russian, Hispanic, and Vietnamese. Following Bengtsson and Hsu (2015), we use a 
list of the most common Jewish surnames from Wikipedia. In total, we have eight ethnic 
minority groups and these eight groups represent the most important subgroups which are 
active in the U.S. VC industry.  
We apply the following sample selection criteria. We restrict our sample to the U.S. 
start-ups. Also, we require that the information about the leading VC firm in each round is 
available. If the leading VC information is missing, we identify a VC firm as leading VC firm 
if it makes the largest investment. Also, we require that the participating partners’ information 
in the leading VC firm is available. Further, as VC firms could enter stage-financing and 
participate in several financing rounds, we restrict the sample to the first match between VC 
firm and start-up. Consistent with Hedge and Tumlinson (2014) and Gompers et al. (2016b), 
the unit of analysis in this paper is VC firm-start-up pair. In addition, we require that profiles 
of founders and partners should be available. Finally, even though Crunchbase provides 
funding history back to 1980s, the size and the quality of the data has been increasing since 
2006. We restrict our sample to the time span from 2006 to 2016 and track the investment 
outcome as of 31 Dec 2017. We have a final sample of 2,246 leading VC firm-start-up pairs.  
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2.3.2 Variables 
2.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
2.3.2.1.1 Collaboration of the VC firm and the Start-up 
VC investment is a two-sided matching process in which both the founder and investor 
must achieve agreement on each other’s requirement (Sørensen, 2007). The information gap 
between founders and partners leads to mutual doubt. To test the influence of social ties on 
collaboration of VC and start-ups, we have a sample of actual pairs of lead VC-start-ups and 
we need to construct counterfactual pairs, for which lead VC firm could potentially invest in 
start-ups but do not. Following Bengtsson and Hsu (2015), we construct the counterfactual pair 
of a single investment as those potential investments made by the same VC firm in other start-
ups in the same year, state and industry of the actual start-up. As a result, the dependent variable 
Collaboration is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the VC firm invested in the start-
up (the actual pair) and zero if the VC firm invested in a potential start-up in the same year-
state-industry of the actual start-up (the counterfactual pair).  
2.3.2.1.2 Post-investment Outcome 
Round Level Analysis 
To examine post-investment outcome, we follow Hochberg et al. (2007) and firstly 
conduct the analysis at the round level. In this sector, we remove the observations if the first 
match between leading VC firm and start-up is in the final financing stage of which the next 
round is IPO/M&A. We then create three dependent variables, firstly testing the probability of 
next round financing if the start-up could survive to next round. We then apply survival analysis 
with the Hazard rate of surviving to next round as the dependent variable. Finally, we try to 
analyse the amount of funds that could be raised if the start-up survives to the next round.  
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Exit Performance 
We treat the final investment outcome as the successful one if the VC firm is able to 
bring the start-up to the IPO market or M&A market (Hochberg et al., 2007). We restrict the 
sample to the time span from 2006 to 2014 and track the investment outcome as of 31 Dec 
2017, leaving an at least a three years window for the VC firm to exit their portfolio companies.  
2.3.2.2 Independent Variables  
2.3.2.2.1 Social Connection Variables 
To measure the social ties between the leading VC firm and start-up, we create five 
different variables. Connected_Pair is a dummy variable which equals one if any participating 
partner in the leading VC firm shares any tie (education, employment and ethnicity) with any 
founder in the start-up and zero otherwise. We then break the connection variable into 
individual ties. Same_School is a dummy variable which is equal to one if any participating 
partner in the leading VC firm went to the same university with anyone of founders and zero 
otherwise. We apply the same logic to construct the Same_Employer and Same_Ethnic_ 
Minority variables.  
We then follow Ishii and Xuan (2014) and construct another variable to measure the 
degree of connections between the leading VC firm and start-up. For each leading VC firm-
start-up pair, we define a matrix consisting of all the participating partners and founders. Each 
element of the matrix is a pair of individuals composed of one participating partner from the 
leading VC firm and one founder from the start-up. The total number of elements in the matrix 
is thus equal to the total number of participating partners of the leading VC firm and the total 
number of founders of the start-up. We then count the total number of connected pairs and 
divide this number by the total number of pairs to form the variable Connection_Degree. 
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Connection_Degree captures the extent to which the participating partners of the leading VC 
firm and the founders are socially connected. For example, a Connection_Degree of 50% 
between a leading VC firm with two participating partners and a start-up with three founders 
indicate that, out of 6 pairs of individuals from the two firms, three people are connected based 
on education, employment and ethnic minority ties.  
2.3.2.2.2 Control Variables 
We also control for VC characteristics, start-up characteristics, and deal characteristics. 
VC experience is the logarithm of the total number of investment activities of the lead VC in 
the three preceding years. We do not use age to proxy experience as age is an accumulating 
variable and does not reflect the recent investment capability of VC firms. In addition, the 
leading VC firm could syndicate with other VC firms and we count the number of VC firms in 
the first match of the leading VC firm and the start-up. We also include a dummy variable 
Fewer_than_50_Employees to control for the relative size of the start-up. Also, to account for 
the start-up quality, we follow Gompers et al. (2016b) and construct Media_Coverage which 
is the number of news articles published in the initial stage of the match of the leading VC firm 
and the start-up. Further, as the first match of the leading VC firm and the start-up might take 
place at a different stage in the development of the start-up company, we include the round 
fixed effects to account for the maturity of the start-up. We also include year effects as VC 
investment is affected by the vintage year economic conditions. Finally, we include the industry 
and state fixed effects.  
2.3.3 Summary Statistics  
We present the descriptive statistics of the sample in Table 2.1. Panel A demonstrate the 
number of pairs by year. Crunchbase database was first established in 2007 and tracks records 
back to 1980s. As can be seen in panel A, data coverage has gradually been increasing in recent 
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years. Similar pattern can be also found in the mean value and aggregate value in our sample. 
The aggregate value trend is consistent with the one of overall U.S. VC industry investment 
(www.statista.com), with the sharp increase in 2014 and the peak in 2015. Panel B reports the 
number of observations in our sample by the state of start-ups. The VC industry is highly 
concentrated in three states including California, New York, and Massachusetts. The 
geographic distribution is consistent with the findings of Chen, Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner 
(2010). They document geographic concentration of VC activities in three metropolitan areas: 
San Francisco, Boston, and New York. Panel C documents the number of pairs by the industry 
of start-ups and the industry category is classified by the Crunchbase database. The three most 
representative industries in our sample are Data and Analytics, Biotechnology, and Commerce 
and Shopping. Crunchbase database archives more high technology investments and this 
reflects the recent trend in the U.S. VC industry as VC investments are flowing into the high 
technology sector. Panel D reports the investment round when the leading VC firm first 
matches with the start-up. The majority of VCs begin to invest in the seed stage or round A. 
Compared to later rounds, the mean value of seed round or round A is smaller than that of 
following financing rounds. As decreasing numbers of start-ups are able to survive to the next 
financing round (Hochberg et al., 2007), we see fewer pair matches in the later rounds. VC 
begins to invest in round R+1, with the condition that the start-up survives to round R. As 
mentioned earlier, we include the round fixed effects to control the maturity of the start-ups 
and the vintage year effects.  
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
In Table 2.2, we present a univariate comparison of connected and unconnected start-
ups. Firstly, the percentage of connected groups is around 4.3% in the test of collaboration and 
is around 8.3% in test of post-investment outcome, suggesting that the VC firm is more likely 
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to invest the connected start-up. We calculate the mean difference between the two groups in 
the last column. From this table, we could observe that, compared to unconnected start-ups, 
connected start-ups have a higher percentage of collaboration with VCs (0.152 vs 0.074), 
higher probability of going to next round financing (0.745 vs 0.587), shorter duration before 
going to next round financing (19.975 months vs 23.293 months), higher next round fund-
raising value (38 million vs 25 million) and a higher percentage of IPO/M&A exit outcomes 
(0.375 vs 0.276). In brief, the univariate test suggests that socially connected pairs of VC firm 
and start-up are more likely to collaborate with each other and have better post-investment 
outcomes.  
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
2.4 Empirical Results  
2.4.1 Collaboration of the VC firm and the start-up 
Table 2.3 reports the regression results on probability of collaboration of the VC firm 
and the start-up. The coefficients of all social connection variables are positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level, suggesting that social ties might help to build up trust between VC 
partners and start-up founders and facilitate the VC firm’s decision of making investment and 
the start-up’s decision of receiving funding. The findings are in line with Hedge and Tumlison 
(2014) and Bengtsson and Hsu (2015). In terms of economic significance, ceteris paribus, the 
likelihood of collaboration increases by 6% when the leading VC firm’s participating partners 
and start-up founders are socially connected. When we break the Connected_Pair into 
individual ties, the strongest effect comes from the employment tie. Ceteris paribus, the 
likelihood of collaboration increases 12% if the leading VC firm’s participating partners and 
start-up founders worked for the same employer before. In the last column, we consider the 
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degree to which the VC firm is connected to the start-up and include the variable 
Connection_Degree. The result suggests that the stronger the connection between the VC firm 
and start-up, the higher the probability of collaboration between the VC firm and start-up. In 
brief, our results conclude the positive influence of social ties on collaboration of the VC firm 
and start-up, providing supporting evidence to the first hypothesis.    
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
2.4.2 Post-Investment Outcome 
2.4.2.1 Round Level Analysis 
After testing the relationship between social ties and investment collaboration, we next 
examine the impact of social ties on post-investment outcome. We conduct two parts of analysis: 
round level analysis and exit performance.  
Table 2.4 demonstrates the probability of the start-up obtaining next round financing. 
To begin, all coefficients of social connection variables are statistically significant and positive, 
implying that socially connected start-ups are more likely to survive to next round financing. 
As for economic significance, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a start-up surviving to next 
round financing is increased by 16% if the start-up is socially connected to the leading VC firm. 
When we look into individual ties, the magnitudes of individual ties are qualitatively similar, 
and the strongest effect is from the ethnicity tie. When we consider the degree of connection, 
we find that the stronger the connection between the leading VC firm and the start-up, the 
higher the probability of the start-up going into next round financing. In brief, social ties 
between the leading VC firm’s participating partners and start-up founders might help to 
facilitate the communication and improve the cooperation, leading to better post-investment 
outcome. In brief, we reject the null hypothesis “Cost of Friendship” and the results in Table 
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2.4 support the “Benefits of Friendship” hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
We next apply the survival analysis and examine the hazard rate of next round equity 
financing by taking the duration into consideration. In the Cox Hazard model, the positive 
coefficient suggests a higher likelihood of a start-up going to the next round financing and 
shorter expected duration.  
As can be seen from Table 2.5, coefficients of all social connection variables are 
statistically significant at least at 10% level and positive. The results suggest that, if a start-up 
is socially connected with the leading VC firm, the probability of going to the next round 
financing is higher and the expected duration of going to the next round financing is lower. The 
findings, again, provide supporting evidence to the “Benefits of Friendship” hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
As an additional step, since social ties are associated with higher probability of next 
round financing, we test how social ties are associated with the amount of fund-raising in the 
next round. Table 2.6 reports that, the majority coefficients of social connection variables are 
positive in a significant way. The results imply that, upon surviving to the next round financing, 
socially connected start-ups will raise larger amounts of funding. In terms of economic 
significance, ceteris paribus, compared to the unconnected group, the socially connected start-
ups raise 35% more funding. This is especially the case if the start-up and the VC firm share 
the school tie, where the start-up could raise 58% more funding.  Further, when we consider 
the degree of connection, we find that the stronger the connection, the higher the amount of 
fund-raising. In summary, social ties are not only associated with higher probability of a start-
up going into next round financing, but also related to larger amounts of fund-raising upon 
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surviving to the next round. The findings in the round level analysis consistently support the 
“Benefits of Friendship” hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
2.4.2.2 Exit Performance 
After performing the round level analysis, we then test the relationship between social 
ties and final exit outcome. By exiting via the route of an IPO, both start-ups and VC firms 
could earn the highest amount of returns and build up their reputations. However, VC firms 
also tend to approach the acquisition market either as the second-best option to going public or 
when they want to exit a portfolio company via “fire sales”. M&A still accounts for the critical 
exit option in the VC market (Phillips and Zhdanov, 2017) and M&A also generates positive 
returns for VCs and start-ups (Gompers and Lerner, 2004). In this regard, we follow Hochberg 
et al. (2007) and treat the investment success as a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
VC firm is able to bring the start-up to the IPO market or the M&A market and zero otherwise. 
[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
Table 2.7 reports the result on the exit performance analysis. The majority coefficients 
of social connection variables are statistically significant and positive except for the coefficient 
of Same_Ethnic_Minority. Regarding the ethnic minority tie, Hedge and Tumlinson (2014) find 
positive influence of the ethnicity tie on exit outcome while Bengtsson and Hsu (2015) take 
the composition of the board into consideration and report negative influence of ethnicity ties 
on exit outcome. In our paper, we consider ties between the participating partners in the leading 
VC firm and start-ups rather than all partners in all VC firms and start-ups. Our findings might 
suggest that at least for the leading VC firm the ethnicity tie is not the primary determinant in 
the exit process. In terms of economic significance, compared to the unconnected group, the 
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likelihood of going IPO/M&A is 9% higher if the start-up is socially connected to the VCs, 
ceteris paribus. When we consider the degree of connection, we find that the stronger the 
connection, the higher the probability of the VC firm taking a start-up to IPO/M&A. Overall, 
our results on exit performance suggest social ties are associated with better post-investment 
outcome and provide further evidence to support the “Benefits of Friendship” hypothesis.  
2.4.3 Selection or Monitoring 
The better performance of socially connected start-ups could be due to pre-investment 
selection of higher quality companies by the leading VC firm or the post-investment monitoring. 
The assortative matching behaviour in VC markets is documented by (Sørensen, 2007). In this 
case, high quality VC firms invest in high quality start-ups. To address the selection effect in 
the post-investment outcome analysis, we adopt the Heckman two-stage model. In the first 
stage, the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is estimated and proxies for unobservable factors that affect 
matching between the VC firm and the start-up. In the second stage, we run the linear 
probability model and include the IMR in the regression. By doing so, we address the selection 
bias on the social connection variable and document the post-investment monitoring of VC 
partners on start-up performance. Woodridge (2002) explains that the null hypothesis of no 
selection effect can be tested by using standard t-test for the coefficient of IMR.  
In the first stage, we need an exogenous variable which affects the matching between 
the VC firm and the Start-up, but not the post-investment success. To construct such a variable, 
we follow Bottazzi et al. (2008) and Hedge and Tumlinson (2014) and use the market 
characteristic variable as the exogenous variable because they exogenously determine the 
availability of connected partners and consequently the likelihood of connected match. More 
specifically, in a highly connected market, a VC firm is more likely to encounter and invest in 
a socially connected start-up. However, conditioned on encountering a connected founder, the 
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VC firm is no more likely to enjoy screening advantages in highly connected market than low 
connected market. In this sense, the quality of investment is not necessarily better in highly 
connected market than in low connected market. After controlling for the selection effects, we 
could then examine how the social ties shape the performance of connected pair. Here, the 
market is defined as the year-state-industry of the start-up. We create an exogenous variable 
Local_Percentage_of_Connected_Pairs as the number of connected pairs (both actual and 
counterfactual) divided by the total number of pairs in the market. This variable helps to capture 
the market characteristics as it reflects the degree of connection of the market.  
[Insert Table 2.8 about here] 
In Table 2.8, we note that in the first stage, the coefficients of 
Local_Percentage_of_Connected_Pairs variables are statistically significant and positive, 
suggesting that in the highly connected market, the probability of collaboration between VC 
firms and start-ups is higher. In the second stage, we note that the coefficients of social 
connection variables are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the inclusion 
of selection effects does not appear to interfere with the basic relationship between social 
connection variables and post-investment outcome. We also note that IMR are always 
insignificant. Consequently, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selection effects.  
Overall, as argued by Gompers et al. (2016b), it is impossible to completely rule the 
selection story. In this paper, the story is that connected VC firms are more likely to select high 
quality start-ups. By adopting the two-stage Heckman selection model, we attempt to address 
this endogeneity and we report that the post-investment monitoring activity of VC firms is most 
likely to be the key mechanism through which the connectedness between the VC firm and 
start-up affects the post-investment outcome.  
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2.4.4 Robustness Check: An International Sample 
As the robustness check, we expand our sample to a global sample. In this part, we 
modify the variable Connection_Degree by excluding the ethnicity tie. This is because the 
ethnicity tie might not be influential in other single ethnicity countries such as China. Also, 
instead of including state fixed effects, we include region fixed effects: US, UK, Europe and 
Rest of the World (Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed, 2015). As can be seen from Table 2.9, 
the main results still hold in the international sample and socially ties are associated with better 
post-investment outcome.  
[Insert Table 2.9 about here] 
2.5 Conclusion  
Information asymmetry is a typical friction in the financial markets and social ties 
which are able to serve as the channel of information transfer help to mitigate the information 
problem and facilitate the financial transaction. In the VC markets, the information gap 
between investors and entrepreneurs is large as little hard information such as revenue and cash 
flow is available for implementation of the valuation model. This paper investigates how social 
ties between VC partners and start-up founders, obtained via school, employment and ethnic 
minority group, affect the collaboration between VC firms and start-ups and post-investment 
outcome.  
To build up social tie variables, we need a comprehensive dataset of the biographies of 
investors and entrepreneurs. We hand collect 2,246 leading VC firm-start-up pairs in the U.S. 
during the period from 2006 to 2017, using the Crunchbase dataset (www.crunchbase.com). 
We obtain detailed information about start-ups, VC firms, participating partners (who lead each 
investment) and founders. To study the collaboration of the VC firm and the start-up, we 
70 
 
construct the counter-factual pair which is the potential investments of the VC firm in the same 
year-state-industry of the start-up. In the post-investment outcome analysis, we firstly conduct 
the round-level analysis and then perform the exit outcome analysis.  
We find that, compared to unconnected pairs, socially connected pairs have a higher 
likelihood of collaborating with each other. Upon investment, a start-up which is socially 
connected with the VC firm has a higher probability of going into next round financing, a 
higher hazard rate of going into next round financing and a shorter expected duration, a larger 
amount of fund-raising in the next round and higher probability of going IPO/M&A. After 
addressing the selection effect, we still document the positive relationship between social ties 
and post-investment outcome.  
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Appendix 2.1: Variable definition 
Variables  Definition and Source  
Dependent variables   
Collaboration 
Dummy variable which equals one for the actual pair and zero for the counterfactual 
pair (potential investment of the leading VC firm in the same year-state-industry of 
the actual start-up). (Source: Crunchbase) 
Next_Round_Financing 
Dummy variable which equals one if the start-up survives to next round financing 
and zero otherwise. (Source: Crunchbase) 
Hazard_Rate 
Conditional probability that the start-up survives to next round financing. (Source: 
Crunchbase). Duration is  
Next_Round_Value 
The amount of funding raised by the start-up upon surviving to next financing round. 
(Source: Crunchbase) 
IPO/M&A 
Dummy variable which equals one if the VC firm brings the start-up to the IPO 
market or the M&A market before the end of 2017 and zero otherwise. (Source: 
Crunchbase/SDC) 
Social ties variables   
Connected_Pair 
Dummy variable which equals one if any participating partner in the leading VC 
firm shares any tie (education, employment and ethnicity) with any founder in the 
start-up and zero otherwise. (Source: Crunchbase, LinkedIn, S&P Capital IQ, 
Bloomberg, and company websites) 
Same_School 
Dummy variable which is equal one if any participating partner in the leading VC 
firm went to the same university with anyone of founders and zero otherwise. 
(Source: Crunchbase, LinkedIn, S&P Capital IQ, Bloomberg, and company 
websites) 
Same_Previous_Employer Dummy variable which is equal one if any participating partner in the leading VC 
firm worked in the same company with anyone of founders and zero otherwise. 
(Source: Crunchbase, LinkedIn, S&P Capital IQ, Bloomberg, and company 
websites) 
Same_Ethnic_Minority 
Dummy variable which is equal one if any participating partner in the leading VC 
firm share the same ethnicity with anyone of founders and zero otherwise. (Source: 
Crunchbase, LinkedIn, S&P Capital IQ, Bloomberg, and company websites) 
Connection_Degree 
Total number of connected pairs between the leading VC firm and the star-up over 
total number of pairs between two parties. (Source: Crunchbase, LinkedIn, S&P 
Capital IQ, Bloomberg, and company websites) 
Control variables   
VC_Experience 
Logarithm of the total number of investment activities of the lead VC in the three 
preceding years. (Source: Crunchbase) 
Number_of_VCs 
The number of VC firms in the first match of the leading VC firm and the start-up. 
(Source: Crunchbase) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees 
Dummy variable which equals one if the number of employees of the start-up is 
fewer than 50. (Source: Crunchbase) 
Media_Coverage 
The number of news articles published in the initial stage of the match of the leading 
VC firm and the start-up. (Source: Crunchbase) 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Temporal distribution 
Panel A illustrates the distribution of VC investments by the vintage year. The sample includes 2,246 investments 
between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase.  
 
Panel B: State distribution  
Panel B illustrates the distribution of VC investments by the state of the start-up. The sample includes 2,246 
investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. Panel C includes the top ten states 
in terms of the number of investments and presents them in descending order. 
 
Panel C: Industry distribution 
Panel C illustrates the distribution of VC investments by the state of the industry category. The sample includes 
2,246 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. Panel C includes the top 
ten industry categories in terms of the number of investments and presents them in descending order. 
Industry Category N Percent% Mean Value ($Mil) 
Data and Analytics 243 0.108 16.964 
Biotechnology 203 0.090 23.684 
Commerce and Shopping 192 0.085 25.424 
Financial Services 154 0.069 23.003 
Information Technology 154 0.069 18.146 
Advertising 149 0.066 13.321 
Apps 143 0.064 13.871 
Hardware 122 0.054 20.307 
Consumer Electronics 119 0.053 26.047 
Health Care 117 0.052 17.946 
Others 650 0.289 16.176 
Total 2,246 1 18.837 
Year N Percent 
Mean Value 
($Mil) 
Aggregate Value 
($Mil) 
2006 29 0.013 8.179 237.191 
2007 48 0.021 15.134 726.432 
2008 42 0.019 14.509 609.378 
2009 44 0.020 10.120 445.280 
2010 65 0.029 13.187 857.155 
2011 77 0.034 11.899 916.223 
2012 124 0.055 13.835 1,715.540 
2013 145 0.065 12.206 1,769.870 
2014 749 0.333 18.226 13,651.270 
2015 577 0.257 27.183 15,684.590 
2016 346 0.154 16.460 5,695.160 
Total 2,246 1 18.837 42,307.900 
State N Percent Mean Value ($Mil) 
California 1,187 0.528 21.630 
New York 332 0.148 14.319 
Massachusetts 197 0.088 18.174 
Texas 71 0.032 12.316 
Washington 60 0.027 17.156 
Colorado 36 0.016 8.040 
Georgia 32 0.014 23.403 
Illinois 31 0.014 23.756 
Utah 30 0.013 22.116 
North Carolina 26 0.012 22.238 
Others 244 0.108 13.883 
Total 2,246 1 18.837 
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Panel D: Round distribution 
Panel D illustrates the distribution of VC investments by the financing when the VC firm firstly invests in the 
start-up. The sample includes 2,246 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from 
Crunchbase.  
Financing Rounds N Percent Mean Value ($Mil) 
Seed/Round A 793 0.353 9.245 
Round B 549 0.244 19.765 
Round C 308 0.137 27.861 
Later Rounds 596 0.265 26.081 
Total 2,246 1 18.837 
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Table 2.2: Univariate test 
The table 2.2 shows the univariate test for key dependent and independent variables. The sample includes 2,246 
investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase.  The last column shows the 
univariate test statistics for mean difference between the connected group and unconnected group. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Connected  Unconnected  Mean 
Difference 
 Mean SD N  Mean SD N   
Collaboration 0.152 0.360 964  0.074 0.263 21,524  0.077*** 
Next_Round_Financing 0.745 0.436 181  0.587 0.492 1,975  0.158*** 
Duration (Months) 19.975 16.399 164  23.293 16.703 1,854  -3.317** 
Next_Round_Value ($mil)  37.963 70.736 105  25.300 43.958 946  12.663** 
IPO/M&A 0.375 0.486 120  0.276 0.447 1,180  0.098** 
VC_Experience 3.663 0.111 187  3.438 0.031 2,059  0.225** 
Number_of_VCs 3.695 0.195 187  4.115 0.056 2,059  -0.420** 
Fewer_than_50_Employees 0.492 0.501 187  0.455 0.498 2,059  0.037 
Media_Coverage 1.257 0.710 187  1.321 0.843 2,059  -0.065 
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Table 2.3: Collaboration between VC and Start-up 
The sample includes 2,246 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. For 
each actual investment (pair of the VC firm and the start-up), we create the counterfactual investment based on 
the year-state-industry of the start-up. The dependent variable Collaboration is equal to one for the actual pair and 
zero for the counterfactual pair. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Connected_Pair 0.064***     
 (0.012)     
Same_School  0.053***    
  (0.017)    
Same_Previous_Employer   0.127***   
   (0.020)   
Same_Ethnic_Minority    0.028**  
    (0.013)  
Connection_Degree     0.089*** 
     (0.010) 
VC_Experience 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 22,447 22,447 22,447 22,447 22,447 
R2 0.126 0.123 0.127 0.122 0.127 
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Table 2.4: Probability of next round financing 
The sample includes 2,156 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. The 
dependent variable Next_Round_Financing is equal to one if the start-up survives to next round financing and 
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Connected_Pair 0.156***     
 (0.023)     
Same_School  0.162***    
  (0.056)    
Same_Previous_Employer   0.130***   
   (0.038)   
Same_Ethnic_Minority    0.180***  
    (0.056)  
Connection_Degree     0.208*** 
     (0.051) 
VC_Experience 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Number_of_VCs 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.095*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Media_Coverage 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Round FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,156 2,156 2,156 2,156 2,156 
R2 0.272 0.270 0.270 0.269 0.271 
77 
 
Table 2.5: Hazard Rate of next round equity financing  
The sample includes 2,018 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. The 
hazard rate is the conditional probability that the start-up survives to the next round financing. The duration is the 
total months from the investment date to the next round financing date. For start-up without next round financing, 
the duration is the number of months between the investment date and 31st December 2017. In Cox hazard model, 
the failure event is the case that the start-up survives to next round financing before the end of 2017. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the industry level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Connected_Pair 0.432***     
 (0.082)     
Same_School  0.467***    
  (0.141)    
Same_Previous_Employer   0.374***   
   (0.102)   
Same_Ethnic_Minority    0.263*  
    (0.145)  
Connection_Degree     0.589*** 
     (0.112) 
VC_Experience -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Number_of_VCs 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees -0.466*** -0.463*** -0.461*** -0.458*** -0.463*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Media_Coverage -0.104* -0.099* -0.101* -0.104* -0.105* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Round FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
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Table 2.6: Next round value  
The sample includes 1,051 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. The 
dependent variable Next_Round_Value is the amount of funding raised by the start-up upon surviving to next 
financing round. We take the logarithm of the value. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Connected_Pair 0.391**     
 (0.145)     
Same_School  0.614***    
  (0.182)    
Same_Previous_Employer   0.517**   
   (0.235)   
Same_Ethnic_Minority    0.224  
    (0.222)  
Connection_Degree     0.418** 
     (0.198) 
VC_Experience 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Number_of_VCs 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees -1.009*** -1.021*** -1.009*** -1.014*** -1.010*** 
 (0.080) (0.082) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081) 
Media_Coverage 0.131** 0.129** 0.134** 0.121** 0.128** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Round FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 
R2 0.385 0.388 0.385 0.378 0.382 
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Table 2.7: Probability of IPO/M&A 
The sample includes 1,300 investments between 2006 and 2014. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. The 
dependent variable IPO/M&A is equal to one if the VC firm brings the start-up to the IPO market or the M&A 
market before the end of 2017 and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Connected_Pair 0.091**     
 (0.042)     
Same_School  0.149**    
  (0.062)    
Same_Previous_Employer   0.128*   
   (0.068)   
Same_Ethnic_Minority    -0.058  
    (0.100)  
Connection_Degree     0.124*** 
     (0.040) 
VC_Experience 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number_of_VCs 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees 0.050* 0.050* 0.050* 0.050* 0.052* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Media_Coverage 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Round FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 
R2 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.121 0.124 
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Table 2.8: Selection effects vs monitoring effects: Heckman selection model 
In Table 2.8, we perform the hackman selection model. In the first stage, the dependent variable Collaboration is 
equal to one for the actual pair and zero for the counterfactual pair (as in Table 2.3). In the second stage, we 
include the Inverse_Mills_Ratio in the second stage regressions. In the next round financing analysis, the 
dependent variable Next_Round_Financing is equal to one if the start-up survives to next round financing before 
the end of 2017 and zero otherwise. In the IPO/M&A analysis, the dependent variable IPO/M&A is equal to one 
if the VC firm brings the start-up to the IPO market or the M&A market before then end of 2017 and zero otherwise. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Next Round Financing IPO/M&A 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Connection_Degree 0.016*** 0.156*** 0.013* 0.177*** 
 (0.006) (0.045) (0.008) (0.051) 
Local_Percentage_of_Connected_Pair 0.764***  0.683***  
 (0.100)  (0.104)  
VC_Experience 0.002*** 0.013** 0.002*** -0.011 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) 
Number_of_VCs  0.007**  0.012** 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees 0.005* -0.058** 0.004 0.074** 
 (0.002) (0.023) (0.003) (0.034) 
Media_Coverage  0.019  -0.013 
  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Inverse_Mills_Ratio  -0.034  -0.020 
  (0.026)  (0.042) 
Round FE N Y N Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21,518 1,831 11,774 956 
R2 0.190 0.325 0.212 0.156 
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Table 2.9: External validity: an international sample 
The sample includes 2,753 investments between 2006 and 2016. The sample is extracted from Crunchbase. In 
Table 2.9, we re-run previous regressions by using an international sample. We construct the Connection _Degree 
by excluding the ethnic minority tie. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Next Round 
Equity 
Financing 
Cox Hazard Next Round 
Equity Value 
IPO/M&A 
Connection_Degree (Excl. Ethnic Tie) 0.172*** 0.520*** 0.439*** 0.101** 
 (0.044) (0.119) (0.153) (0.046) 
VC_Experience 0.023*** 0.017 0.109*** 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.022) (0.006) 
Number_of_VCs 0.013*** 0.013 0.060*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) 
Fewer_than_50_Employees -0.115*** -0.508*** -0.972*** 0.054** 
 (0.025) (0.070) (0.073) (0.026) 
Media_Coverage 0.006 -0.126*** 0.151*** -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.047) (0.046) (0.012) 
Round FE Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,753 2,583 1,292 1,620 
R2 0.248 - 0.341 0.104 
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Chapter 3 Do Diversified Firms Allocate 
Capital Inefficiently? Evidence from Equity 
Carve-outs 
3.1 Introduction 
Whether a conglomerate is an efficient model for a business has been a question for the 
markets for many years. Prior studies have demonstrated that the market valuation of 
conglomerates is at discount to the aggregated individual values of their component businesses 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994; Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). This undervaluation is generally 
attributed to the failure of the capital allocation function of the conglomerate, i.e. the failure of 
the Internal Capital Market (ICM). Several authors argue that the dysfunctionality of the ICM 
is due to factors such as the complexity and opacity of the parent’s portfolio, and asymmetry 
of information between divisional managers and top management as well as between divisional 
managers and shareholders (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). 
Academics have also suggested other reasons for the ICM dysfunctionality, particularly 
corporate socialism, which provides blood life to the weak divisions and starves the strong ones 
of investment funds as well as the managerial preference to allocate capital according to 
organisational politics, rather than objective value-generating criteria (Rajan et al., 2000; Stein, 
2003).  
To address the putative causes of inefficiency in the parent’s ICM, diversified firms 
have the option to undertake divestments of segments of their business in the form of sell-offs, 
spin-offs and equity carve-outs (ECO). A sell-off is a sale of a business segment to another 
company, a spin-off is the floatation of the divested part in a stock exchange, with the 
distribution of the shares in that newly listed company to the shareholders of the parent, and an 
ECO is the floatation of the divested part on a stock exchange, with the parent selling a minority 
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of share ownership to outside investors. A few studies have examined the direct impact of spin-
offs and sell-offs on the allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM (Gertner, Powers, and 
Scharfstein, 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Burch and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 
2004; McNeil and Moore, 2005). Çolak and Whited (2007) (hereafter ÇW) conclude that there 
is no significant improvement in the allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM following these 
restructuring events. The impact of an ECO on the ICM efficiency of the parent has surprisingly 
received scant attention in the literature; and if such an impact exists, it is not clear what drives 
such changes in the functioning of the parent’s ICM following ECOs. 
In this paper we examine the efficiency of the ICM in a new and arguably more 
appropriate context, i.e. the ECO. Prior studies report the impact of ECOs only on the parent’s 
shareholder value and the improvement in the parent’s operating performance, drawing indirect 
inferences about the functioning of the parent’s ICM. However, we believe that this approach 
is consistent with, and not necessarily corroborative of, an improvement in the parent’s ICM 
(Vijh, 2002). Our investigation is, therefore, the first study to focus on the direct impact of 
ECOs on the allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM, a major financial rationale for 
diversification. In contrast to spin-offs and sell-offs, the advantage of using the ECO event for 
assessing the ICM efficiency of the diversified parent is that ECOs directly address some of 
the putative causes of ICM inefficiency. Independent monitoring of the carved-out segment by 
analysts and investors can mitigate the agency conflict between different managerial levels and 
between the top management and the parent’s shareholders.  
An ECO allows the parent to augment its corporate focus and provide the offspring 
with greater autonomy, while the two business entities continue to maintain a strategic 
relationship (Schipper and Smith, 1986). The external capital market also provides valuable 
information to the parent regarding the prospects of the two businesses as separate units (Nanda, 
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1991; Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro, 1995). As a result, and unlike in spin-offs and sell-offs, 
monitoring of the offspring by the ECM also has a healthy feedback effect on the governance 
and efficiency of the parent’s ICM. The ECO generally provides a mechanism to align the 
interests of top management in the newly formed company and the shareholders by facilitating 
managerial incentives based on stock market performance (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). For 
these reasons, we hypothesise that ECOs can lead to a significant increase in the parent’s ICM 
efficiency and improvements in the internal and external governance of the parent are 
associated with such increase.  
To test these predictions, we use a U.S. sample of ECOs completed between 1980 and 
2013. We compare the allocative efficiency of the parent firms before and after the ECO and 
assess the statistical significance of any improvement. We employ three different metrics of 
ICM efficiency following the methodology in Rajan et al. (2000) and ÇW. Two are direct 
measures of capital allocation (relative investment ratio, RINV, and relative value added, RVA) 
and one is an indirect measure reflecting the change in the parent company valuation (excess 
value, EXVAL). We also consider the endogeneity that can be associated with restructuring 
events. Any observed improvement in allocative efficiency following restructuring can 
potentially be linked to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the conglomerate rather than the 
restructuring per se. This calls into question studies that point to inefficient ICMs prior to 
restructuring based on the evidence of post-restructuring increases in allocative efficiency. To 
address the issue of endogeneity, our primary methodology employs the Abadie and Imbens 
(AI) (2006) estimator which corrects for the asymptotic bias that can be present in simple 
matching estimators, such as the propensity score matching (PSM) estimator (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). As an additional test of the robustness of our results, we analyse the change in 
allocative efficiency by using the PSM estimator and the Heckman (1979) model. Our results 
based on the AI estimator demonstrate that ECOs lead to an improvement in the allocative 
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efficiency of parent firms, consistent with the hypothesis of ICM inefficiency in these firms 
prior to ECO. We observe similar results using the PSM and the Heckman methodologies. 
To test whether increased qualities of corporate governance in the parent firms are 
associated with the improvements in the functioning of the parent’s ICM, we examine the 
changes in the internal and external corporate governance characteristics of these firms. 
Specifically, we analyse internal corporate governance characteristics such as board duality i.e. 
non-separation of the board chairman and CEO roles, board size, board composition, CEO 
compensation structure, and CEO tenure. The external governance characteristics that we 
investigate include the degree of analyst coverage, the number of institutional investors on the 
share register of the parent firm, and the concentration of their ownership. We show that the 
analyst coverage of both parent and offspring firms increases significantly following the ECOs 
which suggests that both the parent and carved-out unit are exposed to greater stock market 
scrutiny and greater transparency in the functioning of the ICM. We also find improvements in 
many internal governance characteristics of the parent firms, such as greater board 
independence, smaller board size and CEO compensation and CEO compensation which is 
based more on stock-based incentives than cash.  
More importantly, we demonstrate that the improvement in the parent’s investment 
efficiency is significantly higher in the firms which experience such positive changes in their 
internal and external governance characteristics. We find that higher analyst coverage and 
board independence are related to larger improvements in the parent’s RINV. Additionally, 
higher levels of non-cash CEO compensation are positively related to changes in all three 
measures of the parent’s investment efficiency. Finally, the valuation of the parent firms is 
significantly enhanced by higher numbers of analysts following the parent, by higher non-cash 
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CEO compensation but reduced by larger board size and overlap between the roles of the CEO 
and chairperson.  
This paper contributes to the conglomerate literature in several ways. Previous studies 
adopt corporate restructuring events such as spin-off and sell-off which lead to changes of 
conglomerate components to assess the efficiency of the internal capital market and they do 
not include a benchmark group or control group (see e.g. Dittmar and Shivadasani, 2003; Ahn 
and Denis, 2004). This paper proposes a more appropriate restructuring event equity carve-out 
to assess the efficiency of the internal capital market and address the endogeneity. Further, this 
paper provides new evidence to the literature on the “dark side” of the internal capital market 
(Scharfestein and Stein, 2000; Rajan et al., 2000) by showing that measures of investment 
efficiency increase after a conglomerate equity carve-out. This analysis carries important 
implications for the corporate managers who seek to improve the investment efficiency of their 
companies by demonstrating that ECOs could be a more effective mechanism to restructure 
company operations than spin-offs and sell-offs. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides a review of the literature on 
refocusing and investment efficiency as well as the different implications for the ICM 
following carve-outs and other types of refocusing; Section 3.3 discusses the data sources, 
provides a description of the methodology, and a full list of variables; Section 3.4 presents 
empirical tests of the hypotheses; and the conclusion is presented in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
One of the important rationales for the conglomerate or diversified business portfolio 
held by companies is that it allows them to allocate their scarce capital more efficiently among 
the businesses in their portfolio than do less diversified firms that rely on the external capital 
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market for debt or equity. The conglomerate head office is expected to function as a capital 
market playing an allocative role and, as a result, this market is referred to as the ICM. Such a 
market is said to have an information advantage over investors in the conventional external 
capital market, which allows the conglomerate head office to select potential winners and 
allocate capital to the highest valued investment opportunities (Stein, 1997; Khanna and Tice, 
2001; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004; Anjos and Fracassi, 2011). 
This benign view of the ICM efficiency has been challenged by several scholars. Some 
studies have provided evidence that conglomerates in the stock market trade at discount to the 
value of a portfolio composed of the individual segments assuming such segments were traded 
as stand-alone (or pure play) entities (Berger and Ofek, 1995). The difference in value between 
the conglomerate and the portfolio of businesses as stand-alone entities is referred to as the 
conglomerate or diversification discount (DD). Several explanations have been offered for the 
existence of the DD. Among them is a dysfunctionality of the ICM arising from both the 
complexity and diversity of internal politics and the agency conflicts between the top managers 
and divisional managers (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Scharfstein, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). A corollary to this argument is that any restructuring of the 
conglomerate’s portfolio that results in greater focus or reduced complexity should improve 
the efficiency of the ICM. One should therefore observe a significant improvement in the 
allocative efficiency of the parent following such restructuring. Similarly, where the ICM 
inefficiency is caused by the failure of internal governance to prevent capital misallocation due 
to rent seeking, misaligned incentives, corporate socialism etc., one should observe a 
significant improvement in allocative efficiency when governance is improved following a 
divestment. 
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Diversified firms undertake divestments of segments of their business to cure one or 
more of the putative causes of the dysfunctionality of the parent ICM and the DD. The parent 
firm’s shareholders experience significant positive returns when divestments in the form of 
sell-off, spin-off and ECO are announced, indicating that they are perceived by investors as 
value creating decisions (Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Seward and Walsh, 1996, Mulherin and 
Boone, 2000; Lee and Madhavan, 2010; Desai, Klock, and Mansi, 2011). Other studies have 
reported improved operating performance of the parents following divestments (John and Ofek, 
1995; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Denis and Shome, 2005; Klein and Rosenfeld, 2010). 
These results are consistent with an improvement in the underlying parent’s ICM efficiency 
and a reduction in the DD. They also imply a pre-divestment allocative inefficiency of the 
parent. 
Other studies on divestments have empirically tested the inefficiency of the 
conglomerate’s ICM prior to restructuring by examining the post-restructuring data of the 
parent and offspring (Ahn and Denis, 2004) 8 . This approach is however affected by an 
endogeneity problem. Any observed improvement in allocative efficiency following 
restructuring can potentially be linked to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the conglomerate 
rather than the restructuring per se. This calls into question studies that point to inefficient 
ICMs prior to restructuring based on the evidence of post-restructuring allocative efficiency. 
In this paper we choose to account for the endogenous nature of the ECO decision in the spirit 
of Çolak and Whited (2007). In particular, ÇW assess whether the allocative efficiency of 
diversified firms improves significantly following a spin-off or a sell-off. In the former event, 
a business segment becomes a listed entity subject to independent scrutiny but there are no 
                                                          
8 This approach has been held to be methodologically superior to the prior approach of using a stand-alone single segment 
investment opportunity as a proxy for the unobservable investment opportunity of the segments of the diversified firm (Lang 
and Stulz, 1994). Critics of this proxy-based approach to measuring the segment’s investment opportunity set have argued that 
it suffers from endogeneity bias since the conglomerate’s acquisition of a segment is self-selected and based on its strategic 
considerations (Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
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direct implications for the efficiency of the parent’s residual portfolio. In the latter event, the 
business segment becomes part of the buyer’s portfolio and is shielded from any independent 
monitoring. To assess post-restructuring allocative efficiency, ÇW advocate using a new 
methodology that addresses the issue of endogeneity. ÇW find no evidence of significant 
change in allocative efficiency and conclude that any improvement reported by prior studies is 
likely to be the artefact of a flawed methodology that ignored the endogeneity. 
In this sense, the issue of whether diversified parents have dysfunctional ICMs and 
whether divestments contribute to improvements in the allocative efficiency of the parent 
remains unresolved. This is particularly the case in the context of ECOs as a form of divestment. 
The ECO setting has superior conceptual and methodological properties over sell-offs and spin-
offs for such investigation. An ECO enables the parent to establish the offspring’s value in a 
more transparent manner. In particular, the ECO reduces the information gap that exists 
between company insiders and the capital market participants (i.e. the company outsiders) 
thanks to the release of information about the offspring in the form of regulatory filings and 
annual financial statements (Desai et al., 2011)9. 
Cline, Garner, and Yore (2014) argue that diversified firms operating inefficient ICMs 
tend to avoid issuing new equity or debt since the external capital market generally discounts 
such issues. Such external capital market monitoring improves the ICM by means of a feedback 
loop from investors. Habib, Johnson, and Naik (1997) support the feedback argument in the 
context of spin-offs which, like ECOs, are subject to external capital market monitoring. In the 
                                                          
9 Nanda (1991), drawing upon Myers and Majluf (1984), however, models the ECO decision as opportunistic, designed and 
timed by the parent to exploit its information advantage as the insider over the investors in the ECM and sell stock in the 
overvalued offspring. Slovin et al. (1995), Slovin and Shushka (1998), and Powers (2003) report empirical evidence supportive 
of the Nanda model. Other studies challenging this information asymmetry model provide evidence that the observed 
shareholder value gains are supported by improvement in the operating performance of both the parent and the offspring (Vijh, 
2002). Hulbert, Miles, and Woolridge (2002) argue that such operational improvement is inconsistent with the Nanda model 
of the parent exploiting overvaluation by external capital markets. In our study we focus on the operating performance of the 
parent as manifested in the improvement of the parent ICM functioning.  
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ECO setting, however, the feedback is about both the offspring and the residual parent. Further, 
the need for a more transparent capital allocation between the two and the greater bargaining 
power of the offspring against the parent can improve allocative efficiency (Klein, Rosenfeld, 
and Beranek, 1991; Slovin and Shushka, 1998; Hulbert et al., 2002; Boone, 2003; Triantis, 
2002). The greater bargaining power of the offspring emanates from its new access to the 
external capital market and the constraint on any rent-seeking behaviour by the offspring’s 
managers. To finance the capital investment needs of the offspring, the parent can choose from 
the options of either raising equity directly or through the offspring. This increased financing 
flexibility can also augment the efficiency of the ICM (Nanda, 1991; Slovin and Shushka, 
1998).  
At the same time, the carved-out entity can still enjoy most of the synergistic benefits 
arising from joint operations with the parent company. The extent of these synergistic benefits 
depends on the degree of control that the parent continues to maintain over the offspring. Given 
that the offspring is now a separately listed entity, it is not free to enter contracts or other 
arrangements that are structured in favour of the parent to the detriment of the shareholders in 
the offspring. However, the parent firm can employ a range of control levers such as majority 
ownership, control of the executive composition and control of the board of directors to receive 
favourable treatment. Thus, the parent can still reap the potential benefits of preserving the 
ICM, thereby enhancing its own value (Desai et al., 2011).  
An additional benefit associated with ECOs is that they allow the different residual 
business segments of the parent as well as the offspring to be independently valued by analysts 
who have developed expertise in their respective industries. This is consistent with the 
literature which shows that the number of covering analyst increases and their specialisation 
improves following ECOs (Schipper and Smith, 1986; Slovin et al., 1995; Gilson, Healy, Noe, 
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and Palepu, 2001). Moreover, the management of the offspring can be rewarded with its own 
stock following ECO, thereby enhancing the alignment of the interest of managers and 
shareholders (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Schipper and Smith, 1986). There is also evidence 
that the adoption of segment-based incentive plans could exert a positive influence on the 
quality of employees that either the offspring or the parent can hire (Kumar and Sopariwala, 
1992). Such incentive alignment enhances both the offspring’s and parent’s valuations. This 
channel of efficiency enhancement of the parent is not available in spin-offs and sell-offs since 
the spun-off or sold-off segment has no bearing on the performance of the parent. Hulbert et 
al. (2002) argue that the incentive alignment of the managers of carved-out units through stock-
based compensation will incentivise both the carved-out and parent firms to improve their 
operating performance. Stock-based compensation is also likely to reward the parent’s 
managers if their ECO decision is value enhancing and results in higher market valuation of 
the parent, which should be the rationale behind such a decision. 
In the ECO setting, the financing and investment cash flows between the two entities 
are more transparent and more rigorously monitored by analysts and investors. As a result, 
investment decision processes are improved (Vijh, 2002; Hulbert et al., 2002). While this 
enhances the transparency and monitoring of the ICM, the parent’s business scope is essentially 
unaffected, and this differentiates an ECO from a spin-off or a sell-off. The internal and 
external governance structures of both the parent and the offspring (such as board size and 
independence, institutional ownership, and level of analyst following), are expected to change 
because of the ECO. The potential decrease in information asymmetry and improvement in 
management incentive plans can enhance the quality of corporate governance of both the parent 
and offspring, thereby driving the observed improvement in the efficiency of the parent’s ICM. 
Such improvement in corporate governance mechanisms is the evidence that the expected 
divestment gains are likely to be the true motive for the ECO.  
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The discussion presented in this section motivates the following hypotheses that we test 
in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: The allocative efficiency of the parent’s ICM improves following an ECO. 
Hypothesis 2: The internal and external corporate governance improvements of the parent 
following the ECO are associated with the improvement in allocative efficiency of the 
parent’s ICM. 
3.3 Sample, Methodology, and Variables 
3.3.1 Sample 
To investigate the impact of ECOs on allocative efficiency and firm valuation we 
construct two different samples of companies based on U.S. data: a sample of companies that 
carve out divisions and a sample of companies that do not perform any divestment activity over 
the entire sample period from 1980 to 2013. We obtain the sample of ECOs from the SDC 
Global New Issues Database and our initial sample consists of 1,328 parent firms that complete 
ECOs during the sample period. Following the sample construction methodology in ÇW, we 
exclude companies that operate in financial services industries with Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999, which reduces the sample of ECOs to 889. 
We exclude parent companies for which company- and segment-level data are not available. 
Specifically, since we track each ECO over a 7-year period (i.e. from three years before to three 
years after the transaction year), we exclude companies that do not have relevant financial 
information over this period surrounding each ECO. Our final sample consists of 354 ECOs. 
We obtain our sample of control companies from the most recent Compustat business 
information file. We exclude the firm-year observations that lack any of the financial 
information necessary to perform the matching procedures. We also remove from the control 
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group companies with a changing number of segments during the sample period as this 
suggests some restructuring. Finally, we require that each control firm has more than one 
business segment, i.e. it is a diversified firm. These criteria result in a final sample of 3,695 
control firms. From this control sample we identify a matching firm that did not perform an 
ECO but has characteristics similar to its ECO performing counterpart. To this end we use the 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) procedure and a probit model of the likelihood of performing an 
ECO. Appendix 3.1 provides detailed definitions of the variables used in this study.  
3.3.2 Measuring Allocative Efficiency of ICM Before and After ECO 
We adopt two direct measures of allocative efficiency, namely, the relative investment 
ratio (RINV) and relative value added (RVA) (Rajan et al., 2000; and Çolak and Whited, 2007). 
We also employ an indirect measure of allocative efficiency, namely, EXVAL (Ahn and Denis, 
2004; Çolak and Whited, 2007). These correlation-based measures aim to capture the 
association between the level of investment and the investment opportunities across segments. 
The parent’s investment programme is considered the more efficient, the greater the investment 
in the segments with the highest growth potential and investment opportunities. RINV measures 
the relative investment intensity in high growth versus low growth segments. RVA captures the 
sensitivity of industry-adjusted investment of a parent segment to the industry median q ratio 
that is measured using the pure-play companies which operate in the given segment’s industry. 
The numerator of q is calculated as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus 
market capitalisation minus deferred taxes. The denominator of q equals the book value of 
assets. EXVAL captures the value of a conglomerate relative to a collection of single-segment 
companies in the industries corresponding to the conglomerate’s segments. Appendix 3.2 
describes the formulae used for calculating RINV, RVA, and EXVAL.  
94 
 
3.3.3 Treatment Effects Estimator 
Our methodology accounts for the possible endogeneity that can arise when analysing 
the change in allocative efficiency of firms that decide to perform an ECO. In an observational 
sample such as ours, the assignment of firms to the ECO group (the treatment group) and to 
the non-ECO group (the non-treatment group) is not random and could be self-selected. This 
means that the treatment effect, i.e. the improvement in allocative efficiency of the parent’s 
ICM, could be due to the characteristics of the self-selecting firms rather than to the treatment 
per se. If the decision to carve out business operations is thus endogenous, companies that opt 
for it would have systematically different characteristics from those that decide not to. If the 
allocative efficiency of companies does improve following ECOs, and this improvement is 
attributable to the ECO event, then this treatment effect must be observable after controlling 
for such systematic differences. The average treatment effect is statistically estimated by 
building a control sample of companies displaying the same characteristics and thus the same 
propensity as the treated sample and then averaging the difference in allocative efficiency 
metrics between the treatment and matched control samples.  
We use the matching estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (AI) (2006). This 
sample matching technique provides an adjustment for the asymptotic bias present in simple 
matching estimators such as the PSM estimator. Appendix 3.3 provides a discussion of the 
methodology for obtaining treatment effect estimates based on the AI procedure. A detailed 
description of the implementation of the AI estimation procedure with the Stata software is 
provided by Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004). All matching results are based on one 
nearest neighbour, i.e. one with propensity closest to a treated observation, selected from the 
control group. In unreported results we also perform matching based on more than one nearest 
neighbour control firms and our conclusions remain unchanged. 
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Next, we estimate the treatment effects on each of our performance variables, i.e. the 
control sample-adjusted results. We firstly estimate level treatment effects as the average post-
ECO level of each of the three variables relative to the level in the control sample. We calculate 
the average values of RINV, RVA and EXVAL before and after each ECO. Specifically, we 
define the variable Before as the average for each conglomerate company over a period starting 
two (or three) years before and ending one year before the completion of the ECO. For Before, 
we do not report level treatment effect 10 . The variable After is the average for each 
conglomerate company over a period starting one year after and ending two (or three) years 
after the completion of the ECO, relative to the average of a matched sample of diversified 
firms using the AI method. Following ÇW, we define the variable Change as the difference 
between the variables After and Before.  
The Difference in Difference (DinD) treatment effects captures the average change in 
the performance variables relative to the average change in the control sample. Using RINV as 
an example, the variable DinD is defined as: 
 ∆ RINVECO Parent  – ∆ RINVControl Company                                   (1) 
It should be noted that the DinD variable accounts for unobservable time-invariant 
control factors, whereas the level treatment-effect estimator does not. When the variables 
Change or DinD are significantly greater than zero, we interpret this result as an indication that 
the given improvement in investment efficiency and valuation is driven by the ECO per se and 
not by the inherent characteristics of the ECO parents. 
                                                          
10 In the level treatment effects, it is invalid to adopt the level of RINV, RVA and EXVAL as controls. This is because these 
variables would be self-explained (Çolak and Whited, 2007).  
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The AI matching procedure requires the development of a probability model that 
estimates the likelihood of embarking on an ECO. The probit regression that we estimate is of 
the form: 
Probit (ECO) =  α + βnControls + εn                                                                                    (2) 
To estimate the regression, we use two sub-samples of firms: a treatment sample of 
companies that perform ECOs and a control sample of companies that did not engage in any 
divestment activity. The dependent variable assumes a value of one if the firm has carried out 
an ECO and zero otherwise. We follow previous literature to construct the vector of control 
variables. 
Following Desai and Jain (1999) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), we 
include Relative_Entropy, a measure of the diversity of the industries in which the sample firms 
operate. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) demonstrate that companies that embark on refocusing 
activities tend to be highly leveraged. According to Haynes, Thomson, and Wright (2003), 
larger companies and companies with considerable market shares could gain more by 
increasing their focus on core-operation through restructuring. To account for these effects, we 
include, Log_Sales, Debt/Assets, MTBV (Market to book), and Market_share (ratio of company 
sales to industry sales), in our probit regressions. Following Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), 
we also incorporate measures of liquidity (EBITDA/Sales) and financing needs (Financing_gap) 
in our analysis. We also control for the presence of demand shocks in the firm’s main industry 
(proxied by Largest_segment_profit, company’s largest segment profits divided by that 
segment’s sales) following Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). Following ÇW, we incorporate 
variables that control for the timing of carve-out by capturing the broader product and stock 
market environment. These variables capture the effects of industry sales growth, the demand 
for corporate assets in the conglomerate’s main industry (variable Control_Activity), and the 
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market value of IPO activity and M&A activity. We also incorporate a measure of 
unanticipated shifts in industry prospects, captured by the industry sales growth in the year 
prior to refocusing (variable Industry_Sales_Growth). Finally, in line with ÇW, we include the 
levels of RINV, RVA, Excess_Value in our probit regression since we expect that low levels of 
investment efficiency or value should increase the propensity to refocus.  
As alternative tests, we employ two other familiar estimators, namely, the PSM 
estimator developed in Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) and the Heckman (1979) procedure 
to correct for self-selection11. According to ÇW, the AI technique is arguably superior to other 
matching methods such as the Dehejia and Wahba (2002) PSM and the Heckman bias 
adjustment methods since it does not involve any parametric assumptions regarding the 
distributions of the variables. Relaxing such assumptions is particularly important when using 
data from Compustat, as these distributional assumptions are likely to be untenable and could 
result in biased standard errors. In addition, the distribution of many income and balance-sheet 
statement items may not be accurately captured by the logistic or normal distributions and these 
are the two distributions used by the PSM and the Heckman bias adjustment methods. 
The PSM and Heckman methods employ the same first stage probit model as the AI 
procedure above. For the PSM, as with the AI approach, all matching results are based on one 
nearest neighbour selected from the control group. In unreported results we also perform 
matching based on more than one nearest neighbour control firms and our conclusions remain 
unchanged. In the Heckman (1979) model, we estimate the average investment efficiency 
before and after an ECO by running the following (Heckman) regression:  
∆ 𝑆𝑛(𝑇𝑛)= α + β1T𝑛 + β2InvMills + εn                                                                                                                  (3) 
                                                          
11 Villalonga (2004) applies PSM methodology to the study of conglomerate discount. 
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where α  represents the average change in investment efficiency in the sample of non-
refocusing companies and the sum of (α+β
1
)  captures the average change in investment 
efficiency in the ECO sample. ∆S  is defined as the change in investment efficiency and 
conglomerate valuation and T𝑛  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the company 
performs a carve-out and zero otherwise. In addition, β
2
 is defined as the coefficient on the 
variable used to adjust for self-selection bias in the Heckman regression. If the firm has self-
selected to perform the restructuring and the decision thus is endogenous, εi is correlated with 
∆S and the estimate of β
1
 will be biased. According to Heckman (1979), the issue of having a 
biased estimate is analogous to an omitted variable problem where the omitted variable is the 
inverse Mills ratio (InvMills) that corresponds to the decision to perform an ECO. To obtain a 
consistent estimate of β
1
, we first need to estimate the InvMills with a probit model and then 
include the estimated InvMills in Eq. (3). To present the results from the analysis based on the 
Heckman bias correction procedure, we define the variable Heckman_Treated as the sum of 
(α+β
1
)  in Eq. (3). We also define the variable Heckman_Controls as the coefficient 
corresponding to α in Eq. (3). Finally, we note that all tests in this study are performed with 
winsorised variables at the 1st and 99th percentile of the sample. 
3.3.4 Modelling the Impact of Governance Changes on Investment Efficiency 
To examine whether enhanced corporate governance of the parent and offspring post-
ECO is associated with greater allocative efficiency, we match the offspring and its parent firm 
with the BoardEx and Execucomp databases. We replace any missing information from 
BoardEx and Execucomp by searching the Proxy Statements, 10K and Prospectuses filed by 
the parent and offspring firms. Internal corporate governance characteristics are measured by 
board duality i.e. non-separation of the board chairman and CEO roles, board size, board 
composition, CEO compensation structure and CEO tenure. External governance 
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characteristics are measured by analyst coverage, the number of institutional investors on the 
share register of the given company and the concentration of their ownership. Detailed 
definitions of the corporate governance characteristics examined in this study are provided in 
Table 1. We follow the methodologies in Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) and Coles, 
McWilliams, and Sen (2001) when constructing the internal and external governance 
characteristics. Data on analyst coverage are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (IBES) database. We regress the changes in our investment efficiency measures on the 
changes in corporate governance characteristics to assess the impact of governance changes on 
investment efficiency.  
3.4 Empirical Results  
3.4.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.1 Panel A presents the distribution of our ECO sample over time. The smallest 
proportion of ECOs in our sample was announced in the 1980s. The proportions of ECOs 
announced in the 1990s and 2000s are very similar, with 42% of our ECO sample announced 
in the former and 39% announced in the latter period.  
[Insert Table 3.1 about Here] 
Table 3.1 Panel B shows some of the key financial characteristics of companies that 
embark on ECOs and the control sample of multi-segment companies that do not perform any 
restructuring activity (non-ECO). The table demonstrates several interesting differences 
between the two sub-samples. First, ECO parents appear to have significantly better investment 
opportunities than the control firms (median MTBV of 1.65 vs 1.38 respectively). Second, ECO 
parents have significantly higher EBITDA/Sales margins (median values of 0.14 vs 0.10 for the 
control sample). Third, ECO parents are considerably and significantly more leveraged (with 
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a median Debt/Assets of 0.27 vs 0.18 for control firms), and therefore, under greater financial 
constraints. In addition, the ECO firms comprise significantly more segments (degree of 
diversification) than the control sample (median Number_of_segments of 4.00 vs 2.00 for the 
non-ECO firms). The significant difference in Relative_entropy further confirms that ECO 
parents are more diversified. ECO parents face significantly greater Financing_gap than non-
ECO firms. The other significant differences are in IPO_activity, Market_share and 
Largest_segment_profit.  
Based on this initial univariate analysis, it is apparent that the ECO parents are more 
diverse and complex and, as a result, more vulnerable to dysfunctional ICMs. Additionally, 
these findings show that ECO parents differ systematically from the control sample. This 
suggests that any estimate of improvement in allocative efficiency of the ECO parents’ ICMs 
could be subject to a potential endogeneity, i.e. these systematic differences between ECO and 
non-ECO firms could be the true cause of increase in allocative efficiency and not the ECO 
event per se12.  
Table 3.1 Panel C provides more transactional data on the ECO parents and their 
offspring units. The median offspring is about one twentieth of the median parent and the ECO 
raises nearly $97m (median Total_proceeds). The parent retains a median 72% of equity in the 
newly listed segment. The median of Total_proceeds is around 30% (97 over 311) of the 
median ECO market value, which is consistent with the Equity_retained statistics. Of the 354 
ECOs, 155 are in the same SIC3 industry as the parent, while 84 are in the same SIC2 industry 
but in different SIC3 industries. Thus, 68% of the offspring retain very strong/strong product 
market, technology, input or marketing links with their parents.  
                                                          
12 Such improvement is reported in previous studies that examine the effect of refocusing through spin-offs (Gertner et al., 
2002; Burch and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004) but they ignore the endogeneity. 
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3.4.2 Probit Model of the ECO Decision 
To perform the AI matching procedure, we first estimate a probit regression of the 
likelihood of performing an ECO by including covariates that have been identified as relevant 
by previous studies. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.2 and described in 
detail. Our analysis demonstrates, consistent with the univariate results in Table 3.1 Panel B, 
that companies that perform ECOs have systematically different characteristics from 
companies that do not embark on refocusing. These differences, potentially accounting for 
some of the observed treatment effects, highlight the need to address the problem of 
endogeneity when assessing the change in investment efficiency.  
[Insert Table 3.2 about Here] 
We find that the size of ECO parents is significantly larger and they are more diversified. 
Specifically, for one-unit increase in the Relative_entropy of the parent firm, the likelihood of 
performing an ECO increases by 0.1%. They also have larger sales volume and higher 
valuation, carry more debt, and perform ECOs in favourable market conditions with high IPO 
activity. We note that the IPO_activity and M&A_activity are exogenous to the change in parent 
investment efficiency and valuation following ECO. While being associated with the ECO 
decision, they are unlikely to be significantly related to any subsequent change in the parent’s 
allocative efficiency.  
Based on the above probit model, we employ the AI matching procedure to identify an 
appropriate control (non-ECO) firm for each ECO parent in our sample. To evaluate the 
accuracy of our matching procedure, we compare our ECO sample to the 354 control firms 
identified by the AI method in Table 3.3. The mean and median comparison tests between the 
two groups in terms of the significant firm-specific predictor variables in the probit model 
(Log_sales, MTBV, Debt/Assets, Relative_entropy, Market_share, and Largest_segment_profit) 
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show no statistically significant differences between our ECO parent sample and the matched 
control firms. These findings suggest that the selected control firms are very similar to the ECO 
parents in all important aspects, including their propensity to undertake ECO, but only the ECO 
parents carry out the restructuring. Two other variables significant in the probit model, 
IPO_activity and Industry_sales_growth, are stock market- and industry- related rather than 
firm-specific and hence excluded from this comparison. 
[Insert Table 3.3 about Here] 
3.4.3 Treatment Effects Results 
We proceed with the evaluation of the average treatment effect of ECOs on the 
investment efficiency and valuation of the parents. The results from the analysis are presented 
in Table 3.4, Panels A and B for the analysis of change in allocative efficiency and valuation 
over periods respectively of (-2, +2) years and (-3, +3) years centred on the year of the ECO 
completion, t = 0. As defined in the methodology section, Before is the average for each 
conglomerate company over a period starting two (or three) years before and ending one year 
before the completion of the ECO. The variable After is the average for each conglomerate 
company over a period starting one year after and ending two (or three) years after the 
completion of the ECO, relative to the average of the matched sample. Change is the difference 
between Before and After. 
[Please Insert Table 3.4 about Here] 
We find that the average values of RINV and RVA before the performance of ECOs are 
negative but not significantly different from zero, i.e. companies that perform ECOs do not 
appear to be characterised by significant levels of investment inefficiency before the 
completion of the event. However, to gain a better understanding of whether investment 
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inefficiency existed before the ECOs, we also need to examine whether the investment 
efficiency improves following the ECO, after addressing the possible endogeneity. The 
analysis presented in Table 3.4, both Panels, demonstrates that the investment efficiency of the 
parent is improved during the first three years following an ECO. In particular, the Change 
coefficients for RINV (+0.02) and RVA (+0.01) measured over the window (-2, +2) years are 
statistically significant. Furthermore, DinD coefficient for RINV is positive (+0.01) over the (-
2, +2) years event window and statistically significant (at the 10% level significance).  
Table 3.4, Panels A and B indicate that there is also improvement in the parent’s EXVAL. 
Specifically, this finding is supported by the positive and significant Change coefficient (+0.57) 
over the (-2, +2) years event window, and DinD coefficient (+0.53) over the (-3, +3) years 
event window for the variable EXVAL. These results provide support to our first hypothesis 
that allocative efficiency of parent firms following ECOs improves. The fact that parents are 
better able to allocate capital across different business segments following ECOs suggests that 
these pre-restructuring parents were suffering from inefficiency of their ICMs. 
In Table 3.5 we repeat the analysis of the impact of ECO on conglomerate allocative 
efficiency and valuation with the use of the Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) PSM technique 
in Panel A and the Heckman (1979) bias adjustment procedure in Panel B. We find consistent 
results. Our analysis shows that the Change coefficients of RINV and RVA are positive and 
statistically highly significant when using the PSM technique over the two- and three-year 
event window following ECO. We also find that the coefficient corresponding to the DinD 
variable is positive and significant over the (-3, +3) years event window and across the three 
measures of allocative efficiency when using this technique. The DinD variable for EXVAL is 
also significant over the (-2, +2) years window albeit at a lower level of significance at 10%.  
[Insert Table 3.5 about Here] 
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We note that all coefficients associated with the variable InvMills presented in Table 
3.5 are positive and significant. This finding highlights the importance of adjustment for the 
self-selection bias. In other words, the characteristics that lead companies to choose ECOs as 
a refocusing mechanism are likely on average to impact positively their allocative efficiency. 
Crucially, we also find that most of the Heckman treatment estimates (i.e. the coefficients 
corresponding to the variable Heckman_Treated) are positive and statistically significant in 
Table 3.5. These results demonstrate that there is a significant enhancement in the allocative 
efficiency of parent companies following ECOs and that this enhancement is due to the impact 
of the ECO event itself and not just due to the characteristics of the parent firms. 
It is important to point out that the AI procedure shows that our analysis is unlikely to 
suffer from any asymptotic bias as the values of the DinD Treatment Effects coefficients with 
the bias adjustment are almost identical to the DinD Treatment Effects coefficients without the 
bias adjustment. This result suggests that our analysis based on the PSM in Table 3.5, Panel A 
is as reliable as the AI result in Table 3.4. Since the PSM result is stronger, in terms of statistical 
significance, and it is not tainted by any unadjusted asymptotic bias, it lends even stronger 
support for our hypothesis of investment efficiency improvement following ECOs. Our 
Heckman result in Table 3.5, Panel B is also stronger than the result based on the AI technique. 
Overall, although the methodologically superior AI matching procedure generates a weaker 
result, it does not detract from the reliability of the analysis based on the PSM and Heckman 
methods.  
3.4.4 Analysis of Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Our hypothesis 2 is that better corporate governance in the parent is associated with 
improvements of the parent company’s ICM. To test the validity of this proposition, we 
examine the change in key internal governance characteristics such as board duality, board size, 
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board composition, and CEO compensation structure. We also investigate the change in key 
external governance characteristics such as analyst coverage, number of institutional investors, 
and stock ownership of institutional investors in our sample of ECOs. We do not estimate 
treatment effects in this section, and here the variable Before_p is the average of the given 
governance variable for each conglomerate company over a period starting two (or three) years 
before and ending one year before the completion of the ECO. Similarly, After_p is the average 
of the given governance variable for each conglomerate company over a period ending two (or 
three) years after the completion of the ECO. The variable Change_p is defined as the 
difference between Before_p and After_p. 
Table 3.6, Panels A and B investigate the changes in the governance structure of parent 
firms over periods of respectively (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years centred on the year of the ECO 
completion, t = 0. The results demonstrate that the ratio of non-executive to executive board 
members increases after the ECO over each of the two event windows that we consider. 
Specifically, we observe a positive and statistically significant change in the variable 
Board_indep., amounting to +0.59 and +0.72 during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years event 
windows respectively. At the same time, we find that Board_size decreases significantly by 
0.40 and 0.46 during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years event windows respectively following the 
ECO. These results suggest an improvement in the governance structure of the parent, as 
smaller board size could imply a better coordination among directors (Yermack, 1996) and 
more independent directors can lead to improved control, monitoring, and strategic leadership 
of the board (Gilson et al., 2001). Furthermore, we find that the Analyst_coverage increases 
significantly by 5.4 and 6.1 more analysts during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) year event windows 
respectively following the ECO. These results indicate that the parent management is subject 
to increased internal independent monitoring and more rigorous capital market scrutiny 
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following the ECO. These improvements in governance are likely to lead to reduced levels of 
asymmetric information between company insiders and company outsiders.  
[Insert Table 3.6 about Here] 
We observe no change in the average CEO’s cash compensation during the (-2, +2) 
years but identify a significant increase over the (-3, +3) years window amounting to U.S. 
$0.208 million. We also observe a significant increase in the CEO’s non-cash compensation 
during the (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) year windows. The latter increase in the CEO’s compensation 
package also accounts for the largest proportion of increase in the total average CEO 
compensation in the parent firm. Specifically, our analysis demonstrates that the CEO’s non-
cash compensation increases on average by U.S. $1.22 million and U.S. $1.39 million over (-
2, +2) and (-3, +3) years respectively. This is interesting, given that the parent company is 
likely to be a more focused business following the ECO. As a result, we expect that the CEO’s 
financing and investment decisions are more likely to have a direct impact on the parent 
company’s share price, and these actions will have a more direct impact on the CEO’s non-
cash compensation. It appears that the increase in non-cash compensation associated with the 
ECO leads to a better alignment between the interests of managers and interests of shareholders. 
This better alignment of interests could arguably improve the investment efficiency of the 
parent firm, thereby satisfying one of the key objectives of the ECO, which is to better align 
managerial and shareholder interests than in the more diversified parent. In sum, the analyses 
presented in this section provide supporting evidence that there are some considerable 
improvements in the internal and external governance characteristics. 
Table 3.7, Panels A and B present the analysis of the change in corporate governance 
characteristics in the offspring firm in the first two- and three-year periods following ECO 
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completion respectively 13 , bearing in mind that it was only possible for us to obtain 
observations for offspring firms after the ECO event. In this case, the variable Before_o is the 
value of the given governance characteristic for each offspring at t = 0. After_o is value of the 
governance variable for each offspring as of two (or three) years after the completion of the 
ECO. The variable Change_o is defined as the difference between Before_o and After_o. 
The results show that, in the offspring, Board_size as well as the ratio of non-executive 
directors to executive directors (Board_indep.) tend to increase following ECO. Specifically, 
we observe a statistically significant increase of 0.65 and 0.22 in Board_size and Board_indep. 
respectively over the (0, +3) year period following ECO. Board_size also increases 
significantly over the period of (0, +3) years. These results suggest that as the carved-out units, 
as newly-established entities, tend to expand their sales and market share, they are also likely 
to recruit more directorial talent and increase their board size. Additionally, the increase in the 
proportion of independent directors suggests that the offspring companies tend to adopt a more 
independent board structure that is likely to lead to greater governance effectiveness by 
strengthening oversight and reducing conflicts of interest between board members.  
[Insert Table 3.7 about Here] 
Our analysis also shows that there is an increase in the number of institutional investors 
and the degree of analyst coverage over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) event windows following the 
ECO. Specifically, we observe a positive and statistically significant increase amounting to 
0.56 and 0.45 in the number of institutional investors (Number_of_instit._investors) over the 
(0, +2) and (0, +3) event windows following ECO respectively. The Analyst_coverage of the 
                                                          
13 We note that the data availability for different governance characteristics varies considerably. Each governance characteristic 
is tested based on the number of observations for which we have available data. For example, in Table 3.7, Panel A, data for 
analyst coverage are available for 206 offspring companies while data for the number of institutional investors is available for 
only 81 offspring companies. This large sampling variation needs to be kept in mind in assessing the significance of the 
offspring-related improvements.  
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offspring also increases by 2.5 and 2.8 analysts over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) event windows 
after the ECO respectively. These results demonstrate that the offspring companies are subject 
to strong capital market scrutiny that increases over time, thereby enhancing the external 
governance of the offspring. While the average CEO’s compensation falls together with its 
equity and cash components over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) event windows after the ECO, this 
decrease is not significant. The CEO’s tenure increases significantly by about 1.7 and 2.2 years 
on average during the over the (0, +2) and (0, +3) event windows following the ECO, perhaps 
to provide a stable leadership to the infant firms. This argument receives some support from 
the significant increase in the cases of overlap of the CEO and chairperson roles in these firms 
in the over the (0, +3) event window after the ECO. As a result, there appears to be a trade-off 
between leadership demands and rigorous governance. The internal and external governance 
improvements in the offspring firms, in conjunction with similar improvements in the parents, 
are consistent with such anticipated improvements acting as major motivators for the ECO 
decision. We next model the impact of these changes in governance characteristics on the 
parents’ investment efficiency metrics in a multivariate framework14. 
3.4.5 Effect of Corporate Governance Changes on the Functioning of the Parent’s ICM 
We perform a regression analysis of the determinants of the change in investment 
efficiency and valuation of the parents following ECOs. The results are presented in Table 3.8, 
Panels A and B over the windows (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years respectively centred on the year 
of ECO completion. For each parent company the change in investment efficiency or valuation 
is adjusted for the corresponding change in the matched control firm, where each control firm 
is identified using the AI matching estimator. For the purposes of the regression analysis we 
                                                          
14 We do not model the direct impact of improvements in the offspring on the investment efficiency of their parents measured 
over windows starting before the ECO event and model only the impact of improvements in the parents. 
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measure the change in governance characteristics over a (-2, +2) and (-3, +3) years window of 
parent company and it is adjusted for the corresponding change in the matched control firm.  
[Insert Table 3.8 about Here] 
Overall, the results presented in Table 3.8 support our hypothesis 2 that improvements 
in the governance characteristics of parent firms are associated with the increase in investment 
efficiency observed following ECOs. We note that there was insufficient information for some 
of the companies in the matched control sample and, as a result, we could not include all 
measures of internal and external corporate governance quality measures in our regression 
model. In particular, our analysis shows that greater board independence 
(Change_in_Board_indep.), smaller board size (Change_in_Board_size), separation of the 
roles of CEO and chairperson (Change_in_Board_duality) as well as higher non-cash CEO 
compensation all significantly improve RVA measured over a window of (-2, +2) years. In 
addition, higher analyst coverage (Change_in_Analyst_coverage), smaller board size 
(Change_in_Board_size) and higher non-cash CEO compensation (Change_in_CEO_non-
cash_comp.) significantly improve RINV over the same event window. Similarly, higher 
analyst coverage (Change_in_Analyst_coverage), smaller board size (Change_in_Board_size), 
non-duality of the roles of CEO and chairperson (Change_in_Board_duality) as well as higher 
non-cash CEO compensation (Change_in_CEO_non-cash-comp.) enhance EXVAL. 
Over the longer event window that captures the period of three years before and three 
years after the ECO, we find that greater board independence (Change_in_Board_indep.), 
smaller board size (Change_in_Board_size), separation of the roles of CEO and chairperson 
(Change_in_Board_duality) as well as higher non-cash CEO compensation 
(Change_in_CEO_non-cash_comp.) are all significantly related to improvements in RVA and 
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EXVAL. Our hypothesis 2 of a positive impact of governance changes following ECOs on the 
investment efficiency and valuation of the parent firms is supported. 
3.4.6 Secondary Event Analysis 
ECO appears to be transitory organizational form that is eventually followed by 
secondary corporate event such as a spin-off, sell-off or re-acquisition (Desai et al., 2011; 
Perotti and Rossetto, 2007; Gleason, Madura, and Pennathur, 2006; Vijh, 2002; Klein et al., 
1991). Perotti and Rosetto (2007) model the ECO as a strategic option portfolio with the re-
acquisition and sell-off as the exercise strategy. The parent company will re-acquire the 
offspring when the value of the offspring increases while sell the offspring off when decreases.  
Previous empirical studies examining secondary events have analysed shareholder 
returns using the conventional event study methodology at the original ECO and/or at the 
secondary event (Klein et al., 1991; Slovin and Sushka, 1998; Hulbert et al., 2002; Vijh, 2002; 
Otsubo, 2009). They have interpreted these returns to draw the implications for the original 
motivation for the ECO. None of the studies has, however, examined the real effects and the 
link between investment efficiency improvement and the secondary event. In this section, we 
conduct the additional analysis to explore this question. 
We split our initial ECO sample, following Slovin and Sushka (1998), Otsubo (2009), 
and Colla, Ippolito, and Talamanco (2009), into four sub-samples based on the secondary event 
that follows each ECO. Spin-off is the event where the parent company distributes all shares 
of the offspring to its shareholders. Sell-off is the merger and acquisition event in which the 
parent sells part or full ownership of the carve-out entity to the third party. Re-acquisition is 
the group of parents that reacquire the part or all outstanding shares of the offspring. We firstly 
search the SDC Global New Issues database to identity the secondary offerings event and spin-
off event and then search SDC Merger and Acquisition database to identify the subsequent sell-
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off event and re-acquisition event. We find that most parent companies dilute part of ownership 
through seasoned equity offering (SEO)15. The Retention sub-sample thus includes cases where 
the status quo post ECO is retained and there is no subsequent secondary event and cases of 
partial SEO. 
In Panel A of Table 3.9, we find that a large number of our sample parent firms fall 
under the category of retention. M&A activities (both sell-off and re-acquisition) represent the 
highest proportion of secondary events, amounting to more than 80% of all secondary events. 
This percentage is qualitatively similar to that reported in Klein et al. (1991), Vijh (2002), and 
Desai et al. (2011). We identify 30 spin-off transactions accounting for less than 14% of second 
event cases. In Panel B, we find that parents perform spin-off and sell-off achieve limited 
efficiency improvement in years (-2, +2) or (-3, +3) and no valuation gains at all. Parents either 
re-acquiring their offspring or retaining their ECO status significantly improve their investment 
efficiency and valuation consistently over the windows (-2, +2) years and (-3, +3) years. 
Especially, we find that the magnitude of excess value change for the re-acquisition group is 
higher than the retention group. The results suggest that parents who have made such gains 
exercise their call option and re-acquire the offspring or maintain the ECO status as it continues 
to yield significant benefits to the parents. It also implies that ECO is a reversible decision 
probably aimed at value discovery when the parent was unsure of the division’s true value 
(Perotti and Rosetto, 2007; Desai et al, 2011). It requires the parent to re-evaluate the potential 
for synergy generation between the two businesses and allows it to re-acquire the offspring 
when the possibility of enhanced productive efficiency of a combined entity through scale/ 
scope economies exceeds the costs associated with re-acquisition. 
                                                          
15 62 parent performs a partial SEO which loosens the control of the parent firm while ECM monitoring is enhanced. 37 of 62 
ECOs have equity retention data after SEO and on average, parent companies dilute 20% of shares in the SEO, and thus we 
classify the partial SEO into the retention group. 
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[Insert Table 3.9 about Here] 
3.5 Conclusion 
Prior studies such as Gertner et al. (2002), Ahn and Denis (2004), Dittmar and 
Shivdasani (2003), and Burch and Nanda (2003) investigate the impact of spin-offs and sell-
offs on the functioning of the internal capital market of the parent company. Our study 
contributes to the literature by considering an alternative mechanism of restructuring, namely, 
equity carve-outs. We adopt the methodology in ÇW and account for the endogeneity of the 
carve-out decision by evaluating the change in the allocative efficiency of the internal capital 
market relative to the change in such efficiency which occurs in a group of control companies 
with similar characteristics and propensity to undertake ECO. Specifically, we account for the 
degree of diversification, size, liquidity, leverage, industry M&A and IPO activity as well as 
industry growth. Importantly, our analysis shows that carve-outs have a positive impact on the 
allocative efficiency of parent companies.  
By accounting for the problem of endogeneity we demonstrate that the relative value 
added and relative investment ratio are enhanced following carve-outs in a significant way and 
that these results are not driven by any inherent characteristics associated with companies that 
choose to perform a carve-out, but by the carve-out itself. Importantly, we also demonstrate 
that the improvement in investment efficiency of parent firms is linked to increased capital 
market scrutiny and board independence as well as reduced board size in these companies 
following carve-outs. Our analysis shows that the enhanced allocative efficiency is further 
related to the fact that CEOs of the parent firms have stronger incentives to act in the best 
interest of shareholders since their compensation contracts are geared more towards non-cash 
based compensation following carve-outs. These findings contribute to the extant literature on 
refocusing by showing that the functioning of the ICM can be enhanced by augmenting the 
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level of monitoring from company outsiders as well as the internal governance mechanisms of 
the business rather than by merely reducing its size or industry diversity.  
Our results contrast with the lack of impact of spin-offs and sell-offs in improving the 
allocative efficiency of conglomerate parents, as reported by ÇW and confirmed by our own 
unreported results16. Our analysis carries important implications for the corporate managers 
who seek to improve the investment efficiency of their companies by demonstrating that carve-
outs could be a more effective mechanism to restructure company operations than spin-offs 
and sell-offs. The reasons for this differential impact on allocative efficiency of alternative re-
focusing strategies merit future research.  
                                                          
16 In unreported results we examine the change in allocative efficiency surrounding spin-offs and sell-offs using the same 
performance metrics as in our current paper. Our results suggest that conglomerates that perform spin-offs are characterized 
by significant levels of investment inefficiency before they embark on refocusing In line with the findings in ÇW, we find 
evidence that the ICM of the parent does not change over the two-year period following spin-offs and sell-offs. We find some 
evidence of deterioration in the investment efficiency of parents during the three-year period following sell-offs but not 
following spin-offs. We also repeat the analysis using the PSM matching procedure and the Heckman bias adjustment 
procedure and find no evidence of significant change in allocative efficiency once endogeneity and sample selection biases are 
allowed for. This lack of impact is consistent with the evidence reported by ÇW. These results are available from the authors. 
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Appendix 3.1: Variable definition 
Variable Description and source of data 
Expected 
relation to 
likelihood of 
ECO  
Equity_carve-out (ECO) Dummy variable that is equal to one if the company performs a carve-out and zero otherwise. (Source: SDC) N/A 
Assets Total assets of the conglomerate company.* (Source: Compustat) N/A 
Investment 
Measures the capital expenditures of the conglomerate divided by the total sales in the year prior to carve-out completion.* 
(Source: Compustat) 
N/A 
Number_of_segments Number of segments of the conglomerate company.* (Source: Compustat)  
Tobin’s q 
The numerator of q is calculated as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalisation minus 
deferred taxes.* The denominator of q equals the book value of assets.* (Source: Compustat) 
 
Relative_entropy 
For a firm operating in n industry segments, this takes into consideration (i) number of segments in which it operates, and (ii) 
relative importance of each segment in total sales. If Pi is the share of the ith segment in total sales, then DT = ∑ [Pi*ln (
1
Pi
)]Ni=1  
(Palepu, 1985; Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).* 
(Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Debt/Assets 
A positive proxy for scope and incentive to expropriate debt holders and benefit stock holders. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; 
Parrino, 1997). Debt = long-term debt/ net assets.* (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Log_sales (Size) 
Parent size proxy and measure of likelihood of ECO (Haynes, Thompson, and Wright, 2003). Measured as natural logarithm 
of Net Sales.* (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Market_share  Parent sales/3-digit (primary SIC-code) industry sales. Parent primary SIC code defined by Compustat.* (Source: Compustat) + 
Financing_gap 
Proxy for parent’s need for cash to finance future investment activities (Lang et al., 1995). (Cash flow plus net debt issued 
minus net capital expenditure)/Net sales.* (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
EBITDA/Sales A parent firm liquidity is measured as EBITDA/Net sales. (Source: Compustat) - 
Largest_segment_profit  
Proxy for positive demand shock (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002) operating profits of firm’s largest segment/ its net sales.* 
(Source: Compustat) 
+ 
Industry_sales_growth 
Two-year industry sales growth measured as of year of carve-out completion, at parent’s primary two-digit industry SIC code 
level and a proxy for unanticipated shifts in industry prospects (Çolak and Whited, 2007). (Source: Compustat) 
+ 
M&A_activity 
Positive proxy for liquidity of market for corporate assets (Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002). Value of all mergers, 
acquisitions, and acquisitions of majority interest (as defined by the SDC Platinum Database) in parent firm’s two-digit industry 
and normalized by that industry’s market capitalization.** (Source: SDC) 
+ 
IPO_activity 
Positive proxy for liquidity of market for new equity issues (Schlingeman et al., 2002). Market value of IPOs in parent firm’s 
primary two-digit SIC code industry and normalized by that industry’s market capitalization.** (Source: SDC) 
+ 
MTBV Market value of parent equity/ book value of equity as of one year before ECO completion.*  (Source: Compustat) +/- 
RINV 
Measure of whether the parent allocates capital to relatively high-growth i.e. high q segments. Low allocative efficiency could 
motivate an ECO (Çolak and Whited, 2007). See Appendix 3.2 for description and formulae used to calculate this variable. 
- 
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The numerator of q is calculated as the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalisation minus 
deferred taxes.* The denominator of q equals the book value of assets.* (Source: Compustat) 
RVA 
Measure of whether the parent’s capital allocation to a segment is correlated with the industry median q. Low allocative 
efficiency could motivate an ECO (Çolak and Whited, 2007). See Appendix 3.2 for description and formulae used to calculate 
this variable.* (Source: Compustat) 
- 
Excess_value (EXVAL) 
Indirect proxy for allocative efficiency measured as the parent’s market value of equity to sales ratio relative 3-digit SIC 
industry median adjusted market to sales ratio of segments in which parent operates. Low allocative efficiency could motivate 
ECO (Çolak and Whited, 2007). See Appendix 3.2 for description and formulae used to calculate this variable.* (Source: 
Compustat) 
- 
Board_duality  
Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO of firm is also chairman of the board of directors and zero otherwise.* (Source: 
BoardEx, Edgar 
- 
Board_size  Number of board directors.* (Source: BoardEx and SEC Edgar) - 
Board_indep.  
Number of non-executive directors/number of executive directors (Non-executive directors is used in BoardEx).* (Source: 
BoardEx ans SEC Edgar) 
+ 
Number_of_instit._ 
investors 
Number of institutional investors with a minimum of 5% ownership present on the company’s share register (The institutional 
investor information is obtained by researching proxy statements).* (Source: SEC Edgar) 
+ 
Share_of_instit._ 
investors 
Proportion of shares owned by institutional investors.* (Source: SEC Edgar) 
+ 
CEO_comp. 
Total compensation of CEO in millions USD (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Feldman, 2016).* ).* (Source: BoardEx, Execucomp, 
and SEC Edgar) 
 
CEO_cash_comp. Sum of salary and bonus (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Feldman, 2016).* (Source: BoardEx, Execucomp, and SEC Edgar) +/- 
CEO_non-cash_comp. 
CEO’s total compensation minus his/her cash compensation (Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Feldman, 2016).* (Source: BoardEx, 
Execucomp, and SEC Edgar) 
+ 
CEO_tenure Number of years since the CEO was appointed to that position.* (Source: BoardEx, Execucomp, Edgar) + 
Analyst_coverage 
Analyst coverage for a given year calculated as average of the monthly number of analysts who cover the given stock (Gilson 
et al., 2001).* (Source: IBES) 
+ 
Note: * means as of the company’s fiscal year end taken from its annual financial statements; ** means as of the end of the calendar year preceding the ECO. 
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Appendix 3.2: Definitions of RINV, RVA and EXVAL 
We compute RINV as follows. We first calculate the median q of the pure play (i.e. single-segment) companies 
operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as a segment of the parent portfolio and then rank the segments by 
size of these q’s. Suppose the first k segments have industry median q’s greater than the sales-weighted average 
of all the segments’ industry median q’s. Let Sj be the sales of segment j, 𝑤𝑗  be the proportion of company sales 
made by segment j, 𝐼𝑗 be the capital expenditure of segment j, and (
I
S
)
j
SS
 be the capital expenditure to sales ratio 
of the median pure play company operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as segment j. Then, RINV is 
calculated as: 
 
RINVS≡ ∑ wj
k
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Ij
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- (
I
S
)
j
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- ∑ wi 
n
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I
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S
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S
)
i
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 where 
[
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
]                                                                                                                                                                (2) 
represents investment to sales ratio of segment j adjusted by its industry median and 
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
- ∑ wi 
n
i=1 [
Ii
Si
- (
I
S
)
i
SS
]                                                                                                                                     (3) 
represents the industry- and firm-adjusted investment to sales ratio. Eq. (1) implies that, after adjusting for 
industry- and firm-investment levels, RINVS will be higher when companies invest more in their high-q segments, 
i.e. when they are more efficient.  
If 𝑞𝑗 is the industry median q of segment j, the relative value-added measure that uses sales as the denominator of 
each ratio, RVA is: 
RVA= ∑ wj(qj-q̅)
n
j=1 {
Ij
Sj
- (
I
S
)
j
SS
- ∑ wi 
n
i=1 [
Ii
Si
- (
I
S
)
i
SS
]}                                                                                                (4) 
where ?̅?  is the sales-weighted average of all of the segment industry median q’s. To help understand the 
interpretation of RVA let us assume that we have a conglomerate firm where the sales of the different segments 
are all the same. In this case RVA represents the covariance between industry-adjusted segment investment and 
industry median q. Since the different conglomerate segments have typically different segment levels RVA can be 
thought of as the sales-weighted covariance between investment and q. Higher values of RVA indicate higher 
levels of investment efficiency. 
This variable is defined as: 
Excess Value= (
V
S
)
i
- ∑ wj (
V
S
)
j
SS
n
j=1                                                                                                                           (5) 
where 𝑤𝑗  is the proportion of company sales made by segment j, (
V
S
)
j
SS
is the median market value of equity to 
sales ratio for the three digit SIC-industry in which segment j operates, and (
V
S
)
𝑖
is the market value to sales ratio 
for the entire conglomerate. Higher values of EXVAL demonstrate improvements in company valuation. EXVAL 
is, however, an indirect measure of investment efficiency and could be influenced by other value-relevant factors 
affecting the firm and not just change in investment efficiency.
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Appendix 3.3: A note on the Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching procedure 
We discuss the general problem of obtaining consistent treatment effect estimates here. Let T be a variable which 
takes the value of one if a company decides to perform a carve-out and zero otherwise. Let 𝑆𝑛(𝑇) be the level of 
investment efficiency as a function of T for observation n. Using this notation, 𝐸(𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) represent the 
expected effect of restructuring (the treatment) on the group of refocusing firms (treated group). Likewise, 
𝐸(𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) represents the counterfactual expected effect of deciding not to refocus, given that the firm 
engaged in refocusing (i.e. treatment took place). In our analysis we examine the change in 𝑆𝑛(𝑇) relative to its 
level before the refocusing, which is denoted as ∆𝑆𝑛(𝑇). By taking the change in the investment efficiency we are 
able to control for time-invariant and unobservable differences between the refocusing and non-refocusing 
(control) subsamples. This procedure is similar to differencing to remove fixed effects in a panel data set.  
We estimate the average impact of the decision to refocus on investment efficiency for a group of companies that 
actually decided to refocus, i.e. the average treatment impact on the treated: 
θ|𝑇=1 ≡ 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1) − ∆𝑆𝑛(0)|𝑇 = 1        (1) 
Since we cannot directly measure the effect of both the decision to refocus and the decision not to refocus on the 
same company, 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) represents a hypothetical event that cannot be observed. 
Previous studies on the impact of refocusing on company investment efficiency have measured: 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1)            (2) 
by averaging the difference in investment efficiency for refocusing companies before and after the refocusing 
event. The problem with this method is that, in any case apart from when𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) = 0. The latter 
situation would happen if the companies that actually engaged in refocusing would not have experienced any 
change in investment efficiency in the absence of the refocusing. This condition would only be true if the act of 
refocusing is the sole way to enhance investment efficiency or if the refocusing companies have no other 
characteristics that impact investment efficiency. The first requirement is false and the second one is a matter that 
can be determined only empirically.  
We need to make certain assumptions to estimate the unobservable part of the function: 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1). The 
typical assumption in the treatment effects literature is that allocation to treatment is random, dependent on a 
group of observable pre-treatment characteristics (i.e. observable variables that distinguish between refocusing 
and non-refocusing firms), Z. Simple matching procedures use this assumption by matching each treated 
observation to one or more untreated observations with similar pre-treatment characteristics, Z. Then, 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) is estimated by taking the average of ∆𝑆𝑛(0)  over the matches (control subsample). This 
makes it possible to obtain an estimate of θ|𝑇=1  by taking the difference between ∆𝑆𝑛(1)  and estimate of 
𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1). This type of treatment effect estimation is usually performed without replacement (Dehejia 
and Wahba, 1999).  
Simple matching estimators described above are asymptotically biased when the vector of company characteristics 
Z contains more than one variable. When the matches of treated and non-treated observations are not exact, the 
treatment effects estimator is asymptotically biased. Abadie and Imbens (2006) (AI) introduce matching with 
replacement to minimise the asymptotic bias and estimate a term that corrects for the bias. The bias correction is 
only necessary for the estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(0)| 𝑇 = 1) as the term 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) can be observed directly and 
is an estimate of the difference between two components. The first component is the impact of treatment on the 
control subsample with perfect matching. The second component is the actual impact of treatment on the control 
subsample. To obtain these two terms it is necessary to estimate the conditional expectation of ∆𝑆𝑛(0) given 𝑍𝑛 
which is given by regressing ∆𝑆𝑛(0)  on 𝑍𝑛  based on the control subsample. To estimate the conditional 
expectation, we need to take 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑛) ≡ 𝛽0̂ + 𝛽1̂𝑍𝑛, where 𝛽0̂, a scalar, and 𝛽1̂, a vector with the same dimension 
as 𝑍𝑛, are the estimated coefficients from the regression. The bias corrected estimate of 𝐸(∆𝑆𝑛(1)| 𝑇 = 1) is 
equal to the simple regression estimate presented above plus a component which we denote as 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑛) − 𝜔0̂(𝑍𝑖). 
This component is defined as the difference between the predicted values of ∆𝑆𝑛(0) using a group of controls for 
the nth treated observation and the group of controls for its associated match. 
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Table 3.1: Sample statistics 
 Panel A: Sample distribution over time 
Notes: The sample covers the period 1980 - 2013. 
Panel B: Financial characteristics of ECO parents and non-refocusing firms 
Variable 
ECO 
Mean (A) 
Controls 
Mean (B) 
Difference A-
B 
(t-stat) 
ECO 
Median 
Controls 
Median 
Difference A-B 
(Pearson chi2) 
Assets 34,662 33,077 1,585*** 
(11.821) 
3,786 5,613 -1,827 
(1.232) 
Investment 0.078 0.057 0.021*** 
(3.730) 
0.057 0.045 0.012 
(1.491) 
Number_of_segments 4.09 2.63 1.46*** 
(2.833) 
4.00 2.00 2.00** 
(2.362) 
Log_sales 8.077 5.056 3.021*** 
(21.672) 
7.275 5.084 2.191*** 
(149.3) 
MTBV 2.113 2.074 0.039** 
(2.023) 
1.646 1.380 0.266*** 
(18.609) 
Debt/Assets 0.287 0.205 0.082*** 
(10.058) 
0.271 0.182 0.089*** 
(94.210) 
EBITDA/Sales 0.156 0.092 0.064*** 
(6.473) 
0.142 0.101 0.041*** 
(21.840) 
Relative_entropy 0.930 0.598 0.332*** 
(11.305) 
0.970 0.622 0.348*** 
(49.984) 
RVA -0.001 -0.022 0.021* 
(1.650) 
-0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001*** 
(18.724) 
RINV -0.0004 -0.006 0.006** 
(2.228) 
-0.0002 0.0003 -0.0005*** 
(17.580) 
EXVAL -0.330 0.180 -0.510*** 
(-2.737) 
-0.119 0.0648 -0.184*** 
(10.467) 
Financing_gap 0.089 0.020 0.069*** 
(5.384) 
0.064 0.049 0.015*** 
(8.270) 
IPO_activity 0.003 0.004 -0.0002 
(-0.550) 
0.0008 0.0003 0.0005*** 
(2.703) 
M&A_activity 0.076 0.150 -0.074 
(-1.078) 
0.041 0.039 0.002 
(0.020) 
Industry_sales_growth -0.030 0.024 -0.055*** 
(-7.359) 
0.025 0.031 -0.006*** 
(2.613) 
Market_share 0.095 0.048 0.047*** 
(7.701) 
0.056 0.005 0.051*** 
(126.877) 
Largest_segment_profit 0.073 0.099 -0.026** 
(-2.178) 
0.100 0.081 0.019** 
(4.655) 
Sample size 354 3,695  354 3,695  
Notes: The sample covers the period 1980 - 2013. Assets are measured in millions of U.S. dollars. T-stats are 
provided for the mean comparison tests and Pearson chi2 statistics are provided for the median comparison tests 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
Year Frequency by year Percent 
1980s 68 19.2% 
1990s 149 42.08% 
After 2000 137 38.69% 
Total 354 100% 
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Panel C: Additional ECO characteristics 
Statistics 
Equity_ 
retained 
Market_value_of_E
CO (Million USD) 
Market_Value_of_ 
Parent (Million USD) 
Total_proceeds 
(Million USD) 
SameSIC3 ECO 
Different SIC2 
ECO 
Same SIC2 but different 
SIC3 ECO 
Mean 66.50% 2,519.159 21,178.497 584.925 - - - 
Median 72.00% 311.400 5,649.530 96.855 - - - 
Sample Size 184 259 244 354 155 115 84 
Notes: The sample covers the period 1980 - 2013.
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Table 3.2 : Probit model of likelihood of equity carve-out  
Variable Coefficients Marginal Effects 
Log_sales 0.218*** 0.001*** 
 (13.37) (9.788) 
MTBV 0.029** 0.007** 
 (2.268) (2.284) 
EBITDA/Sales 0.103 0.002 
 (0.940) (0.692) 
Debt/Assets 0.228*** 0.003*** 
 (9.891) (7.331) 
Relative_entropy 0.321*** 0.001*** 
 (5.554) (4.147) 
RVA 0.281 0.001 
 (0.907) (0.443) 
RINV -0.012 -0.004 
 (-0.137) (-1.228) 
EXVAL 0.004 0.0008 
 (0.656) (0.079) 
Financing_gap -0.089 -0.002 
 (-1.035) (-0.258) 
IPO_activity 5.029** 0.059*** 
 (2.577) (3.291) 
M&A_activity -0.231 -0.002 
 (-1.325) (-1.481) 
Industry_sales_growth -0.355* -0.007* 
 (-1.837) (-1.939) 
Market_share -0.416** -0.001** 
 (-2.215) (-2.482) 
Largest_segment_profit -0.326** -0.003** 
 (-2.277) (-2.397) 
Sample of carve-outs 354 
3,695 
0.329 
Control sample 
Pseudo R2 
Notes: RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined according to Eqs. (1), (4) and (5) in Appendix 3.2. For definitions of 
other variables see Appendxi 3.1. T-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 3.3: Covariates Balance 
Notes: T-stats are provided for the mean comparison tests and Pearson chi2 statistics are provided for the median 
comparison tests in parentheses. The matched sample is obtained following Abadie and Imbens (2006). ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Variable name 
Carve-outs 
Mean (A) 
Controls 
Mean (B) 
Difference A-
B 
(t-stat) 
Carve-outs 
Median 
Controls 
Median 
Difference 
A-B 
(Pearson 
chi2) 
Log_Sales 8.077 7.468 
0.609 
(0.741) 
7.275 5.735 
1.540 
(2.372) 
MTBV 2.113 2.006 
0.107 
(0.816) 
1.646 1.467 
0.179 
(1.582) 
Debt/Assets 0.287 0.237 
0.050 
(1.258) 
0.271 0.281 
-0.010 
(1.283) 
Relative_entropy 0.930 0.933 
-0.003 
(-0.660) 
0.970 0.940 
0.030 
(1.431) 
Market_share 0.095 0.097 
-0.002 
(-1.149) 
0.056 0.061 
-0.005 
(1.390) 
Largest_segment_ 
profit 
0.073 0.080 
-0.007 
(-1.180) 
0.100 0.108 
-0.008 
(0.188) 
Sample size 354 354  354 354  
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Table 3.4: Change in investment efficiency and firm value of parents following ECO 
Panel A: Change in allocative efficiency (-2, +2) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.025) (-0.914) 
After 0.018** 0.007*** 0.241 
 (2.571) (3.531) (1.303) 
Change 0.018** 0.008*** 0.571** 
 (2.545) (4.147) (3.440) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.011 0.009* -0.147 
 (1.069) (1.801) (-0.817) 
Panel B: Change in allocative efficiency (-3, +3) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.023) (-0.914) 
After 0.011 0.004*** -0.644 
 (0.164) (4.013) (-0.974) 
Change 0.012 0.005** -0.314 
 (0.203) (2.524) (-0.502) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.098 0.002 0.529*** 
 (0.685) (0.511) (3.977) 
Notes: RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined in Appendix 3.2. Sample size is 354 ECO parents and 354 control 
firms. The control sample is selected using the Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching procedure. Before is the 
average for each conglomerate company over a period starting two (or three) years before and ending one year 
before the completion of the ECO. The variable After is the average for each conglomerate company over a period 
starting one year after and ending two (or three) years after the completion of the ECO, relative to the average of 
a matched sample. Change is the difference between Before and After. DinD treatment effects are difference 
between change for treated observations and change for corresponding control observations. T-stats are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3.5: ECO effects on investment efficiency and firm value based on propensity score 
matching (PSM) and Heckman methodologies 
Panel A: Treatment effects Adjusted for matched control firm efficiency using the Dehejia and Wahba 
PSM procedure 
Change in allocative efficiency (-2, +2) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.000) (-0.914) 
After 0.013* 0.024** 0.025 
 (1.857) (2.182) (0.926) 
Change 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.355*** 
 (3.500) (5.000) (2.934) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.0231 0.013 0.050* 
 (1.036) (0.500) (1.667) 
Change in allocative efficiency (-3, +3) years event window 
 RINV RVA EXVAL 
Level Treatment Effects    
Before -0.0004 -0.001 -0.330 
 (-0.080) (-1.000) (-0.914) 
After 0.017** 0.025** 0.155** 
 (2.125) (2.273) (2.300) 
Change 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.485*** 
 (4.500) (4.333) (2.580) 
DinD Treatment Effects    
DinD 0.028* 0.002** 0.0603* 
 (1.867) (2.222) (1.774) 
Notes: Panel A and Panel B present the results of analysis of the effects of carve-outs on investment efficiency 
and firm value of parents. RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined in Appendix 3.2. Sample size is 354 ECO parents 
and 354 control firms. The control sample is selected using the Dahejia and Wahba PSM procedure.  Before is the 
average for each conglomerate company over a period starting two (or three) years before and ending one year 
before the completion of the ECO. The variable After is the average for each conglomerate company over a period 
starting one year after and ending two (or three) years after the completion of the ECO, relative to the average of 
a matched sample. Change is the difference between Before and After. DinD treatment effects are difference 
between change for treated observations and change for corresponding control observations. T-stats are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
.
 124 
 
Panel B. Heckman bias-adjusted change in investment efficiency and firm value  
Change in allocative efficiency (-2, +2) years event window 
Variable RINV RVA EXVAL 
Heckman_Treated 0.027* 0.001 0.135*** 
 (1.929) (0.200) (5.625) 
Heckman_Controls -0.038*** -0.010*** -0.727** 
 (-3.167) (-2.500) (-2.077) 
InvMills 0.011*** 0.002** 0.224** 
 (3.667) (2.000) (2.113) 
Change in allocative efficiency (-3, +3) years event window 
Variable RINV RVA EXVAL 
Heckman_Treated 0.008** 0.003*** 0.113*** 
 (2.000) (3.000) (5.136) 
Heckman_Controls -0.014*** -0.004*** -0.668*** 
 (-7.000) (-6.667) (-7.506) 
InvMills 0.003*** 0.0004** 0.206*** 
 (4.286) (2.000) (7.103) 
Notes: RINV, RVA and EXVAL are defined in Appendix 3.2. The variables labelled ‘Heckman_Treated’ 
correspond to the sum of (α+β
1
) in the regression, ∆ Investment Efficiency= α + β
1
Di + β2InvMills + εi, where 
‘∆ Investment Efficiency’ is the change in investment efficiency, Di is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
sample company performs carve-out and 0 otherwise, ‘InvMills’ is the coefficient on the variable used to adjust 
for self-selection bias in the Heckman regression. ‘Heckman_Controls’ is value of α in the Heckman regression. 
T-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Governance characteristics of ECO parents 
Panel A: Event window (-2, +2) years  
Variable 
Board_ 
duality 
Board_ 
size 
Board_ 
indep. 
Number_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
Share_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
CEO_ 
comp.  
 
CEO_ 
cash_ 
comp.  
CEO_ 
non-cash_ 
comp. 
 
CEO_ 
tenure 
Analyst_ 
coverage 
Before_p 0.553*** 11.529*** 4.948*** 1.979*** 0.190*** 4.899*** 1.822*** 3.153*** 5.920*** 11.021*** 
 (12.61) (20.899) (18.767) (11.868) (11.187) (8.264) (10.874) (6.034) (9.639) (16.488) 
After_p 0.541*** 11.131*** 5.534*** 2.107*** 0.179*** 6.244*** 1.856*** 4.372*** 5.560*** 16.441*** 
 (12.357) (22.744) (19.971) (10.879) (10.084) (9.024) (10.177) (6.894) (15.148) (19.184) 
Change_p -0.012 -0.398** 0.586*** 0.127 -0.011 1.345*** 0.034 1.218*** -0.359 5.420*** 
 (-0.467) (-2.610) (3.098) (1.052) (-0.857) (3.356) (0.294) (2.906) (-0.614) (12.297) 
Sample size 122 122 122 98 98 123 123 123 157 147 
Panel B: Event window (-3, +3) years 
Variable 
Board_ 
duality 
Board_ 
size 
Board_ 
indep. 
Number_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
Share_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
CEO_ 
comp.  
 
CEO_ 
cash_ 
comp.  
CEO_ 
non-cash_ 
comp. 
 
CEO_ 
tenure 
Analyst_ 
coverage 
Before_p 0.585*** 11.851*** 4.962*** 2.300*** 0.190*** 3.786*** 1.642*** 2.172*** 6.270*** 11.017*** 
 (12.840) (17.330) (17.126) (12.723) (10.104) (9.714) (10.268) (6.555) (10.192) (15.169) 
After_p 0.599*** 11.387*** 5.678*** 2.371*** 0.177*** 5.394*** 1.850*** 3.560*** 5.932*** 17.108*** 
 (13.583) (18.414) (19.011) (11.232) (9.192) (9.524) (9.909) (6.803) (14.580) (18.187) 
Change_p 0.014 -0.464*** 0.716*** 0.070 -0.013 1.607*** 0.208* 1.387*** -0.338 6.091*** 
 (0.498) (-2.637) (3.303) (0.452) (-0.888) (3.902) (1.723) (3.307) (-0.538) (12.268) 
Sample size 94 94 94 81 81 102 102 102 127 120 
Notes: Before_p is the average of the given governance characteristic for each conglomerate company over a period starting two (or three) years before and ending one year 
before the completion of the ECO. Similarly, After_p is the average of the given governance variable for each conglomerate company over a period ending two (or three) years 
after the completion of the ECO. The variable Change_p is defined as the difference between Before_p and After_p. T-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   
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Table 3.7: Governance characteristics of ECO offspring  
Panel A: Event window (0, +2) years 
Variable 
Board_ 
duality 
Board_ size 
Board_ 
indep. 
Number_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
Share_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
CEO_ 
comp.  
 
CEO_ 
cash_ 
comp.  
CEO_ 
non-cash_ 
comp. 
 
CEO_ 
tenure 
Analyst_ 
coverage 
Before_o 0.574*** 7.515*** 3.807*** 1.839*** 0.203*** 2.589*** 0.947*** 1.678*** 1.669*** 3.493*** 
 (13.474) (26.870) (18.402) (8.452) (8.662) (6.341) (7.706) (4.627) (4.868) (20.715) 
After_o 0.576*** 8.169*** 4.019*** 2.395*** 0.233*** 2.136*** 0.910*** 1.235*** 3.397*** 6.015*** 
 (13.679) (28.820) (20.610) (10.891) (10.543) (6.566) (9.816) (4.375) (9.803) (16.865) 
Change_o 0.007 0.654*** 0.216** 0.555*** 0.030 -0/453 -0.036 -0.442 1.728*** 2.521*** 
 (0.446) (3.916) (1.978) (3.603) (1.332) ( -1.421) (-0.458) (-1.383) (17.804) (9.285) 
Sample size 136 136 136 81 81 81 81 81 136 206 
Panel B: Event window (0, +3) years 
Variable 
Board_ 
duality 
Board_ size 
Board_ 
indep. 
Number_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
Share_of_ 
instit._ 
investors 
CEO_ 
comp.  
 
CEO__ 
cash_ 
comp.  
CEO_ 
non-cash_ 
comp. 
 
CEO_ 
tenure 
Analyst_ 
coverage 
Before_o 0.587*** 7.611*** 3.923*** 1.855*** 0.189*** 2.665*** 0.996*** 1.710*** 2.616*** 3.467*** 
 (13.054) (25.238) (17.359) (8.981) (7.410) (5.814) (7.035) (4.182) (4.373) (20.201) 
After_o 0.860*** 8.397*** 3.968*** 2.304*** 0.228*** 2.105*** 0.971** 1.143*** 4.849*** 6.259*** 
 (27.095) (28.381) (16.635) (10.453) (9.378) (6.050) (7.9570) (3.840) (8.10) (15.644) 
Change_o 0.273*** 0.785*** 0.045 0.449** 0.039 -0.560 -0.024 -0.478 2.232*** 2.792*** 
 (5.810) (3.670) (0.258) (2.300) (1.506) (-1.535) (-0.179) (-1.582) (6.740) (8.524) 
Sample size 121 121 121 69 69 81 81 81 121 189 
Notes: Before_o is the governance characteristic for each offspring at t = 0. After_o is the governance variable for each offspring in two (or three) years after the completion of 
the ECO. The variable Change_o is defined as the difference between Before_o and After_o T-stats are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.  
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Table 3.8: Impact of changes in governance following ECO on investment efficiency and 
valuation of parents 
 
 Panel A: Analysis of change in investment efficiency and valuation over the event window (-2, +2) years 
Panel B: Analysis of change in investment efficiency and valuation over the event window (-3, +3) years 
Variable 
(1) Change_ 
in_RINV 
(2) Change_ 
in_ RVA 
(3) Change_ 
In_EXVAL 
Change_in_Analyst_coverage 0.195 0.0161 15.36** 
 (0.804) (1.061) (2.573) 
Change_in_Board_indep. 0.0340** 0.0236*** 0.159** 
 (2.224) (2.942) (2.252) 
Change_in_Board_size -0.219 -0.0406** -9.129** 
 (-0.193) (-2.549) (-2.095) 
Change_in_Board_duality -0.089 0.0575 -0.111** 
 (-0.719) (1.116) (-2.055) 
Change_in_CEO_non-cash_comp. 0.0136 0.0307*** 0.829*** 
 (1.108) (2.812) (3.333) 
Change_in_CEO_cash_comp. -0.002 -0.001 0.212 
 (-0.451) (-0.808) (0.651) 
Sample size 81 81 81 
R2 0.181 0.253 0.183 
Notes: The dependent variable in each model is the change in investment efficiency (RINV in Model 1 and RVA 
in Model 2) or valuation (EXVAL in Model 3) adjusted by the change in the matched control firm where each 
control firm is identified using the AI matching estimator. The independent variables in each model are also 
adjusted by the change in the matched control firm sample where each control firm is identified using the AI 
matching procedure. T-stats are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(1) Change_ 
in_RINV 
(2) Change_ 
in_ RVA 
(3) Change_ 
In_EXVAL 
Change_in_Analyst_coverage 0.715*** 0.002 6.034*** 
 (4.129) (0.979) (3.407) 
Change_in_Board_indep. 0.005 0.188* 0.041 
 (0.049) (1.937) (0.862) 
Change_in_Board_size -0.241*** -0.151 -0.984** 
 (-2.813) (-0.799) (-2.301) 
Change_in_Board_duality -0.025 -0.799* -0.897*** 
 (-1.811) (-1.848) (-2.920) 
Change_in_CEO_non-cash_comp. 0.002*** 0.015* 0.003** 
 (3.551) (1.957) (2.235) 
Change_in_CEO_cash_comp. 0.004*** 0.003* 0.019 
 (2.953) (1.789) (1.078) 
Sample size 93 93 93 
R2 0.377 0.315 0.261 
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Table 3.9: Secondary Events Analysis 
Event Number (%) of ECO 
Spin-off 30 (8.5%) 
Sell-off 82 (23.2%) 
Re-acquisition 105 (29.6%) 
Retention 137 (38.7%) 
Total 354 (100%) 
Notes: To identify the secondary events of the carve-out, we follow Slovin and Sushka (1998), Otsubo (2009) and 
Colla et al. (2009) and divide the secondary events into four groups. Spin-off is the event where the parent 
company distributes all shares of the offspring to its shareholders. Sell-off is the merger and acquisition event in 
which the parent sells the carve-out entity to the third party. Re-acquisition means that parent reacquires the part 
or all outstanding shares of the carve-out firm. In the secondary equity offering, parent company sells all or a part 
of shares of the carve-out the public market. We firstly search the SDC Global New Issues database to identity 
the SEO event and the spin-off event and then search SDC Merger and Acquisition database to identify the 
subsequent sell-off event and re-acquisition event. The Retention sub-sample represents cases where the status 
quo post ECO is retained and there is no subsequent secondary event and the cases of SEO. 
  
 Panel B: Average change in measures of investment efficiency and secondary events  
Notes: The dependent variable in each model is the change in investment efficiency (RINV in Model 1 and RVA 
in Model 2) or valuation (EXVAL in Model 3) adjusted by the change in the matched control firm where each 
control firm is identified using the AI matching estimator. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event Change_in_RINV  Change_in_RVA   Change_in_ EXVAL 
 (-2, +2) 
years 
(-3, +3) 
years 
 (-2, +2) 
years 
(-3, +3) 
years 
 (-2, +2) 
years 
(-3, +3) 
years 
Spin-off  0.011 0.014*  0.0002 0.008**  -0.018 -0.028** 
 (0.993) (1.880)  (1.531) (2.644)  (-0.915) (-2.174) 
Sell-off 0.002 0.005  0.016** 0.003**  -0.032 -0.017 
 (1.192) (0.635)  (2.302) (2.509)  (-0.804) (-1.541) 
Reacquisition 0.018* 0.014**  0.007*** 0.005***  0.054** 0.049** 
 (1.966) (2.522)  (2.668) (2.948)  (2.183) (2.183) 
Retention  0.024*** 0.012***  0.008*** 0.006***  0.023** 0.014* 
 (6.478) (3.092)  (2.694) (2.796)  (2.165) (1.837) 
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